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Abstract 
China has experienced more than three decades of dramatic urbanisation. The 
process is associated with the expansion of urban built-up areas into formerly 
rural areas. Urban villages, a kind of slum-like informal settlement, are formed 
when farmland is requisitioned, with the rural residential land left on which 
indigenous villagers construct and rent large houses with substandard conditions 
for low-income rural migrants. Since urban villages have created many problems 
and urban development faces a lack of land supply, these villages are listed on the 
government’s agenda for regeneration.  
The practice of urban village redevelopment has proven to be controversial. It 
soon caused more social problems and attracted attention from academia. This 
research seeks to understand and analyse how different groups of stakeholders 
interact with each other in the process of property requisition and compensation, 
how decisions are made and how conflicts are generated and resolved. The 
research focuses on stakeholders’ practices at a micro-level. The case study 
approach is selected, and the case is an urban village in Xiamen, China. Qualitative 
methods, mainly semi-structured interviews, participant observation and 
document analysis, are used to generate data. Qualitative analysis is adopted to 
analyse data and a social capital framework is applied to theorise the findings.  
Empirical findings from the case suggest that there are two major factors 
influencing the processes and dynamics of urban village redevelopment. The first 
is competing interests among different groups of stakeholders arising from the 
policies formulated by the governing authorities. The second is villagers’ 
misinterpretation of the development process and policies, due to villagers’ lack of 
proper education and the limited participation mechanisms within the 
redevelopment programme. A democratic reform is needed in such programmes 
that require requisition and demolition approaches in the future to reduce the 
conflicts and enable them to be addressed more effectively and justly.  
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Chapter One - Introduction 
1.1 Research Background 
China’s dramatic development and urbanisation have achieved some significant 
outcomes. The country now ranks as the world’s second largest economic entity, 
with more than 50 per cent of the population now classified as urban. Nevertheless, 
at the same time, many problems have arisen. The tension between authority and 
ordinary people, especially the vulnerable, has reached a critical level. Many 
factors are responsible for this situation. One is associated with the expansion of 
urban areas into previously rural areas. Urban constructions require land, and the 
government has focused on land supply mainly through rural land requisition for 
decades, instead of urban land renewal. Considerable areas of rural land have been 
purchased from rural collectives by the state at a cheap price. In the first stage, 
only agriculture land is requisitioned, while rural residential developments are 
kept intact, to bypass costly resettlement for indigenous villagers. But in the 
second stage, when the remaining residential land has been developed into 
problematic urban villages, and the government shifts the focus of land supply 
from expansion to renewal, the redevelopment of urban villages has become very 
important in government policy agendas. In this thesis urban villages are defined 
as a kind of informal settlements, characterised as congested large-scale 
substandard houses built in an absence of regulations, owned by indigenous 
villagers and situated on their rural collective land. In practice, redevelopment 
programmes prove to be controversial due to the conflicts of interest between 
different groups of stakeholders. Urban village developments have generated new 
social problems and have attracted attentions from the academia. This research 
seeks to add to this academic knowledge by understanding the micro-practices 
through which different groups of stakeholders interact with each other in the 
process of urban village redevelopment and why these practices are constructed, 
enacted and implemented and how the conflicts arising from them are addressed.   
The question of why this research matters needs to be answered. First, urban 
villages, as places integrated with both urban and rural elements and impacts, are 
considered as epitomising to the changing societal and economic form of Chinese 
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cities, e.g. the development over 50 years of Nan-ching village in Guangzhou (Zhou 
and Gao, 2001). They have played (and continue to play) a crucial role during 
China’s dramatic social and economic transition from an agricultural country to 
the world’s manufactory. As Wang et al (2009: 968) argue, urban villages “have 
changed the simple rural–urban division of Chinese society and diversified the 
social, economic and spatial composition of the country”. Urban villages contribute 
considerable land for urbanisation and industrialisation. Furthermore, houses 
built in urban villages offer large-scale affordable accommodation to shelter very 
large numbers of low-income rural migrants in urban areas, who constitute the 
cheap labour force for both manufacturing and low-end services. Without the 
examination of urban villages, it is not possible to truly understand the holistic 
context of China’s development.  
Second, urban village redevelopment programmes involve diverse groups of social 
actors, mainly the local governments, the developers and villagers and this 
research provides an accessible opportunity to investigate the interaction of three 
important forces that shape the urban governance at grass-roots level. In the 
reform era, the socialist-style urban governance – imposing hierarchical control 
via the party-state, work-units and Hukou system (a household registration system 
used as a technique to restrict social mobility) – was shaken by new elements that 
emerged within the marketization process, such as changes in people’s 
organisation, capital and production materials, and their replacement by new 
territorial organisations, e.g. municipality, urban districts, Street Offices and 
Residents’ Committees to form a new system of urban governance (Wu, 2002).  
Programmes of urban village redevelopment are an ideal lens to examine the new 
urban governance and development through these interactions, on an empirical 
basis. It enables a greater understanding of why a divide between different groups 
of actors develops and why conflicts take place during the practice of urban 
redevelopment programmes and how these conflicts are manifested, experienced 
and explained. So far, although there are many reports and research regarding the 
subject of urban village redevelopment, very few of these studies have explored 
urban village redevelopment processes specifically from this aspect with micro-
level detail. Therefore, more empirical research needs to be done to discover how 
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urban governance and development is applied in the field of urban village 
redevelopment, e.g. what are the policies, their rationales and their 
implementation.  
1.2 Research Aim, Objectives and Questions 
To provide a new aspect to examine issues of how and why conflicts are generated 
in the urban governance and development, the research has the aim of 
understanding and analysing the policies and stakeholders’ interactions at a local 
micro-level during the requisition and demolition process of urban village 
redevelopment, by studying the case of VA Village in Xiamen, China. In terms of the 
study objectives, these focus on two elements– policies and stakeholders. 
Therefore, the objectives are to understand the policy-making, policy-
implementation, stakeholders’ decision-making and actions. To be more specific, 
the objectives are:  
a) To understand the contemporary situation of urban village redevelopment, 
policies, policy-making and policy-implementation in terms of the requisition and 
demolition process of rural properties by the developer and the government; 
b) To understand participants’ decision-making process in the programme, their 
interactions, the conflicts and tensions generated in the process and their 
outcomes; 
c) To develop theory, provide empirical evidence and analysis, methodological 
reflection and policy implications for future researchers and policy-makers; 
Consequently, the research questions to be addressed to meet the objectives are:  
a) What is the contemporary situation of the development of urban villages, in 
terms of the requisition and demolition process of rural properties? How are 
policies made? What are the aims, rationales, and the practice of policies and the 
outcomes arising from them?  
b) Why is public participation included or excluded in policies and decision-
making process, and how is it manifested (or not) either in formal or informal 
ways?  
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c) How do different groups of stakeholders interpret the policies? What are their 
interests? How does the developer employ strategies, if any, in dealing with the 
policies?  
d) How are decisions made within different groups of stakeholders? What and how 
are actions taken by them to interact with others? How do participants take 
advantage of their power and resources to achieve their goals? How do all of these 
affect the policy-making process and shape the development of the programme?  
e) Why do tensions and conflicts exist or not exist among different groups of 
stakeholders? How are these conflicts and tensions generated in the process?  
f) What lessons can be learned for future urban village redevelopment 
programmes?  
The research has been designed to enable each of these questions to be addressed. 
A case study approach and qualitative methods, mainly in-depth interviews, 
participant observation and document collection, are adopted for data collection in 
the field research. VA Village is selected as the research case. It is an intermediate-
scale urban village located in Xiamen City, Fujian Province, China. Initiated in 2008, 
the programme in VA Village had been implemented for nearly five years by the 
end of the field research in May 2013. The long-term process enriched the content 
of the programme and made it an ideal case for the investigator to examine the 
above research questions.  
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis consists of eight chapters in total. Chapter One is this introduction. 
Chapter Two summarizes the existing literature from relevant fields. Section 2.1 
provides an introduction. Section 2.2 begins with an overview of the history of 
urban regeneration in west Europe and China. In recent years, urban village 
redevelopment became an increasingly important topic since the Chinese 
government had shifted the focus to it from urban expansion, in terms of land 
supply. Section 2.3 continues to introduce two types of urban village study. The 
first type explores the characteristics of urban villages, and the second type 
focuses on the regeneration of urban villages. Empirical evidence from the 
literature shows that the practice of urban village redevelopment is controversial. 
5 
 
The conflict of interests among different groups of stakeholders is seen as the key 
issue. Section 2.4 summarises the available evidence and thinking about issues of 
collective resistance in China.  
Chapter Three provides an account of the methodology, a discussion of the 
research design and the practice of the field research. Section 3.2 presents the 
research design and methods. A case study approach and qualitative methods, 
mainly in-depth interviews, participant observation and document collection, are 
adopted for data generation. Qualitative analysis is taken for data analysis. VA 
Village at Xiamen City is selected as the case, since the village fits the case study 
selection criteria and the programme had functioned for years and accumulated 
rich experience that enables the investigator to yield the expected data. Section 3.3 
focuses on the field research. It began with the preparatory work, which aimed to 
understand the village’s context, identify potential stakeholders, and prepare for 
subsequent interviews. Some challenges emerged in contacting and interviewing 
informants. Eventually, the investigator collected the required data from the 
decision makers of the ordinary villagers, and company representatives, but did 
not manage to gain access to and generate useful data from the villagers’ 
committee or government representatives. Audio recordings were transcribed. 
Then all the data was analysed via coding, sorting and integration to form the 
framework and key themes of the thesis.  
Chapter Four aims to review social capital theory briefly, and then discusses how it 
is applied as the thesis’s theoretical framework. The review in Section 4.2 covers 
Bourdieu’s, Coleman’s and Putnam’s conceptualizations of the theory and the key 
contemporary criticism of them. Section 4.3 introduces the theory’s application in 
the field of urban regeneration, and the consequent strengths and weaknesses. 
Section 4.4 continues to develop and present the theoretical framework used by 
the research. Finally, the framework of eight domains identified by Forrest and 
Kearns (2001), three types of social capital and different elements of Bourdieu’s, 
Coleman’s and Putnam’s conceptualizations of social capital are adopted to 
construct the framework to structure the investigation and analysis.  
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Chapters Five, Six and Seven present the analysis and empirical findings. Chapter 
Five introduces the context of the government and the developer through the 
analysis of their policies and strategies respectively. Section 5.2 briefly discusses 
general policies – policies of or above district-level. It shows that the policy-
making is a top-down process. The high level officials establish the basic 
framework and principles, while the lower levels of authority subsequently 
populate this based on localised contextual details. The key idea of policies is to 
ensure the state’s control and interest within rural land redevelopment. Section 
5.3 firstly explores the programme’s official policies, including policy-making, 
interpretations and objectives. The section continues with the analysis of the 
developer’s Strategy One at the first stage of the programme. The idea of 
replicating a successful scheme from a nearby programme to this one in order to 
achieve the same success did not work, for it did not adapt the scheme sufficiently 
to take into account VA Village’s specific context, e.g. a better location and higher 
income levels. The practice of granting privileged households extra benefits and 
then combining their power with other available forces to facilitate the process 
failed, since it was challenged by collective resistance from the ordinary villagers. 
The following part of the section is the discussion of Strategy Two at the second 
stage of the programme. It survived under various pressures and gained 
popularity, largely because the new programme manager found a way to balance 
the interests and aims of different groups of stakeholders. The analysis of the 
programme’s budget control confirmed that the idea of the new strategy was to 
return all the developer’s potential profits to affected households as compensation. 
Nevertheless, it still faced many challenges to complete the programme.  
Chapter Six elaborates on the context of indigenous villagers from VA Village. They 
are characterised as two distinct groups – the privileged group and the ordinary 
group, represented by the Villager Committee and the leadership of elders 
respectively. Both played an important role in the interaction and influenced the 
process profoundly. Section 6.2 outlines three important characteristics of the 
leadership and decision-makers from the ordinary group. They are composed of 
mainly elder men, with limited education experience but good interpersonal social 
networks and the associated mutual help mechanisms. Section 6.3 reveals three 
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different views of value prevailed among them that affected their decision-makings. 
These concern the permanent property use right, prefer sustainable revenue and 
strong emotional attachments to the village. Section 6.4 illustrates their 
problematic information interpretation through two examples, the prejudicial 
interpretation of an earthquake donation event and drawing false knowledge to 
justify their claim for higher compensation standards. Section 6.5 shifts the focus 
to VA Village Committee. Empirical evidence shows that the elections of the 
committee have been manipulated. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of its 
governance enjoys a high level of legitimacy and acceptance. As a result, the role of 
the committee in the programme seems to be more of an agency of the government, 
rather than an autonomous organisation of villagers. Finally, Section 6.6 theorizes 
the empirical findings within the framework of social capital theory.  
Chapter Seven focuses on actions conducted by stakeholders during the 
programme. Section 7.2 examines the forming of cooperation during the first stage 
of the programme. The close collaboration among the developer, the local 
government and the village committee enabled them to conduct a series of joint 
actions, including the frequent administrative inspections in the village which 
aimed to depress villagers’ rental businesses, and forced demolitions of the elder 
centre and Mr VG’s iron-board house that represented attempts to intimidate the 
villagers. Under the leadership of elders, the ordinary group of villagers also 
formed effective cooperation and conducted many collective actions. They 
appealed to upper-level authorities, hiring lawyers to sue the municipality, and 
undertook collective resistance to defend the properties against the aggressively 
forced demolitions. Section 7.3 turns to the decline of the cooperation. The revised 
new programme scheme gained popularity and reduced the tension between the 
developer and the ordinary group of villagers. It also changed the relationship 
between the developer and the local government, including the village committee. 
Within the ordinary group of villagers, the acceptance of the programme increased 
and the intentions of cooperation declined. Section 7.4 again uses the social capital 
framework to theorize the empirical findings.  
Chapter Eight is the overall conclusion. It briefly summarizes key empirical 
findings. The research finds that, the current institutional system regarding the 
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requisition and demolition of rural properties is made in a top-down approach. It 
ensures the authority’s control and benefit upon the rural development, but 
decreases indigenous villagers’ interests, and restrains the developer’s flexibility in 
adjusting compensation standards based on the programme’s specific context. 
Nevertheless, field research shows that implementers tend to develop their own 
strategies in conducting programmes, rather than strictly practice the 
government’s policies. Conflicts among different stakeholders are generated for 
many factors, e.g. the conflict of interest distribution, the difference of view of 
values and the lack of mutual trust and communication. Empirical evidences 
basically support the theory of social capital. Furthermore, it is reflected that a 
promising approach to conduct this kind of programmes seems to be the one 
suggested by the literature, the villager-led paradigm, in which stakeholders are 
empowered to lead the decision-making process.  
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Chapter Two - Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a detailed literature review of urban regeneration and the 
associated empirical research to date and situates this study within that field of 
research.  Section 2.2 briefly introduces urban regeneration and its relation to the 
redevelopment of urban villages in China. Section 2.3 moves on to consider some 
empirical studies. Specifically, section 2.3.1 focuses on comprehension-oriented 
studies, including discussions on the emergence of urban villages and their 
characteristics. Section 2.3.2 turns to regeneration-oriented studies, summarising 
the main issues in urban village redevelopment and the different approaches used 
to deal with them in practice. Section 2.4 provides an account of the studies on 
collective resistance in China. Finally, in Section 2.5, a summary of the whole 
chapter is provided with the position of the thesis located within the existing 
literature.  
2.2 Urban Regeneration 
Towns and cities face constant changes, including the social problem of urban 
decline characterised by social exclusion, physical decay, worsening living 
conditions and growing unemployment (Medhurst and Lewis, 1969: 2). Urban 
regeneration is understood as an approach to deal with these issues of urban 
decline. Generally, urban regeneration is defined as ‘(a) comprehensive and 
integrated vision and action which leads to the resolution of urban problems and 
which seeks to bring about a lasting improvement in the economic, physical, social 
and environmental condition of an area that has been subject to change’ (Roberts 
and Sykes, 2000: 17). Urban regeneration has become a global phenomenon and 
has been subject to significant coverage in academic and research literature.  
Urban regeneration has experienced a series of evolutions over the past decades 
since the Second World War in Western Europe (Roberts and Sykes, 2000: 14-16). 
In summary, in the 1950s, the practice of urban regeneration focused on ‘repairing 
wartime damage and reconstructing the fabric of towns and cities’, by using 
‘reconstruction and extension of older areas of towns and cities’ and ‘suburban 
growth’. In the 1960s, it continued, but there appeared ‘some early attempts at 
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rehabilitation’. While retaining an emphasis on peripheral development, in the 
1970s, the focus shifted to ‘in-situ renewal and neighbourhood schemes’ and 
emphasized ‘greater co-ordination between the previously separate economic, 
social and physical strands of policy’. In the 1980s, the new policy stance 
underlined the role of partnership, resulting in the private sector replacing the 
central state as the dominant role in  providing resources, under which ‘many 
major schemes of development and redevelopment’, ‘flagship projects’ and ‘out of 
town projects’ were conducted. In the 1990s, the regeneration ‘move(s) towards a 
more comprehensive form of policy and practice’ and ‘more emphasis on 
integrated treatments’, e.g. the acknowledgement of ‘environmentally sustainable 
development’.  
Generally, the traditional practice of urban regeneration has largely been primarily 
based on a property-led mechanism. Although property-based regeneration is 
considered to be necessary, it also suffers from some limitations, especially the 
insufficiency and inadequacy necessary to meet the requirements of multiple tasks 
in urban regeneration (Turok, 1992; Imrie and Thomas, 1993). In recent decades, 
the practices in urban regeneration have become both more strategic and diverse. 
For example, there is an emergence of a culture-led approach that understands 
that culture can be used to boost urban economic growth and enhance the 
competitive position of cities and urban neighbourhoods (Miles and Paddison, 
2005). These evolutions have also resulted in a decline of single-sector and single-
agency approaches because of their limitations, and additionally the rise of multi-
agency approaches, due to the recognition that urban issues have multiple causes 
(Carter, 2000). Specifically, public participation is promoted in urban regeneration 
programmes through the multi-agency partnership model in many countries (e.g. 
Hastings, 1996; Foley and Martin, 2000; Muir, 2004). Participation may be defined 
as ‘the redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently 
excluded from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in 
the future’ (Arnstein, 1969: 216).  
China, however, represents a very different non-Western context for urban 
dynamics and urban policy (Ye, 2011). The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) 
generated a series of problems in urban China.  Since the launch of economic 
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reform in the 1980s, large-scale redevelopment programmes have been initiated 
to regenerate urban areas. Meanwhile, cities in China have witnessed high-speed 
urbanisation and industrialisation. Significantly, the process is associated with 
urban areas sprawling outwards through the suburbs and encroaching on rural 
land, transforming this into land for construction. During this dramatic socio-
economic urban transition, new challenges have arisen. To deal with problems of 
green land shortages, the erosion of farmland and the inefficient use of urban land, 
in the government agenda the focus of land development has been shifted from 
urban sprawl to urban regeneration (Zhou, 2014). Specifically, in the new era, 
urban regeneration programmes focus on three main domains: ‘run-down urban 
areas’, ‘dilapidated state-owned factory sites’ and ‘urban villages’ (Zhou, 2014: 
297). This thesis focuses on the regeneration of urban villages.  
2.3 Study of Urban Villages 
The phenomenon of urban villages has received attention from both public policy 
and academic studies. Based on the focus of the research presented in this thesis, 
the existing literature can be divided into two broad categories (Tong and Feng, 
2009). The first one is comprehension-oriented, usually developed through 
exploratory research. This considers urban villages as a newly emerged urban-
spatial phenomenon in the transitional society of urban China, and aims to achieve 
a better understanding about such villages, including their emergence, 
proliferation and characteristics. The second category is more regeneration and 
policy-oriented. This is characterised by applied research, which focuses on 
identifying the problems urban villages have, and their corresponding solutions, 
such as ideas, mechanisms and policy implications.  
2.3.1 Comprehension-oriented Studies 
This type of research aims to explore and understand urban villages 
comprehensively as a newly emerged phenomenon, including their emergence and 
key characteristics.  
The Emergence of Urban Villages 
The existing literature suggests that the formation of urban villages in China is a 
result of complex trends and processes with a series of explanatory and causal 
factors.  These may be summarised as including economic reform, urban sprawl 
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and industrialisation, the dual land system, the fiscal income system, the influx of 
rural migrants, the lack of sufficient affordable settlements in urban housing 
systems, villagers’ need for new livelihoods and the absence of state regulation and 
enforcement (e.g. Zhang et al, 2003; Smart and Tan, 2005; He et al, 2009; Liu et al, 
2010; Zhang, 2011; Hao et al, 2011; Xu et al, 2011; Lin and De Meulder, 2012; Song 
and Zenou, 2012; Zhou, 2014).  
The economic reform of 1978 initiated China’s dramatic socio-economic transition 
over the following decades. To transform the planning-oriented economic system 
into a market-oriented one, a series of reform policies were formulated. The 
commercialisation of urban housing began within this process (Wang and Murie, 
1996; Chen et al, 2011). Before the reform, housing was distributed to urban 
employees by local governments or work units as a part of the welfare package, at 
the token cost of a low rent. From 1979 to 1998, the process of housing reform was 
slow and relatively minor in its scale and significance. However, in July 1998, a 
milestone policy was launched by the State Council, which established a fully-
functioning market-oriented housing system, and officially abolished the 
traditional welfare housing system. The impact of the reform on Chinese society 
was profound.  
Within the economic reform, Chinese cities experienced high-speed urbanisation 
and industrialisation (Ma, 2002). The demand for new urban land drove urban 
sprawl that encroached on suburban/rural areas. Crucially, not all the rural land 
was included in the process. Before further explanation, it is necessary to discuss 
the context of the urban-rural dual land system (Lin and Ho, 2005). The system is 
believed to be the root of the formation and proliferation of urban villages, as well 
as a major challenge for urban regeneration (Zhou, 2014). In terms of ownership, 
urban land is state-owned by the government, while rural land is collective-owned 
by rural villagers. In terms of land use rights, the urban land use rights are 
separated from land ownership and can be exchanged in the market between land 
users. On the other hand, the use of rural land has more restraints. Rural land 
contains residential land, agricultural land and other land usages (e.g. deserted 
land, ponds, forests and burial sites). Both the ownership and utility of rural land 
are strictly regulated and even collective owners are forbidden to change or 
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capitalise on them. Authorised by the relevant law, the government is the only 
legal entity empowered to transfer rural land ownership from the collective to the 
state, by paying a certain amount of compensation for villagers. The land system 
and the requisition process are summarised in Figure 2.1 (He et al, 2009: 1933). 
Local governments have a strong incentive to conduct rural land requisition, since 
it is an important approach to gain local fiscal income from land leasing, attract 
investments and promote economic growth via the land redevelopment (Qian and 
Weingast, 1997; Ding, 2007; Xu et al, 2011; Lai et al, 2014). Therefore, once gained, 
the land use right would usually be leased out to the private sector for commercial 
development, and the considerable land lease fees would go into local 
governments’ fiscal revenues. 
 
Figure 2. 1 The institution of land requisition and property rights redistribution 
in China 
Source: He et al, 2009: 1933 
 To cope with such contexts, a strategy was developed by the government for rural 
land requisition (Lin and De Meulder, 2012). Generally, the compensation for 
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farmland is based on its annual agricultural output, while the costs for residential 
land compromise not only monetary subsidy for the land and constructions 
(mainly houses), but also the resettling arrangement for indigenous villagers, 
which is complicated, time-consuming and expensive. Therefore, in practice, the 
strategy is to expropriate the non-residential land only, excluding the residential 
land, intentionally from the rural land requisition to avoid the high costs as well as 
the social burden of relocation. In the 1990s, a large scale rural land requisition 
occurred nationwide. The total amount of defined urban built-up areas was almost 
quadrupled during 1984 -2010, from 8,842 km2 to 40,058 km2 (National Bureau of 
Statistics of PRC, 2011). Once the land was developed and incorporated into urban 
built-up areas, villages and the remaining residential land were surrounded, like 
enclaves, by urban construction areas.   
The development of newly-requisitioned rural land is usually associated with 
manufacturing and commercial investments, bringing to it, labour-intensive 
industries. To meet the needs of the workforce demand, the restraints imposed by 
the Hukou system, to control social mobility, were loosened (Chan and Zhang, 1999; 
Fan, 2008). In the same period, a series of rural reforms had improved farming 
efficiency and many rural populations were no longer involved in agriculture. The 
pulling force of higher-income job opportunities from urban areas and the pushing 
force of transforming the surplus rural labour led to a massive population flow of 
labour (Chen, 1996; Song and Zenou, 2012: 497). Consequently, the urban 
population experienced an explosive growth.  
These migrants created a great need for new urban accommodation, but they are 
excluded from the urban housing system socially, economically and institutionally 
(Lin and De Meulder, 2012). After the housing reform, urban housing consisted 
mainly of commercial housing and a small proportion of social housing. 
Commercial housing is not only a form of domestic shelter but also a popular 
financial investment in China. The housing price has increased to an unaffordable 
level for the majority of the population (Mak et al, 2007). Although municipalities 
provide social housing for low-income households, the amount is limited and it is 
only available for urban Hukou holders, rather than for rural migrants. The great 
demand for low-rent accommodation was driven by villagers, who had lost their 
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farmlands and were urged to find another way to make their livelihoods (Lin and 
De Meulder, 2012). Consequently, their houses were reconstructed informally. To 
gain as many cheap rental rooms as possible out of their limited budgets, the 
houses were usually modified into high-density and high-rise units with extremely 
substandard conditions. Long-term investments e.g. the upgrading or renovation 
of houses were also avoided by indigenous villagers, since the property rights were 
blurred and insecure (Tian, 2008). Although both the construction and renting 
business enterprises were considered to be illegal by the municipalities, urban 
planning and regulatory control could not be fully enforced by them since the 
villages were officially under the rural administration system (Zhang et al, 2003; 
Zhang, 2005; Tian, 2008). Some scholars (He et al, 2009; Zhou, 2014) believe that 
the authorities tolerate their existence because they are implicitly aware of the 
importance of urban villages in providing cheap accommodation for low-income 
populations, and they even deliberately designed their emergence. As a result, such 
informal but affordable and accessible settlements soon attracted massive inflows 
of rural migrants, and became the main source of housing provision for them. 
Eventually, these villages, characterised by ‘narrow roads, face-to-face buildings, a 
thin strip of sky, and inner streets packed with shops, grocery stores and service 
outlets’, were referred to as ‘urban villages’, or ‘cheng-zhong-cun’ (literately 
meaning ‘village in city’ in Chinese) (Liu et al, 2010: 136).  
Characteristics of Urban Villages 
As a form of (often slum-like) informal settlement, urban villages share many 
common characteristics, such as poor living conditions and high crime rates, with 
other informal settlements, such as urban squatter areas in Hong Kong (Smart, 
2001) or slums in Mumbai (Nijman, 2010). However, they also possess some 
unique features due to the specific Chinese context, including being built by 
villagers rather than migrants and property ownership arrangements (Zhang et al, 
2003). As a rural community surrounded by urban areas, urban villages become a 
mixture of villages and urban communities, as Figure 2.2 shows (Liu et al, 2010: 
137).  
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Figure 2. 2 The plural characteristics of urban village 
Source: Liu et al, 2010: 137 
This section illustrates some important characteristics from the existing literature. 
The emergence of rural shareholding reforms in urban villages has been 
extensively discussed (e.g. Po, 2008; Liu et al, 2010; Hao et al, 2011; Lin and De 
Meulder, 2012; Lai et al, 2014). Officially, the villager committee, considered an 
autonomous grassroots organisation although closely shadowed by the local 
Communist Party, is in charge of all public affairs, while the village’s party 
committee takes care of political issues (Kelliher, 1997; Louie, 2001). Many 
investigations find that, within the transitional process, a new form of 
administrative unit – shareholding institutions - emerges in a bottom-up way and 
undertakes economic affairs from villager committees (Po, 2008; Liu et al, 2010; 
Hao et al, 2011; Lin and De Meulder, 2012). This phenomenon was initiated by the 
large scale rural land requisition during the 1990s. Meanwhile, in many villages, a 
small amount of farmland was specifically left for villager collectives, known as 
“reserved land” or “industrial land”. The land was intended for economic 
development, as an approach for funding villagers when they no longer practiced 
agricultural activities. Due to this, villagers’ livelihoods shifted from agriculture to 
the housing rental business. To manage collective assets and enterprises, 
especially to utilise the reserved land, various forms of shareholding institutions, 
e.g. companies and co-operatives, were established under bottom-up initiatives in 
these urban villages.  
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An example of a shareholding company structure is illustrated in the following 
figure (2.3) (Hao et al, 2011: 220). Shares are owned by all indigenous villagers, 
and the quantity of shares allocated to individuals depends on their age, length of 
residence in the village and other factors. Decision-makers for the companies are 
elected from the pool of eligible villagers. In some cases, the reserved land is leased 
to outsiders from the private sector for use as housing, industrial or commercial 
development, while in others, the land is developed by the shareholding 
institutions themselves. Both models would normally generate considerable 
revenue. All profits the institutions gain are used to improve villagers’ living 
conditions, e.g. for social security, public services, infrastructure upgrading and 
construction of collective buildings. The companies, therefore, not only provide a 
potentially better management of collective assets, but also have a significant fiscal 
redistribution effect on indigenous villagers. Moreover, since indigenous villagers 
usually have no access to urban welfare and public services, shareholding 
institutions take on this responsibility. Other non-economic issues, e.g. birth 
control, household registration and publicity, still remain in the charge of villager 
committees.  
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Figure 2. 3 Management structure of the shareholding company of Gangxia 
village in Shenzhen 
Source: Hao et al, 2011: 220 
The land use in urban villages has been widely explored in the literature (e.g. Choy 
et al, 2013; Lai et al, 2014). Investigations conducted by Choy et al (2013) in 
Shenzhen show that the land use in urban villages is significantly inefficient. Their 
statistical analysis of the economic performance of the land’s industrial 
development reveals that the monthly rental price of industrial plants and the 
production of industrial value on collective land are much more inferior to those 
on state land. Two factors appear to be responsible for this insufficient land use. 
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The first one is viewed from the government perspective. As discussed previously, 
there is a lack of effective state regulation, planning and enforcement in urban 
villages since they are officially under rural administration (e.g. Tian, 2008; Liu et 
al, 2010). The second one is from the landowner perspective. The property rights 
of collective land are incomplete, which has many negative influences (Choy et al, 
2013; Lai et al, 2014). Specifically, three key institutional constraints on collective 
land development generated from the urban-rural dual land system are identified. 
They are ‘land insecurity caused by the possibility of being expropriated by the 
government’, ‘unequal access to credit due to the unequal land rights’, and 
‘absence of state regulations on collective land transactions because of the lack of 
de jure property rights’ (Lai et al, 2014: 193). Consequently, villagers cannot 
capitalise the land for financial resources in order to make the land more 
competitive through long-term investment e.g. the improvement of infrastructure 
and environment, and at the same time, villagers have incentives to utilise the land 
for short-term benefits rather than long-term investments.  
Some studies also focus on the characteristics of urban village residents (e.g. Liu et 
al, 2010; Hao et al, 2011). Although indigenous villagers are the property owners 
of urban villages, the main populations living in urban villages are rural migrants 
(Zhang et al, 2003; Wei and Yan, 2005; Zhou, 2014). Investigations by Liu et al 
(2010) find that these migrants tend to live there on their own, without families. 
Their analysis of household survey data in six large cities shows that, compared to 
the average household size (2.94 persons) and space (26.27 m2 per capita) of all 
urban residents, rural migrant households are smaller (2.58 and 14.56), while 
indigenous villager households are larger (3.82 and 43.58). The analysis also 
concludes that all village residents have low occupational status, being mainly self-
employed and small business owners (17.86%), manual workers and service 
sector workers (17.86%) and casual workers and others (52.68%). Another survey 
report of urban villages in Futian District, Shenzhen, by Hao et al (2011) reflects 
this, showing that the family income of indigenous villagers compromises four 
parts: private room renting (60%), profit-sharing from the collective economy 
(30%), family business (6%) and wages (4%), while migrants largely work in local 
businesses and a small proportion run their own small business. Based on such 
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economic backgrounds, the research finds that the two groups are polarised in 
terms of social hierarchy in the village: indigenous villagers are the better-off and 
privileged class, enjoying public services, facilities and events, while migrants are 
the worse-off underclass, having no access to these services, facilities and events 
and barely having any communication with villagers. Nevertheless, both of the two 
groups are considered as marginalised classes living in deprived communities.  
Although urban villages are often critiqued in the literature, their positive effects 
are also recognised (Zhang et al, 2003; Liu et al, 2010). For villagers, the 
development of urban villages benefits them significantly. The farmland 
requisition does not offer reasonable compensation or employment opportunities 
for villagers to maintain their lives, while they are not competitive in the urban 
labour market and have no access to urban social security and welfare (Liu et al, 
2010). The prosperous renting business enables them to gain considerable 
revenue and make a new livelihood. The benefit is reciprocal between landlords 
and tenants. For low-income groups, especially rural migrants, urban villages 
provide desirable housing. As discussed previously, massive rural populations 
came to cities, but China’s urban housing system failed to meet their huge demand 
for affordable and accessible housing (Sato, 2006). In contrast, urban villages 
managed to deliver this. For example, surveys show that the average monthly 
housing rent in Guangzhou’s urban villages in 2007 was as cheap as 16 Yuan per 
square metre, while that of the whole city was around 32 Yuan per square metre 
(Liu et al, 2010). It was also reported that Guangzhou’s urban villages 
accommodated as many as 3 million migrants (Xie, 2005). Therefore, the role of 
urban villages is highly spoken of, as ‘an innovative and positive agent to promote 
urbanisation in today’s China by sheltering massive numbers of rural migrants and 
assimilating them into cities’ (Zhang et al, 2003: 913). For nearby urban residents, 
despite rising social problems, urban villages provide them with advantages as 
well, including convenient shopping opportunities for daily goods, inexpensive 
services and an intensive social interaction (Song and Zenou, 2012).  
Other characteristics of urban villages have been discussed in the literature. To 
explore the effects of urban villages on the formal housing market, Song and Zenou 
(2012) developed a hedonic housing price model and their statistical analysis 
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showed that housing prices are lower the closer the buildings are to urban villages. 
To explore the activities of tenants in urban villages, Lan and Feng (2010) adopted 
time-geography analysis to investigate the characteristics of their time allocation 
and spatial-temporal structure. The results showed that their activities were 
dominated by work on weekdays and by recreation at home at weekends. To 
understand the current situation of public space and public life in the streets of 
urban villages, Li et al (2014b) conducted a case study in Baishizhou village and 
found that the streets suffered from weak space accessibility and low space quality. 
Most of the public activities taking place were necessary, functional and mundane 
and people expected to have more diverse activities, more facilities and a better 
environment.  
2.3.2 Regeneration-oriented Study 
Since urban villages suffer from many problems, e.g. unhealthy living conditions, 
poor construction quality and intensified social disorder, they have been widely 
condemned by the media, the government and academia (Zhang et al, 2003; Liu et 
al, 2010). Furthermore, when faced with the shortage of land supply after decades 
of urban sprawl, officials often shift their focus to urban regeneration (Hao et al, 
2011). Urban villages are then scheduled for regeneration, mostly based on a 
demolition-development approach (Zhang, 2005). To conduct the regeneration, 
firstly the properties (houses and the land) need to be requisitioned. However, 
compared to the previous farmland requisition, these new forms of requisition 
have proven to be difficult and problematic. Much research has been aimed at 
investigating the causes of these problems and their potential solutions.   
Generally, three main issues have been identified. The first issue is the financing 
approaches and the corresponding partnerships. The cost of redevelopment 
programmes are composed mainly of the compensation for properties and the 
resettlement arrangement for affected households of indigenous villagers. For 
smaller urban villages, the government is capable of financing these programmes, 
for example the fund drawn from the municipal financial budget to support urban 
village redevelopment in Shenzhen (Chung, 2009). Accordingly, these programmes 
are usually conducted in a state-led paradigm, in which the government plays a 
dominant role, either by its direct involvement or by establishing state-owned 
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companies specifically to conduct the regeneration programme. For large urban 
villages, although the potential profit could be considerable, outweighing the total 
costs required, the investment in the early stage is often too substantial for the 
government to initiate programmes. As a solution, a third party from the private 
sector who has financial resources and expertise is introduced to form a tri-
partnership (e.g. Li and Li, 2011). This is seen as a developer-led paradigm. Some 
urban villages enjoy a good location and as such, the land is expected to have a 
high potential market value. The general idea is to divide the land into two parts: 
the collective plot for indigenous villagers’ resettlement and livelihoods, and the 
commercial plot to be transferred into state-land and leased for programme fees 
and profits (Lin and De Meulder, 2012; Li et al, 2014a). Following this, a developer 
is authorised to be in charge of the programme, prepay all costs and recoup the 
expenditure as well as receive profits at the end from the land leasing. In both 
paradigms, indigenous villagers are usually represented by villager committees or 
shareholding companies in the partnership (e.g. Chung, 2009; Li and Li, 2011). 
There are also other paradigms, e.g. the villager-led paradigm or a mixture, which 
are rarely seen but will be introduced at the end of this section (e.g. Chung, 2009; 
Li et al, 2014a).  
The second main issue is the conflict of objectives among different groups of 
stakeholders. The following figure (2.4) illustrates the situation that arises when 
the private sector becomes involved (Hao et al, 2011: 221). In other cases where 
there are only villagers and government, the situation is similar, other than “cost 
control”, which goes into the government’s objectives.  
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Figure 2. 4 The interplay between the main stakeholders in urban village 
redevelopment 
Source: Hao et al, 2011: 221 
The competence of interests derived from land appreciation is the nature of the 
issue (Zhou, 2014). For the government, urban villages are perceived as ‘more of 
an urban governance problem than a socio-economic phenomenon’, and the 
drivers to redevelop them are economic benefits, environmental improvements 
and the elimination of social problems generated by them (Hao et al, 2011: 221). 
The developer simply pursues profit and cost control. Both actors have an 
incentive to requisition the properties at a low cost to generate a higher profit. 
Therefore, the evaluation and compensation of rental buildings becomes a 
controversial process. In the rental economy, villagers tend to build as many 
rooms as possible out of the land. This results in rental buildings usually being 
associated with substandard quality, congested space and chaotic planning. Most 
of them are considered illegal, although little effective action has been taken to 
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terminate these practices. Therefore, a dilemma emerges for the government in the 
legislation of policies for property evaluation and compensation is that : if such 
‘illegal’ constructions are compensated for, at a price that satisfied villagers, the 
total cost would be huge and landlords in other villages would perceive it as an 
incentive to construct more units/rooms as a preparation for the future requisition 
(e.g. Li and Li, 2011); if they are not compensated or the price is unacceptable for 
villagers, it is hard to convince them to sign purchase contracts voluntarily. Despite 
these being private properties, the compensation for the collective land is a 
challenge as well. The total amount of compensation is considerable for villagers, 
yet they are aware that the land possesses a higher value than the compensation 
on offer and they therefore request a higher price (Hao et al, 2011).  
The third issue is the resettlement of affected households and their lives 
afterwards, including indigenous villagers and rural migrants. For indigenous 
villagers, they are usually provided with resettling flats. However, villagers, 
especially the elders, have developed an emotional bonding with their locality and 
their existing lifestyle. They prefer to live in low-rise houses rather than high-rise 
apartment buildings. They are not satisfied with resettling buildings which are 
usually constructed to the lowest standards. Above all, they are mostly concerned 
about their livelihood since they are worried that they will be unable to earn the 
same amount of money from the rental business after the redevelopment (Lin and 
De Meulder, 2012). For rural migrants, the redevelopment demolishes their 
existing accommodation and provides nothing for them as compensation (Zhang, 
2005). They are forced to leave and find alternative shelter on their own. As 
discussed previously, the current housing system excludes low-income migrants, 
even though research has shown that they are important for the urban economy 
(Lu et al, 2006). Urban villages act to replace or replicate the role of social housing 
and have become migrants’ main housing source (Zhang et al, 2003; Wei and Yan, 
2005). Rural migrants prefer to live in these urban villages despite the poor living 
conditions, because they do not intend to spend much on their dwelling (Zheng et 
al, 2009). Therefore, the resettlement of migrants would become a problem after 
the redevelopment. As Zheng et al (2009) argue, simply demolishing urban villages 
could lead to the development of new urban villages in other areas e.g. in further 
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suburbs, instead of urban villages vanishing altogether, as the authorities might 
anticipate. It is suggested that the government should consider the whole issue 
based on a broader framework of urban economic prospects (Chan et al, 2003).  
The remaining part of this section illustrates some of the empirical and theoretical 
implications contributed by scholars utilising various theories.  Despite their 
differences, to some extent, they could all be framed within the three issues 
identified above. Li and Li (2011) compare two cases in Shenzhen, each of which 
has a different coalition arrangement. Based on urban regime theory, their analysis 
finds that the results of redevelopment are strongly shaped by the interplay of 
power structures and relations. In the case of Yunong village, villager 
representatives were empowered to participate in decision-making processes. The 
government and the developer showed their enthusiasm for the success of the 
programme by keeping in close communication with villager representatives and 
villagers, whilst the authority even waived its interest to the developer and 
villagers. It concluded that the well-balanced distribution of power structures was 
the factor that made the progress run effectively. The programme became the first 
successful case in Shenzhen. Conversely, in Gangxia village, although the 
government tried to duplicate their previous success by bringing in the same 
developer with another developer in the partnership, the Gangxia case failed. In 
this case, at least three interest groups were identified within the village, but the 
government tried to bypass others by only cooperating with the chairman of the 
village who was elected under the support of the authority.  Despite increasing 
disagreement from other groups, the government pushed the process ahead by 
force and the actions were perceived as unfair since the other groups’ interests 
were impaired. Organised protests emerged and the programme proceeded slowly. 
This comparison revealed how the outcomes were shaped by the interplays of 
power (as the means), and were affected by the distribution of interests (as the 
end). The government’s concession on interests was an important facilitator to 
success. Another key factor identified is the quality of the joint commitment to the 
collaborative partnership (Zhou, 2014). The comparison suggests that the quality 
of programme outcomes can be improved by the empowerment and participation 
of property owners and the strong transparency of the decision-making process.  
26 
 
Although the current practice, based on a top-down demolition-redevelopment 
approach, has managed to produce some successful programmes (e.g. the Yunong 
case mentioned above), it is criticised by Lin and De Meulder (2012) as out-dated 
and unsuitable for the context of urban villages. A new bottom-up conceptual 
framework is developed by them, which takes advantage of three modes of 
economic integration (market exchange, redistribution and reciprocity), and 
methodologies adapted from the strategic urban project approach. There are three 
key points that emerge here. First, an intensive cooperation among the state, the 
market forces and the public is emphasised. Specifically, “the public” includes 
indigenous villagers, organised and empowered migrants, local experts and 
students. Second, visions at different scales are underlined as platforms for actions, 
e.g. focusing the poverty reduction strategy at the national level; integrating the 
role of urban villages in the urban economic system at the city level; and 
strengthening the interconnections between urban villages and neighbouring 
urban areas at the district level. Third, the mediating role of space in specific 
actions that bring both opportunities and problems is highlighted. For example, 
the redevelopment of the reserved land is a chance for ‘unifying fragmented spatial 
structures, enhancing social inclusion and replacing decayed labour-intensive 
industries with cultural and high-end industries and advanced services’ (Lin and 
De Meulder, 2012: 385). They believe that through this framework it is possible to 
achieve the sustainable redevelopment of urban villages.  
The bottom-up approaches seem to be promising. The famous project in Liede 
village, Guangzhou can shed more light on such approaches. Li et al (2014a) and 
Zhou (2014) examine the case in detail. The local government initially had 
attempted to redevelop the village several times by using the conventional top-
down approach, in which purchase contracts were secured by force. When they 
failed, the government turned to a villager-led paradigm. The villager collective 
was authorised to develop a proposal with a partner appointed by them from the 
private sector. The government only functioned as the “night watcher” to supervise 
the planning and facilitate the process. The proposal they developed divided the 
collective land into three plots. The first plot was transferred into state land and 
leased out for the programme’s funding and profits. The other two plots remained 
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as collective-owned land, with one designated as a residential plot, for the in-situ 
resettlement of indigenous villagers, while another designated as a commercial 
plot, managed by the village’s shareholding company, for economic development 
as a way to guarantee villagers’ livelihood in the long-term. Specifically, the 
village’s heritage, life-style and social networks and norms were considered in the 
proposal and preserved as much as possible. The programme was viewed as a 
success, and villagers were argued to be better-off than before. The shift to a 
neoliberal ideology is seen as the key to its success. The decision-making power is 
decentralised to the collective of villagers. The government keeps the minimum 
involvement, and particularly, even waives its interests from the land leasing 
revenue. Therefore, the government did not have any direct land revenue from the 
programme; instead, it focused on the long-term revenue. This is considered the 
main difficulty, to duplicate the model in other cases, as the local government’s 
fiscal income heavily depends on rural land requisition and leasing (Ding, 2007). 
This was admitted by the vice-mayor of Guangzhou in public (Zhou, 2014). The 
Liede case was, therefore, a special one. It was approved deliberately to serve the 
holding of the 2010 Guangzhou Asian Games, which was a more prioritised issue.  
In another successful programme in Xiasha village, Shenzhen, the local 
government took a similar but slightly different approach. Chung (2009) examined 
it and concluded that it was a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches. 
In the programme, there were only two main partners – the local government and 
the villagers (represented by their shareholding company). In the partnership, the 
local government and a special project fund set up by the municipal government 
provided the funding, while the villagers took charge of all aspects of the 
comprehensive redevelopment plan. The programme was again viewed as a major 
success. Chung emphasises the significant meaning of the case, for it implies ‘a 
recentralization of state power’ and ‘a new way of governing urban planning’ 
(Chung, 2009: 269). Nevertheless, it is doubtful if the model could be replicated in 
other cities for two reasons. First, the context of Shenzhen is unique. The 
municipality has abundant financial resources and managed to set up the special 
fund. The local government was supportive and paid for the financial gap the 
programme required. Second, the model does not change the deeper roots of the 
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problem – the dual land system and the planning system. Even if the experience of 
these cases is replicable for others, it is not flawless. Despite the apparent success 
of these outcomes, they are still criticised by Zhou (2014) as being unsustainable. 
An important reason for this is that the main residents, who are tenants, were 
excluded or marginalised from the programmes. Another reason is that social and 
environmental considerations were overlooked.  
2.4 Collective Resistance in China 
The literature suggests that the current practices of urban village redevelopment 
reveal that the top-down approach still plays a dominant role (e.g. Xu el al, 2011; Li 
and Li, 2011). The authoritarian local governments, as well as developers, take 
charge of the decision-making process in the partnership. As property owners, 
indigenous villagers are marginalised. They have limited influence or are even 
excluded from meaningful participation in the programmes. The requisition-
compensation process also proves to be problematic. When conflicts arise, force or 
coercion is prioritised by the authorities, instead of more compromised or 
inclusive responses such as negotiations or concessions. For example, to prohibit 
villagers from building more illegal settlements, the Futian government issued a 
policy, which was ignored by villagers, as a result the government took action by 
‘sending the police force to block the construction site and cutting water and 
electricity supply to these new structures’ (Li and Li, 2011: 428). Sometimes the 
hard-line tactic ‘works’ from a government or developer perspective but, 
sometimes it causes collective resistance from people as a defence of their 
interests, as Zhou (2014: 303) observed: ‘community participation was rarely 
found in urban development and the grassroots could hardly get their voice heard, 
and even became victims, evidenced by numerous conflicts in the land 
expropriation reported by the media’.  
Although collective resistance is a commonly-seen phenomenon in China, the 
number of academic investigations into resistance is relatively small. One reason 
could be that the topic is too sensitive to gain access to data sources. It is 
reasonable to assume that few potential research participants would take the 
political risk of being interviewed. Nevertheless, the existing literature does offer a 
more general understanding. For example, Cai has conducted a series of studies on 
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this topic (e.g. Cai, 2002, 2005; Shi and Cai, 2006; Cai, 2006, 2007, 2008 a, b, c, 
2010). His works are represented in the book Collective Resistance in China (Cai, 
2010). Based on 266 cases of collective resistance gathered from both primary 
fieldwork and secondary sources, Cai (2010) develops an argument about the 
conditions and challenges for staging successful collective resistance in China. The 
dynamic of the increasing state-citizen and civil disputes is seen to be that ‘citizens’ 
legitimate or legal rights have been ignored by state agencies or businesses in the 
fast-changing socioeconomic context’ (Cai, 2010: 21). As an approach to disputes, 
collective resistance is adopted since it is believed to ‘increase the odds of success 
or because citizens lack other alternatives’ (Cai, 2010: 19). Generally, the local 
governments’ responses depend on the forcefulness of citizens’ resistance as well 
as the governments’ perceived costs of making concessions. Three tactics are 
identified as achieving more effective resistance. First, activists can place multiple 
pressures on local officials by ‘relating their grievances to other problems that are 
tied to the same local governments’ (Cai, 2010: 70). Second, citizens can improve 
the chance of success by ‘disaggregating the state and seeking support or allies 
from within the state or ‘among the bureaucratic elite’’. Third, a more frequently 
used method is to conduct disruptive collective actions, although the success is 
highly conditional, especially when violence is used. Two difficulties in staging 
successful resistance are identified. First, local governments are reluctant to make 
concessions, especially when the resistance is not forceful. Second, activists have 
the risk of being suppressed or punished by local governments, both in an illegal 
way, e.g. hiring local thugs to harass or attack them, or in a legal way, e.g. through 
the use of law and regulations.  
O’Brien and Li also make an important contribution to this topic (e.g. O’Brien and 
Li, 1995; O’Brien, 1996; Li and O’Brien, 1996; O’Brien, 2002 a, b; O’Brien and Li, 
2004; O’Brien and Li, 2005; O’Brien and Li, 2006; O’Brien and Li, 2007; Li and 
O’Brien, 2008; Li, 2010). Their works are represented particularly in their book 
(O’Brien and Li, 2006), in which they systematically examine ‘rightful resistance’ in 
rural China. Rightful resistance is a subset of collective resistance, defined as ‘a 
form of popular contention that operates near the boundary of authorised 
channels, employs the rhetoric and commitments of the powerful to curb the 
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exercise of power, hinges on locating and exploiting divisions within the state, and 
relies on mobilising support from the wider public’ (O’Brien and Li, 2006: 2). The 
main feature to distinguish this form of resistance is that the claims in rightful 
resistance are legal or perceived as legal by activists. To understand the initiatives 
of rightful resistance, firstly, O’Brien and Li examine the structural opening, which 
is generated from the problem of information asymmetry in multilevel hierarchical 
government. Information could be distorted and misinterpreted between policy-
makers in Beijing and street-level officials, which could be exploited by villagers in 
order to conduct rightful resistance against local governments. However, they 
believe this opening has limited usefulness, since the State tends to release 
contradictory policies and local governments manage to exploit them as well to 
reduce or abdicate their responsibilities. Secondly, villagers’ perceptions of 
opportunity are examined. Villagers have limited ability in acquiring and 
interpreting information and the conflicting signals coming from Beijing. 
Eventually, an understanding developed that the central leaders do have good 
intentions, but these become reinterpreted through the misconduct or distortion 
of local officials. This is the foundation on which rightful resistance is initiated. 
Furthermore, the boundary-spanning nature of rightful resistance is emphasised in 
that these claims are ‘not prescribed or forbidden, but tolerated (even encouraged) 
by some officials and denied by others’ (O’Brien and Li, 2006: 52). A feature of 
tactical escalation in rightful resistance is highlighted as well. Since every form of 
contention wanes quickly over time, in terms of its power and effectiveness in 
challenging opponents and attracting followers, collective actions are radicalised 
tactically to renew or increase their influence. Specifically, three variants of direct 
action are identified, specifically, these are; publicising policies, demanding 
dialogue and face-to-face defiance. Finally, the significant meanings of rightful 
resistance are examined, including its effects and consequences for China’s future.  
2.5 Summary 
In recent decades, the focus of land supply has shifted from urban sprawl to urban 
regeneration in the agendas of local governments in China. As a key domain in 
urban regeneration, the redevelopment of urban villages has taken place 
nationwide and drawn considerable attention. As a result of the urban-rural dual 
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land system, local governments play a dominant role in the requisition and 
compensation mechanisms of urban villages. A partnership of local authorities, 
indigenous villagers and developers is usually formed to implement programmes. 
Although in some specific cases, e.g. Liede village in Guangzhou, the bottom-up 
approach is adopted and villagers are empowered as main decision-makers, the 
most common feature of these programmes is still the traditional top-down 
approach, controlled by the local government. Driven by the incentives for fiscal 
income and economic growth, the authorities tend to expropriate properties from 
their owners with a low level of compensation and lease the land to developers for 
high revenue.  
Dissatisfied with the interest distribution, villagers claim a more reasonable 
compensation. There are also some individuals or groups who resist such 
programmes, since they are afraid of losing the livelihood of their rental business, 
and cannot earn as much through alternative sources after the redevelopment. In 
many cases, their requests are ignored or rejected. As a result, collective action is 
sometimes pursued by villagers to defend their mutual interests, as a tactic to 
increase the odds of success when there is no better alternative available. The 
existing literature on collective resistance has provided a general understanding of 
this phenomenon in China. However, there is a lack of knowledge about rural 
resistance in urban village redevelopment. Furthermore, the existing literature 
does not investigate the process of urban village redevelopment at the micro-level 
or over time in specific programmes. Addressing these gaps in our knowledge is 
important and beneficial both for enhancing academic understanding and 
potentially improving the processes and outcomes of urban village regeneration 
programmes. Within the context of China’s dramatic socio-economic transition, an 
increasing number of conflicts are taking place. The conflict in urban village 
redevelopment is a reflection of wider tensions within contemporary Chinese 
society. This requires greater examination and an understanding of a number of 
elements including the trio-partnership, the interplay of power and interests, 
decision-making processes by different groups, cooperation, conflicts, collective 
resistance and responses from the government. By examining a case study in an in-
depth and qualitative way, a better understanding of Chinese urban policy and its 
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consequences may be achieved. The next chapter will discuss the research design 
and methods.  
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Chapter Three - Research Design and Methods 
3.1 Introduction 
Literature review shows that existing research in urban village studies is 
categorized as the basic study, which investigates the development and the 
characteristics of urban villages, and the applied study, focusing on the 
redevelopment. However, both suffer from a lack of focus on the micro-level 
processes enacted within localities. This research aims to address this gap in 
knowledge by ascertaining and analysing the experiences and perceptions of a 
range of actors involved in a local redevelopment programme. It sought to achieve 
this by collecting and analysing narrative data, mainly interviews from participants 
of the redevelopment programme. Furthermore, the data provides rich details 
which enable readers to gain a much more nuanced and vivid understanding about 
the characteristics of urban villages and the dynamic nature of redevelopment 
programmes occurring within them, rather than relying on quantitative statistical 
studies or conceptual theorising lacking empirical grounding.  
This chapter discusses how the research was designed and what methods were 
selected in order to answer the research questions and address the gap identified 
in the literature review. Section 3.2 introduces the research design, and justifies 
the adoption of the case study and qualitative methods in the research. Their 
strengths and weaknesses are examined. The background and context of the case 
city and case village are also presented. Following this, the chapter proceeds to 
introduce how the methods were applied and practiced in the field is reviewed in 
Section 3.3.  
3.2 Research Design 
The research was designed to enable specific answers to the research questions. 
Section 3.2.1 justifies the use of a case study combined with qualitative methods as 
the research approach, including the consideration of taking Xiamen and VA 
Village as the case study city and village. The strengths and weakness of this 
approach are also examined. Then section 3.2.2 introduces why Xiamen is selected 
as the case city and presents background information required to understand the 
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context within which the redevelopment programme was situated. Section 3.2.3 
continues to discuss the selection of VA Village and its context.  
3.2.1 Research Approach 
This research is based on a case study approach. This section will justify the use of 
a case study methodology and reflect on the challenges, strengths and weaknesses 
of this approach.  
Case Study Strategy and Qualitative Methods 
According to Yin (2003: 5), there are five types of research strategies, including 
experiment, survey, archival analysis, history and case study. To judge which one is 
more advantageous for a research, three conditions are used:  
 
Figure 3. 1 Five strategies and three conditions 
Source: Yin, 2003: 5-8. 
The first condition is the type of research questions. Generally, there are five types 
of questions, “how”, “why”, “what”, “how many” and “how much” (Yin, 2003: 5). 
“What” questions also contain two different sub-types. One is exploratory, which 
could be answered by any exploratory research, e.g. “what can be learned from the 
redevelopment programme in VA Village”, while the other one is actually another 
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form of “how many” and “how much” questions, e.g. “what are results of the policy 
implementation in VA Village’s programme”.  
As shown in the literature review, the existing research has already answered 
many questions e.g. what urban villages are, how they form and develop, what 
their influences are, what actions the authority has taken to deal with them, what 
the difficulties and consequences are, etc. However, there is a lack of on the ground 
micro-level studies, which focus on the process from the angle of individual 
participants. To address this gap, my research focuses on stakeholders’ 
participation, examining how their decisions are made, how actions are taken and 
how and why conflicts are generated, by analysing their biographical experience 
and contextual data gained from interviews. Therefore, this research mainly 
focuses on “how”, “why” and “what” (exploratory sub-type) questions, which 
makes case study, history and experiment more advantageous than survey and 
archival analysis. In fact, archival analysis is rarely used in urban village studies, 
due to the lack of archival records. Although the use of social surveys is the 
prevailing methodological approach in the field, it is not appropriate for this 
research. A survey strategy usually adopts positivism as a philosophical stance, 
associated with a quantitative approach in data inquiry, and statistical techniques 
in data analysis. Specifically, the survey can be characterised into four types:  
Type Feature Example of usage 
Factual 
survey 
Aim to gain information from individuals 
concerning their material situation; seen as 
‘hard data’ 
The Census 
Attitudinal 
survey 
Focus on attitudes of the population Political opinion 
poll 
Social 
psychological 
survey 
Focus on the relationship between attitudes 
and behaviour; explain a person’s behaviour 
through the measurement and analysis of 
attitudes 
Used in social 
psychology 
Explanatory 
survey 
All surveys are explanatory to some extent; 
explain how people’s attitudes or intentions 
are linked to explanatory variables 
Specifically 
designed to test 
hypotheses which 
are derived from 
theories 
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Table 3. 1 Four types of social surveys 
Source: Ackroyd and Hughes, 1983; May, 2001: 89-90.  
In terms of research interest, the first two types focus on the “frequency” of 
variables from the object, through which they are good at answering “how many” 
and “how much” questions. The last two types focus on the “relationship” between 
the variables. In all four types, the methods used in data collection are closed-end 
questioning, e.g. questionnaires and structured interview. Therefore, the 
investigator is supposed to have a substantial understanding about the object and 
a very good idea of the answers before designing the questions, as it would be too 
late to revise them once the inquiry begins, which suggests that the survey is more 
advantageous in verification rather than discovery (Gable, 1994).  
In contrast, this research is a discovery type. The “how” and “why” questions are 
explanatory and deal with operational links needing to be traced over time (Yin, 
2003: 6). A case study, combined with qualitative methods, fulfils this requirement. 
In practice, it enables the investigator to generate in-depth data from objects, by 
continuous observation, by asking open-ended questions, and by continuing to ask 
further questions based on previous answers over time, in an attempt to have a 
better and fuller understanding of the “truth”. The inquiry process is more 
dynamic than static. Questions evolve while the investigator accumulates 
understanding. Therefore, in such a scenario, qualitative methods, including open-
ended interviews, observation and document collation and analysis, are more 
advantageous than survey methods. Adopting a case study approach also means 
that the investigator’s philosophical stance lies in social constructivism (usually 
combined with interpretivism). Basically, a constructivist seeks to interpret the 
varied and multiple subjective meanings directed toward certain objects or things, 
which are usually generated through discussions or interactions with others and 
through historical and social norms that operate in individuals’ lives, rather than 
starting with a theory (Creswell, 2003: 8-9).  
There is one more minor reason why the research design rejected using a survey 
methodology. The inquiry in social survey is associated with delivering 
questionnaires to individuals. The majority of participants from the villager group 
are illiterate or only have very limited reading and writing skills. The only way to 
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complete a questionnaire therefore, would be to read and explain the questions to 
the participants and then to fill in the answers for them. According to my previous 
research experience when delivering questionnaires to such groups of people, 
respondents tend to be talkative and give more information in their answers than 
the questionnaires required. Some of these answers can be rich and contain 
meaningful detail, however this rich detail would be redundant in a survey of this 
kind. However, questionnaires can be limiting in that they do not allow expansion 
on the topic, therefore, qualitative methods are more useful for capturing more 
detailed information in the field.  
The second condition is whether the object of the research is more a contemporary 
than a historical one or the other way around. Initially formed in the 1990s, urban 
villages are a contemporary phenomenon. This period witnessed large-scale 
farmland being requisitioned by the authority and the emergence of urban villages 
simultaneously over the country. To redevelop them, in recent decades, the 
government has continued to take various actions to requisition the remaining 
part of these villages – the residential land. Meanwhile, many conflicts took place, 
within the context that the market price of housing kept increasing to an extremely 
high level, and as such, property owners in urban villages gradually became aware 
of the high potential value of the land and houses, which hugely outweighed the 
compensation offered by the authority. Thus, this phenomenon is unprecedented. 
These are real life events occurring in the moment and therefore require the 
investigator to stay within the contemporary scope. Compared to a historical 
approach, the unique strength of using a case study in the research is that it adds 
two more sources of evidence for the investigator: observation of the events and 
interviews with the persons actually involved in the events (Yin, 2003: 8). Actually, 
they consist of the majority of the primary data collected.  
The third condition is whether the research requires controls or not, or in another 
way, the extent of the control the investigator is able to acquire over the events. 
The existing literature does not imply any feasibility in conducting social 
experiments on this topic. Even if an experiment was implementable, it would not 
fit the research as well, since any purposeful intervention from the outside would 
make the data deviate from real world situations. So far, the most effective way to 
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answer the research questions remains to study the research objects, the 
programme and participants, in the living environment, without manipulations. A 
case study does not require any control, and it provides the investigator with the 
opportunity to stay close to the research object within its real life context. Based 
on the three features, it was reasonable that a case study approach was adopted 
for the research.  
Key Strengths and Weaknesses 
There are many discussions that concern the strengths and weakness of a case 
study and qualitative approach. One of the key strengths is facilitating in-depth 
investigation. This allows the investigator to retain the holistic and meaningful 
characteristics of real-life events, and understand their nature and complexity 
(Gable, 1994; Yin, 2003: 2). The nature of the study research questions required 
that the research was in-depth. As a study with longitudinal elements, the research 
focused on the whole process of the programme, from its beginning to the current 
situation, by interviewing participants. Based on the contextual understanding, 
insights were captured via qualitative data analysis. However, being in-depth 
means the research lacks the breadth, which a larger scale quantitative approach 
may offer. Therefore, one of the key critiques about case study approach is that 
they cannot, or should not, be used for generalisation, for the object is usually one 
specific example (Giddens, 1984: 328; Gable, 1994; Thomas, 2011: 17).  
As a single-unit case study in a specific city, it is true that the thesis suffers from 
the weakness of breadth and limitations of any attempted generalisation. The 
redevelopment of urban villages is highly context-dependant, which determines 
that the findings cannot be generalised too broadly. There are two important 
factors in the case study context:  the policy system and the social and economic 
context at the locality. The policy-making process is a top-down one, in which 
national policies are made firstly, and then secondly, provincial, municipal, district 
and village level policies are formulated based on higher-level policies and the 
specific local context. Finally, in practice, inevitably policies vary in different areas, 
and may sometimes even be completely different. The general trend is that, the 
more developed the area is, the more flexible and villager-oriented the policies are. 
For example, in Guangzhou and Shenzhen, two well-developed metropolitan areas, 
39 
 
the authorities have a completely distinct idea of the redevelopment of urban 
villages from other localities. Policies there encourage villagers to form an 
economic organisation and conduct the redevelopment programme by themselves, 
if they have sufficient financial power, or alternatively, they can invite another 
developer as their partner to participate in the redevelopment to support them 
financially (Han, 2004; Tan et al, 2012). The advantage is that conflicts of interests 
will be reduced as the government is less directly involved in the redevelopment 
process. Villagers are the main developer of their own property and they 
nominally receive the most benefits from this. The disadvantage is that the 
government cannot share in the revenue directly. In developed areas like 
Guangzhou and Shenzhen, the finance does not depend on land sale since they 
have prosperous broader commercial economies. In less developed areas, e.g. in 
tier-three cities and towns where urban villages are still in the beginning or early 
growth phases, revenue from land sales usually composes a big proportion of the 
government’s budget and it is impossible for the government to develop a strategy 
that replicates Guangzhou’s or Shenzhen’s. Strategies therefore will be contextual 
to their locality. Therefore, the research is limited in terms of its capacity for the 
generalisation of its findings.  
However, defences against the critique of generalisation can be found in the 
literature as well. Hammersley and Gomm (2000: 3) accept the critique, but 
emphasise “the aim of case study research should be to capture cases in their 
uniqueness, rather than to use them as a basis for wider generalization.” Wieviorka 
(1992: 160) makes the point that “it (a research case) is significant only if an 
observer[…] can refer it to an analytical category[…] If you want to talk about a 
‘case’, you also need the means of interpreting it or placing it in a context […]” 
Giddens (1984:328) also suggests that, “they can easily become so if carried out in 
some numbers, so that judgements of their typicality can justifiably be made”. To a 
wider discussion, there was an increasing voice that doubted the conventional 
wisdom towards the case study, as Flyvbjerg (2006: 223) comments that “social 
science has not succeeded in producing general, context-independent theory and, 
thus, has in the final instance nothing else to offer than concrete, context-
dependent knowledge”. Therefore, based on their ideas, one way to overcome this 
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weakness is to conduct multiple-case studies; another approach is to focus on the 
advantage of a case study’s strength – the uniqueness, as shown in following:  
 Unique relative to 
what?  
How might VA Village be interesting or 
instructive?  
As an urban village in the 
world 
All other informal 
settlements in the 
world 
Showing how an urban village and its 
redevelopment process is different from 
other informal settlements; generalise the 
similarity from the comparison with other 
informal settlements 
As a project featured with 
the participation pattern 
of property owners, 
commercial power and the 
governmental force 
All other projects 
which have the 
similar pattern of 
participants with 
similar context 
Showing how decisions are made, how 
actions are taken and how conflicts are 
generated in a kinship-based community in 
the context of urban village redevelopment; 
generalise the similarity from the 
comparison with other projects 
As an urban village in 
Xiamen 
All other urban 
village in Xiamen 
Showing why the government’s policies, 
why the company’s strategies are 
problematic and why conflicts are 
generated, and how could they be improved 
in other cases; generalise the similarity 
from the comparison with other villages’ 
projects 
Table 3. 2 What can be learned from the uniqueness of VA Village 
Notes: Adapted from Thomas (2011: 20) and his example: how can a stunning 
new white rose with fragrance tell stories from its uniqueness  
Qualitative Interviews 
As explained previously, the thesis adopts a case study as its research approach, 
combined with qualitative methods to generate data – interviews, the collection 
and analysis of documents and participant observation. The use of semi-structured 
and unstructured (or loosely structured) interviews is the primary methodological 
technique. Interviews are a form of qualitative research that enables the collection 
of data through conversations conducted by the investigator with informants, 
characterised by features including ‘a relatively informal way’, ‘a thematic, topic-
centred, biographical or narrative approach’ and ‘the assumption that data are 
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generated via the interaction’ (Mason, 1996: 38-39). The major difference between 
semi-structured and unstructured interviews is that, the semi-structured approach 
is bounded and framed by ‘a thematic guide with probes and invitations to expand 
on issues raised’ (Fielding, 1988: 212). This type of interview allows respondents 
to answer relatively freely in their own terms, but still enables the researcher to 
control the conversation within a specific focus (May, 2001: 123). In contrast, the 
unstructured interview is characterised by being more ‘open-ended’ with less 
framing restraints, and its corresponding strength is ‘an ability to challenge the 
researcher’s preconceptions, as well as enable the interviewee to answer questions 
within their own frame of reference’ (May, 2001: 124).  
The combination of these two methods is necessary and useful for my field 
research. Firstly, both methods facilitate the generation of in-depth qualitative 
data. Furthermore, each method has its own respective merits dependent on the 
specific situation in which they are applied. The thesis focuses on specific 
objectives and questions. The semi-structured interview helps to guarantee that 
the conversation is kept on the right track and therefore to meet the investigator’s 
expectations. However, some factors may influence the interview quality 
negatively. Based on my field experience, for example, some angry villagers tended 
to use the interview as a chance to express and report their unhappy experience 
and opinions, which potentially shifts the focus of the interview gradually to their 
anger toward the village authority, the government and the developer, as well as 
their cynical attitude towards, and criticism of, alleged corruption and the 
bureaucracy. This generated important data and it was worthwhile to listen to and 
record these perspectives. Nevertheless, if the respondent kept repeating the same 
things emotionally, the interviewer may need to intervene and guide the 
interviewee back to the main focus of the investigation. An interview guide 
prepared beforehand will facilitate this process, and help to ensure that the 
questions enable the coverage of all key points being examined. However, the 
usefulness of the guide could be limited. As discussed before, the issue of urban 
village redevelopment is a recently contemporary phenomenon occurring in a 
dramatically and rapidly transforming society. There is often a lack of a proper 
understanding about the topic, due to the lack of relevant literature. This makes 
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the research an exploratory type and I understood that the real situation revealed 
by the fieldwork could be totally different from my starting presumptions. In such 
circumstances, the unstructured interview technique had the advantage of 
allowing informants to express what they understand freely, by using their own 
‘ideas and meanings with which they are familiar’ (May, 2001: 124).  
Despite the strengths arising from using an interview methodology, the thesis 
suffers from some disadvantages by taking this methodology as a route to 
understanding the reality of the social world, as well as, being the main data 
generator. A key criticism argues that interviews are ‘a topic of social research’ or 
even just ‘a social encounter’ as with other types of encounter, rather than ‘a 
resource for social research’ (May, 2001: 142-144). This is because an interview 
can only provide ‘internal’ understanding within the interview, and the internal 
understanding has limitations as well. For example, the data gathered from the 
field work has some weaknesses from this point of view. The majority of villagers 
are illiterate, without any proper schooling. In the discussion of remote events and 
issues, the accuracy of their account, provided by their fuzzy memory and limited 
narrative ability, was uncertain.  
In interviews with representatives from the developer party, it was difficult to 
ensure that they were not consciously shunning, lying, or hiding something for 
commercial, political or other purposes. Even if it was a genuine description of 
their authentic ideas, attitudes and experience, there could be something omitted 
unconsciously. Furthermore, by all means, it is impossible for the investigator to 
truly understand the events simply through the interview without knowing the 
specific context in which it took place. Last, but not least, an audio recording and 
the corresponding transcription are never an ‘objective record’ of the interview, 
and even a visual record cannot record ‘what went on behind the camera’ (Mason, 
1996: 53). As mentioned before, for example, some interviews are conducted using 
the South Fujian Dialect, which includes many vocabulary items and phrases that 
do not have an exactly corresponding written Mandarin translation.  
I was aware of these weaknesses, and attempted to minimise the negative 
influence they might bring into the analysis and the thesis. For instance, I will 
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avoid making any arbitrary judgement simply upon a singular source of evidence, 
and try to triangulate conclusions with multiple-evidence from different 
respondents or sources of information. The limitations of the analysis are 
highlighted and explained in the thesis when necessary. 
3.2.2 Case Study City 
This section firstly explains why Xiamen City is selected as a case study city, and 
then briefly introduces the context of Xiamen City.  
Selecting the City 
Cities belong to hierarchies in terms of their size, population, economic 
development, roles etc. Broadly, cities in mainland China can be categorised into 
four hierarchies, according to their size, economic development/GDP, population 
and their role in the country or the region. The first hierarchy is “the big four” – 
Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen, which are the most developed four 
metropolitan areas. The second hierarchy is “the tier-one cities”. The tier-one cities 
are usually capital cities, e.g. Zhejiang, Nanjing, Chengdu, Wuhan, Baoding and are 
the economic backbone of their regions, e.g. Tianjin, Dalian, Xiamen, Suzhou, 
Qingdao. The third hierarchy is “the tier-two cities”, which are important but have 
less influence than the first-line cities. The fourth hierarchy is “the tier-three cities”. 
It includes all the remaining cities and towns in China.  
The big four cities are not ideal places to conduct this research. Guangzhou and 
Shenzhen have a distinct mechanism for conducting redevelopment in urban 
villages, in which an economic organisation made up of the collective of villagers, 
for example a joint-stock company owned by the collective, plays the dominant 
role in the operation (Han, 2004; Tan et al, 2012). This mechanism appears to 
function relatively successfully. Since the collective is empowered to distribute the 
revenue by themselves, few conflicts have emerged. Therefore, some of the key 
research questions, for example, “how conflicts are generated during the process”, 
cannot be answered if the big four cities were used as case studies. Beijing as the 
capital city has taken many actions in redeveloping urban villages, and many have 
been dismantled. Meanwhile, this process has inevitably accumulated some 
conflicts. Since this topic has already become a major social concern and a 
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sensitive political issue in recent years in these big cities, fewer people would be 
likely to participate in the research, especially in the capital. Therefore, the data 
inquiry in Beijing’s villages would be difficult. In addition, the particular 
characteristics and features of the big four cities mean that findings would be less 
representative of, and applicable to, the majority of Chinese cities; whereas 
selecting case studies from cities in a lower hierarchical category enables the 
research to reflect the experience of a greater number of urban areas in China.  
The tier-one cities are developed areas with many urban villages and are the most 
appropriate for the field research. Compared to the tier-two and tier-three cities, 
the advantage is that there are more examples to select from. In less developed 
cities and towns, urban villages may not be found, or have not been planned, to be 
redeveloped yet. Finally, Xiamen is chosen as the case city from the tier-one cities, 
mainly because of some pragmatic considerations. Firstly, Xiamen is a city that I, as 
the researcher, was already familiar with, which enabled advantages in orientating 
the research, such as understanding the local context and accessing research 
participants and documents. Secondly, I speak South Fujian Dialect, which is 
widely spoken among indigenous residents living in south Fujian Province, 
including Xiamen. Usually, a large proportion of indigenous villagers in urban 
villages is illiterate or only has very basic and limited reading and writing skills. A 
problem generated from this is that those people can only, or prefer to, 
communicate in their dialects (if any) or in Mandarin, which they speak with a 
local accent. It is easy to distinguish whether one is an outsider or not from the 
very beginning of a conversation. It is likely that a researcher who was perceived 
to be an outsider would have more difficulties in accessing and recruiting research 
participants given the sensitive nature of the topic and therefore would take longer 
to build the mutual trust that is required to ensure the most effective data 
generation from conducting qualitative interviews. Based primarily on these two 
reasons, Xiamen was chosen as the case study city. 
Xiamen City 
Xiamen is a coastal city with a population of more than three and a half million 
(according to the 2010 Census), situated in southeast Fujian Province, China. The 
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city has a 1565.091 km2 administrative land area in total, comprising two districts 
(Siming and Huli, nearly 165 km2 in total) in the island area, and the other four 
(Haicang, Jimei, Xiang’an and Tong’an, nearly 1400 km2 in total) in the coastal 
mainland area. Xiamen Island is the most urbanised and developed area of the city. 
The mainland part is largely a rural area.  
In 1978, China began to reform its central planned economic system to a market-
oriented one. In 1980, Xiamen Special Economy Zone (XSEZ) was set up by the 
state authority. XSEZ was a 2.5 km2 area in northeast Huli District initially, which 
was then enlarged to the whole Xiamen Island in 1984. Supported by a series of 
policies, XSEZ enjoyed many privileges, e.g. tax reduction for companies, 
permission for foreigners and individuals to invest, convenience for foreigners to 
enter and exit the border etc., and the infrastructure in XSEZ was significantly 
upgraded. In recent years, the coastal area of Fujian Province, with Xiamen as its 
heart, has been set up as the Western Taiwan Strait Economic Zone, to attract 
more investment, especially from Taiwan.  
 
Figure 3. 2 GDP growth of Xiamen 
                                                        
1 Statistics in this section refers from the website of Xiamen Government, 
http://www.xm.gov.cn/zjxm/xmgk/200708/t20070830_173889.htm  
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Note: The unit is one million Yuan. The statistics was based on those years’ price 
respectively. The inflation is not considered 
Source: Statistics Bureau of Xiamen2 
The economic growth was remarkable. From 1978 to 2011, the GDP kept 
increasing. In 2011, Xiamen’s GDP was close to Ghana’s GDP (nominal), ranking 83 
in the world3. Meanwhile, the percentage of primary industry (the industries that 
produce natural resources e.g. agriculture, fishing and mining) as a total of GDP 
kept decreasing, bottoming at nearly 1% at 2011. The percentage of secondary 
industry (manufacturing and construction) had fluctuated around 50% within a 
small range. The percentage of tertiary industry (services) kept increasing in first 
decade and then fluctuated around 45%, see the following figure (3.3).  
 
Figure 3. 3 The industrial pattern of Xiamen 
Source: Statistics Bureau of Xiamen4 
Six districts play different economic roles. Siming and Huli districts are the two on 
the island. Although they occupy the smallest areas, they have the highest density 
of population and investment, and the highest GDP. Siming District has historically 
                                                        
2 See http://www.stats-xm.gov.cn/tjzl/tjsj/ 
3 According to the statistic from United Nations, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/dnltransfer.asp?fID=2  
4 See http://www.stats-xm.gov.cn/tjzl/tjsj/ 
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been the traditional financial, commercial, residential and political centre of 
Xiamen. Huli District used to be a rural area. Since the XSEZ was founded, Huli 
District has attracted a considerable amount of investment and become the 
manufacturing hub of the city. It was then transformed to a highly industrialised 
and urbanised area. Its GDP grew drastically and stayed in rank two, as shown in 
the following chart. In each set of bars, from left to right, they are respectively 
Siming, Huli, Jimei, Haicang, Tong’an and Xiang’an District.  
 
Figure 3. 4 The six districts’ GDP growth  
Note: The unit is one million Yuan. Statistics was based on these years’ prices.  
Source: Statistics Bureau of Xiamen5 
However, such an economic pattern of development did not last long. With the 
process of urbanisation, the population in the island experienced an explosive 
growth, and housing prices within the island increased to a very high level, 
unaffordable for the majority of citizens. As a result, the developer and the 
authority sought to redevelop the industrial area for more profitable commercial 
                                                        
5 See http://www.stats-xm.gov.cn/tjzl/tjsj/ 
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developments, especially real estate. In 2006, Xiamen authority released the 
Guidelines of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (from 2006 to 2010) for National 
Economic and Social Development6. The Plan required Huli District to transform 
its industrial pattern to a Hi-Tech-oriented one, gradually decentralising heavy 
industries out to mainland areas. As a result, the nearby urban villages that used to 
house large populations of labourers working in the factories, including VA village, 
were listed in the agenda of redevelopment.  
3.2.3 Case Study Village 
This section firstly discusses the approach used to select the case village, followed 
by an overview of villages on Xiamen Island. Then the context of case village VA 
village is introduced. Finally, the key term of “the villager collective” is explained.  
Selecting Village 
Dozens of urban villages are located in Xiamen Island. There are several 
approaches to categorising them. One way is to categorise them according to 
several indexes e.g. villages’ administration status, land’s property right status and 
indigenous villagers’ Hukou status, as following:  
 Administration 
Status 
Land Property Right 
Status 
Hukou 
Status 
Category I Under municipal 
admin. 
The state owns the land Urban 
Category II Under municipal 
admin. 
The collective of indigenous 
villagers own the 
residential land 
Urban 
Category III Under rural 
admin. 
The collective of indigenous 
villagers own the 
residential land 
Rural 
Category IV Under rural 
admin. 
The collective of indigenous 
villagers own the 
residential land and some 
farmland 
Rural 
Table 3. 3 Four categories of urban villages 
                                                        
6 http://www.xm.gov.cn/zfxxgk/xxgkznml/szhch/gmzghs/200803/t20080327_202978.htm 
49 
 
There is another way to categorise them, based on their location, development and 
their relationship to built-up urban areas. This form of categorisation has been 
used in other research studies (Li, 2001; Chen, 2004; Wu and Zhou, 2005). This 
categorisation in based on conceptualising villagers as living organisms with 
different ‘life phases’: 
Phase Feature 
Mature phase These villages are usually in the city, surrounded by 
prosperous built-up area. 
Growing phase These villages are located at the urban fringe and near 
prosperous built-up area. When the city keeps growing 
and expanding, they will step into the ‘mature phase’. 
Beginning phase There is a certain distance between these villages and 
urban built-up areas. When the city keeps growing and 
expanding, they will step into the ‘growing phase’. 
Table 3. 4 Three phases of urban villages 
Although the two approaches use different criteria and present results in different 
forms, there are some connections between the results. Villages in the Mature 
Phase of the ‘life phases’ typology are usually in Category I and II of the ‘indices’ 
typology classification. They usually have been highly assimilated as a part of the 
city. The locations are economically advantageous, surrounded by prosperous 
built-up areas, and the properties (land and houses) have a high potential financial 
value. To requisition them would be challenging, since the price would be too high 
for the developer to offer, and property owners would not accept a low price easily. 
Villages in the Growing Phase of the life phases’ typology are usually in Category II 
or III of the indices classification. Although their farm land has already been 
requisitioned, they are still under a rural administration system, which means they 
probably have not been planned to be demolished yet. Villages in the Beginning 
Phase may fit Category III or Category IV, or they may not yet be urban villages, but 
instead they are geographically close to urban areas and have the potential to 
become urban villages.  
To make a better choice in selecting the case village, some more criteria were 
added to categorise potential urban villages as case study sites, e.g. security 
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condition, accessibility of gaining access to documents and interviewees, progress 
of redevelopment, situation of participation, situation of conflicts etc. From the 
sample of potential localities, the case study village was chosen as the one that had 
the potential to best facilitate answers to the research questions and, at the same 
time, best represent a certain type of urban village, or implementation process. 
The matrix below shows how the case study village was selected across a range of 
criteria 
 Sample A Sample B Sample C … VA village 
Category I II III … II 
Phase Mature Mature Growing … Mature 
Security Might be 
dangerous 
Might be 
dangerous at night 
Might be 
dangerous 
… Safe in daytime, 
might be 
dangerous at the 
demolished area at 
night 
Accessibility to 
documents and 
interviewees 
Hard Hard Medium … Medium 
Progress of 
redevelopment 
Just start the 
demolition 
A mixture of 
demolition and 
redevelopment 
Haven't 
begun yet 
… In the requisition 
and demolition 
process 
Situation of 
participation 
No 
participation 
No participation N/A … Has limited 
participation 
Situation of 
conflicts 
No conflicts 
yet 
Many protests 
from villagers 
N/A … Many conflicts in 
the past, including 
protests, fighting 
and etc.  
Table 3. 5 Matrix for categorising samples 
VA village was selected finally during the field research, and its features are shown 
in the matrix. One of the main reasons for selecting this village was that its 
redevelopment process had been underway for more than four years by 2013. 
During this process, many conflicts had emerged and resulted in a series of 
informal and formal participatory actions among stakeholders, e.g. protests, 
fighting and filing lawsuits. Later in the process, at around 2012, a new strategy 
had been adopted and had generated new outcomes and circumstances. The 
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programme in VA village, therefore, appeared to offer a procedural, political and 
social richness that other potential case studies did not appear to have. VA village 
would enable a study that revealed how a policy had been implemented and 
changed after its initial failure, how a policy has been updated and implemented 
and how the informal participation among stakeholders developed accordingly. 
This richness seemed to offer the contextual and historical potential to facilitate 
the answering of the research questions.  
Villages on Xiamen Island 
The phenomenon of urban villages has emerged in the city within recent decades. 
The city’s old town area used to be the only built-up area of the island, while the 
other area was rural or undeveloped. Since the 1980s, the high speed urbanisation 
triggered by the national reform policy drove the built-up area sprawl from the old 
town area gradually to the whole island, except for the mountainous area in the 
south. For example, as the following image (3.1) shows, in 2003, the built-up area 
had covered most of the island, only the east and south areas remaining rural. 
Within the process of urban sprawling, some villages had been entirely dismantled, 
while others had just been partially demolished or grew larger. Those villages that 
remained took advantage of migrants’ increasing need for dwellings to build large 
amounts of (usually overly dense and substandard) housing to rent for profits. 
Then urban villages were formed, see Image 3.2.  
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Image 3. 1 Villages in 2003 
Notes: Patched areas are villages’ residential areas identified visually, not 
including farmland.  
Source: Google Earth satellite map of 28-12-2003 
The authority has a strong motivation to redevelop urban villages, aiming to 
generate a high potential economic profit from the land. In practice, firstly the 
authority has to requisition the village land and land attachments such as buildings, 
transferring the ownership from the villager collective to the state. It requires the 
authority to prepay a considerable amount of investment. Instead, in some cases, 
commercial developers with strong financial capacity would be commissioned as a 
means of financing the developments. Once the authority owns the land, usually, 
its use right would be leased for commercial redevelopment. The fund, as well as 
the consequent tax revenue from land development, had contributed greatly to the 
governmental income and had become one of the main means for local 
government to raise financial resources for urban renewal programmes in China 
(Yang and Wu, 1999: 116). However, the implementation of property requisition 
was problematic. The rental economy in urban villages was prosperous and 
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profitable and became villagers’ only livelihood when they lost their farm land. 
Furthermore, housing prices in Xiamen Island became increasingly high and 
unaffordable. Compared to the high potential value of the land and the houses, 
villagers found it hard to accept the unattractive price offered by the programme. 
As a result, conflicts took place.  
 
Image 3. 2 Villages in 2011 
Notes: Patched areas are villages’ residential areas identified visually, not including 
farmland.  
Source: Google Earth satellite map of 07-10-2011.  
The change of villages could be seen from the comparison of the two satellite 
images (Image 3.1 and Image 3.2). Some villages, especially those close to the 
downtown area, had been redeveloped entirely. Meanwhile, the farm land kept 
shrinking and disappeared eventually, either being requisitioned by the authority 
or being encroached on by villages. The remaining villages, especially those in the 
peripheral areas of the island, had expanded their residential areas gradually over 
the eight years, growing from Beginning Phase to Mature Phase of the life phases 
typology.  
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VA Village 
VA Village is selected as the case village. For anonymity, the genuine names of all 
villages involved are not used in the thesis. Instead, pseudonyms e.g. VA, VB and VC 
(short for Village A, B, C) are adopted. The case village actually contains two 
homogenous villages, VA Village and VB Village. Before 2003, these villages were 
under the rural administrative system. VA Village, VB Village and the other five 
nearby villages were combined to form an administrative village, the fundamental 
administrative unit in the rural administration system. It was named VA 
Administrative Village since the administrative office of the authority was 
stationed in VA Village, and the seven villages were officially named Natural 
Villages for distinction. Therefore, there are VA Administrative Village and VA 
Natural Village. The programme the research examines concerns VA and VB 
Natural Villages only. VB Village is smaller than VA Village, besides which there is 
few difference between them. VB Village also borders VA Village. For convenience, 
people usually refer to both VA and VB Village as “VA Village” for simplicity. In 
2003, VA Administrative Village was transferred into the urban administrative 
system and renamed VA Community. The Natural Villages were renamed VA 
Community Branch, VB Community Branch etc. However, indigenous villagers, as 
well as migrants, continue to use traditional names. This thesis therefore refers ‘VA 
Community Branch’ and ‘VB Community Branch’ as ‘VA Village’ for simplicity.  
According to local residents’ oral history and VA Village Chronicles (written in 2010, 
unpublished), the area of VA Administrative Village had been inhabited at least 
before the Ming Dynasty (more than 600 years ago). Before the land requisition, 
VA Administrative Village had 4.7 km2 residential land, 1.08 km2 irrigated field, 
2.16 km2 dry land, 1.93 km2 mountain/forest/slope land, 0.35 km2 
pond/river/reservoir land and 1.33 km2 costal land (statistics from VA Village 
Chronicles). The majority of villagers were peasants, making their livelihood from 
farming.  
During the urbanisation launched after the 1980s, the village’s land was gradually 
requisitioned for infrastructure construction, e.g. building the Gaoqi International 
Airport and city roads. In 1993, to extend the industrial zone, almost all of the 
farmland was requisitioned and transferred for industrial use. Subsequently, a lot 
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of manufacturing factories were constructed surrounding the village. Labourers, 
mostly migrants from rural areas, flooded into the industrial zone for jobs. To 
make a livelihood, villagers sized the opportunity to extend and enlarge their own 
houses, and rent vacant rooms out to accommodate those labourers. Soon the 
village became crowded and congested, full of informal settlements and tenants. 
The population of tenants was more than ten times that of indigenous villagers at 
its peak. In around 2008, the population of tenants peaked at more than 100,000 
(according to interviews with indigenous villagers). By 2013, the number had 
decreased to around 50,000. In contrast, indigenous villagers are a small group, 
numbering 6,250 in 2010 (1,906 in VA and VB villages), as shown in the following 
table (3.6).  
Village Household Team No. Household Population 
VM village 1 114 342 
2 (including VK village) 112 356 
3 100 312 
VC village 4 58 149 
VB village 5 200 566 
VA village 6 122 333 
7 118 342 
8 112 333 
17 111 332 
VA village 9 161 603 
10 95 358 
11 153 537 
12 86 302 
16 77 303 
VL village 13 83 243 
14 73 249 
15 99 319 
18 91 271 
Migrants 19 ? ? 
Total  1965+? 6250+? 
Table 3. 6 Demographics in 2010 
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Notes: The population of migrants is unavailable since the group is massive and 
highly mobilised.  
Source: VA Village Chronicles (written at 2011, unpublished) 
The population is governed by an autonomous grass-roots organisation – VA 
Community Committee (VACC). Officially, members of the committee should be 
elected by all indigenous villagers. There is another organisation, VA Committee 
Branch of the Chinese Communist Party (VACBCCP). Members of VACBCCP consist 
of CPC party members within VACC, and the leadership is appointed by its upper-
level CCP committee branch – SO Street Committee Branch of CCP (SOSCBCCP). In 
practice, VACC is in charge of civil affairs while VACBCCP is in charge of political 
affairs, and both are under the administration of SO Street Office. Members of the 
two committees are usually overlapped, as shown in the following table (3.7).  
Position in VACBCCP Name Position in VACC Name 
Secretary A Head B 
Vice-Secretary B Vice-Head E 
C 
Other Members  D Other Members G 
E H 
F I 
Table 3. 7 The authority of VA Administrative Village 
VACC has six sub-organisations: four committees, in charge of conflicts conciliation, 
public security, public health and civil affairs; and two working teams, in charge of 
emigrant affairs and birth control. Furthermore, there are eighteen household 
team leaders and up to 200 villager representatives.  
In 2003, the area of VA Village was planned to be redeveloped into a residential 
and commercial centre. This was emphasised again in 2007 when the 
administrative buildings of Huli District Government were moved to the village’s 
eastern periphery, border. Gradually, factories were demolished and the land was 
redeveloped. Only a few manufacturing factories still remained, and they would be 
replaced by real estate and commercial programmes. VA Village faced the same 
fate, listed in the agenda of redevelopment, and the programme started in 2008.  
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The Villager Collective 
Residents in VA Village consist of two distinct groups - indigenous villagers and 
migrants/tenants. Migrants are people who come from other areas and live in 
rental houses in the village. Due to the Chinese property ownership system, it is 
impossible for a migrant to buy or own a property in the village. Indigenous 
villagers are the property owners. They own the village land collectively and own 
their private constructions individually. Indigenous villagers are considered as a 
whole, composing a special group, called “the villager collective”. Members of the 
villager collective usually share something in common that links them to the group.  
This can include, but is not limited to, the others’ acceptance, kinship, Hukou status 
(registered at the village), overlapping social networks, common culture, values, 
dialect, accent, and the most important item that a member possesses properties 
(a house, or use right of a piece of land) in the village. Being a member of the 
collective, one has the entitlement to enjoy compensations and relocation houses 
from the compensation scheme in the redevelopment programme.  
However, the definition of member of the villager collective is vague and 
sometimes can be controversial.  In some circumstances it is easy to judge whether 
one is a member of the collective or not. For example, it is not hard to understand 
why villagers who were born and raised in the village within an indigenous 
household are counted as members. When a girl gets married to an outsider, 
settles in other location and changes her Hukou registration place, she is then 
considered to have quit the collective. By contrast, if as an outsider, a girl gets 
married to a member, settles down in the village, registers her Hukou at the village, 
then she will be considered as having become a member. However, there are many 
situations in which it is hard to judge if a person is a member or not. For instance, 
in the first scenario, if the married girl keeps her Hukou status, and she inherited a 
house in the village from her parents, or in the second scenario, if the person re-
registers her Hukou in the village, or if a villager just moves out to the nearby 
downtown, and registers his/her Hukou there, but he/she still works inside the 
village and spends most of time in the village, then it would be controversial to 
determine whether they are members or not. Some people may answer yes while 
some say no.  
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To solve the problem, the programme develops a criteria system to distinguish 
members from non-members. However, during the fieldwork for this study, 
company representatives acknowledged that the system was not perfect and that 
they had encountered many situations where the criteria could not clearly be 
applied. When this happened they would hold a meeting within VA Headquarters 
to discuss and judge the case. In recent years, the power to determine membership 
status of the villager collective was taken back from VA Headquarters to the 
Construction Bureau of Huli District Government.  
3.3 Field Research 
This section introduces how the field research was conducted in VA Village. First, 
the preparation work is reviewed. Then Section 3.3.2 gives an account of 
interviewees. Section 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 describes how villagers and other groups of 
informants were contacted and interviewed, respectively. Section 3.3.5 discusses 
how the interview transcripts were analysed.  
3.3.1 Preparation 
The preparation work began when VA Village was chosen. The purpose of this 
work was to understand the context of the village, identify different groups of 
stakeholders and prepare for interviews. The first step was to make the best use of 
the Internet. Key words were used to search for information, for example, ‘VA 
Village’, ‘demolition and requisition in VA Village’ in Chinese. Search results were 
examined carefully and downloaded selectively. New key words were identified 
from search results, e.g. company names of the developer, names of policies or 
some key terms from compensation schemes, and they were examined in more 
depth to accumulate more information, similar to a snowballing technique. 
Gradually, considerable secondary data had been collected, including news, 
reports, policies, relevant articles and images.  
The next phase involved me, as the researcher, becoming familiar with the case 
study surroundings and local residents. I visited VA Village and spent a couple of 
weeks observing and speaking to local officials and residents. When in the village, I 
visited the redevelopment programme’s Headquarters to find any available data, 
and acquired some free publicity materials, e.g. leaflets, brochures and DVDs, 
59 
 
which introduced the programme from the official perspective. Photos of some 
sites in the village were taken. I also had casual conversations with local residents, 
to confirm what I already knew from second-hand data and to generate more 
contextual information. Meanwhile, different groups of stakeholders were 
identified. Once I found there was little more I could discover and I knew sufficient 
context about the village, saturation point was reached and the preparation work 
was over. The next stage was to contact and interview relevant stakeholders.  
The secondary data found in this stage was useful, but had some limitations, 
especially in terms of the material found on the Internet. Firstly, some key data 
identified as being required was not available either online or offline. For example, 
many urban and district level policies were supposed to be crucial since they had 
frequently been quoted in the secondary data, e.g. news and reports, but their full 
contents turned out to be unavailable on the Internet. Secondly, the data found was 
often biased. Most news articles were very positive about the redevelopment 
programmes, probably due to the censorship regulations and few complaints, 
arguments and conflicts had been reported. Publicity materials from the 
Headquarters had the same problem. Other information sources found online, 
including articles and posts from social network sites, appeared to have been 
written by local residents, and mostly concerned the negative effects of 
redevelopment programmes, with residents making complaints, doubting the 
programme and reporting events they had witnessed in their village. It would have 
been helpful if I could have interviewed the authors of these pieces, but 
unfortunately it was difficult to contact them. Thirdly, the volume of data sources 
was limited, with online data, especially news items, comprising a large proportion 
of all the secondary data. Although data collected at the preparation stage had 
these limitations it was useful and sufficient to accomplish the purpose of case 
study contextual understanding.  
3.3.2 Account of Interviewees 
Based on the secondary data and casual conversations with local residents, 
relevant stakeholders and their administrative relationships were identified. 
Additionally, a list of key themes and issues was developed, for me, the 
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investigator, to refer to during interviews. At the end of this section, a table is 
provided to summarise all of the interview participants.   
Identifying Stakeholders 
Different groups of stakeholders were identified in the preparation stage, as well 
as their relationships in terms of administration, as the following figure (3.5) 
shows. People from these organisations were all involved in the programme, 
although the extent of their influence and participation varied. Based on the 
positions they take and the nature of their influence, they are categorised into four 
tiers. Tier One, which comprises four organisations (Label A, B and C; C includes 
two), participated in the programme mainly through an indirect way and their 
influences were mostly indirect. The interview with Mr PD, a planner in Xiamen 
Bureau of Urban Planning (Label B), revealed that the only involvement the 
Bureau had took place in the preparation stage of the programme, when the 
developer applied to the Bureau for the approval of the village’s redevelopment 
plan, as part of the initiative’s legal basis. He emphasised that the Bureau had 
never participated and should not participate in the process of requisition and 
demolition. The leadership of Xiamen Municipality (Label A) is in charge of making 
urban policies, including those for redevelopment programmes, and does not 
participate in any specific programme directly. The two Bureaus (Label C) have 
direct influence on the developer (Label F), but issues of the programme are 
beyond their reach. Tier Two, consisting of another four institutions (Label D, E, F 
and G), have direct influence on the programme, but their involvements are not 
based on a frequent or daily participation. Their major duties lie elsewhere. They 
only exercise their power occasionally, which is usually influential and decisive, on 
some major decision-making, e.g. the adoption of new compensation schemes or 
the appointment of new programme managers. Tier Three, including six groups 
(Label H, I, J, K, L and M), are the main functioning agencies of the programme and 
participate in the programme on a daily basis. For instance, organisations (Label H 
to L) have the duty of contacting and negotiating with the decision makers of 
indigenous villagers (Label M) face to face, drafting and signing contracts etc. Tier 
Four (Label N), are the migrants (tenants) who leave their home to come to the 
city to make a living. They treat the village as a temporary shelter, although some 
61 
 
of them have lived there for ten years. Their lives have been affected by the 
programme, to some extent, but many actors, including often themselves, consider 
them as outsiders and exclude them from the programme. They have little 
influence in the programme, and do not try to acquire any.  
 
Figure 3. 5 Administrative structures of organisations 
In the figure, an arrow means “has direct influence to” or “in charge of”. What the 
labels stand for could be found in Table 3.9 in the section of Summary of 
Interviewees. Tier One contains A, B and C; Tier Two contains D, E, F and G; Tier 
Three contains H, I, J, K, L and M, and Tier Four contains N. Therefore, the 
interview strategy was conceived accordingly. It was clear that the investigation 
should focus mainly on Tier Three’s groups during the field research, since they 
were the main participants directly involved in the process. Within the other three 
tiers, whether or not to interview Tier One seemed to make little difference to the 
research due to their limited understanding of, and participation in, the 
programme. However, it was clear that it would be helpful, for policy 
interpretation, to interview policy makers from the leadership of Xiamen 
Municipality. Although participants from Tier Two have limited involvement, they 
play an important role in the programme. VA Headquarters (Label H) is made up of 
a general commander, a vice-general commander, and members from 
organisations I, J K and L. The position of commander is usually taken by leaders 
from D, E or G in Tier Two. However, the accessibility to Tier One and Two turned 
out to be a big challenge. The last one is Tier Four. Given the fact that there are 
plenty of tenants living in the village, and interviewing them would not be difficult, 
a couple of interviews could be conducted to know how much they understand 
about the programme.  
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Designing Interview Guide 
A list of key points was developed, based on research questions. The guide was 
used as a check list to direct me to develop open-ended questions, and to make 
sure that all the relevant points were covered in the interviews.  
Category Key Points 
Basic information The interviewee’s background (age, education, role in the 
programme etc.) 
Understanding of policies and the 
programme 
Understanding of policies (how do they know them; to what 
extent do they know them) 
Understanding of compensation scheme (how do they know 
it) 
Events in the implementation The interviewee’s participation (what have he done) 
The others’ participation (what have the other stakeholders 
done) 
Big events or conflicts 
Problems of the programme What makes the programme problematic in implementation 
How and why these problems generate 
Table 3. 8 Interview guide 
Based on each point, many questions were asked accordingly. For example, 
reference “big events or conflicts happened” led to questions such as “when did it 
happen”, “who participated in it”, “how did the event begin”, “what did they do”, 
“could you describe x more specifically” etc. The list was not fixed. It was 
provisional. Once new key points were identified from interviews, the list was 
expanded; or once I found that things turned out to be different from what had 
been expected from the interview guide, it was adapted to adjust to the real 
situation.  
Summary of Interviewees 
Finally, 29 participants were interviewed in total. The interviews varied, in terms 
of the length, being audio recorded or not, in a group or not. All formal interviews 
were summarised into the following table (3.9). For anonymity, real names of all 
participants will not be showed in the thesis. Instead, pseudonyms, e.g. “PM” for 
Programme Manager, “VA” for Villager A, “CRA” for Company Representative A, are 
adopted.  
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Tier Label Group Pseudonym and Position Data and 
Length 
Place and Recording 
One A Leadership of Xiamen Municipality 
B Xiamen Bureau 
of Urban 
Planning 
Mr PD, a planner March 06 
2013; ten 
minutes via 
telephone 
Unrecorded; write down 
key points during 
interview 
C State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission of Xiamen Municipality, and 
Xiamen Municipal Commission of Development and Reform 
Two D Huli District Government 
E Xiamen Bureau of Land Resource and Real Estate Management 
F CA Company 
G Huli Bureau of Construction 
Three H VA Relocation and Demolition Headquarters 
I CB Company Mr PM, the programme 
manager 
January 12, 
2013; an 
hour 
In the office of VA 
Headquarters; recorded 
and transcribed 
Mr CRD, an experienced 
company representative, who 
used to work at CC Company 
April 04, 
2013; two 
hours and 
twenty 
minutes 
At a tea room near VA 
Village; recorded and 
transcribed 
April 20, 
2013; two 
hours 
May 7, 2013; 
two hours 
J SO Street Office Mr SOC, a low-ranking official 
from SO Street Office, and 
now working at the 
Headquarters in charge of 
publicity and record keeping 
March 22, 
2013; half an 
hour 
In the office of SO Street 
Office; recorded and 
transcribed 
K CC Company Mr CRC, a company 
representative 
December 02 
2012; half an 
hour 
In the office of VA 
Headquarters; recorded 
and transcribed 
Mr CRS, a company 
representative 
December 09 
2012; half an 
hour 
In the office of VA 
Headquarters; recorded 
and transcribed 
Mr CRA, a company 
representative 
March 08, 
2013; fifteen 
minutes 
In the Headquarters’ 
reception room in VA 
Village; unrecorded, 
take key points during 
interview 
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L VA Community 
Committee and 
VA CCP Branch 
Committee 
Mr VCH, the Head of VA 
Community Committee 
February 19, 
2013; fifteen 
minutes 
In the Committee’s 
office; unrecorded, take 
key points during 
interview 
M Indigenous 
Villagers 
Mr VS, a middle-age man; Mr 
ZH, an elder man who used to 
be the leader of the fifth 
household team 
February 03, 
2013; two 
hours 
At Mr VS’s home; 
recorded and 
transcribed 
Mr VF, Mr VT, Mr VZ, Mr VL 
and Mr VJ, elder men, and Mr 
VD, a middle-age man. Mr VF 
and Mr VT have attended 
primary school. Mr VD has 
graduated from a college 
February 23, 
2013; an 
hour and a 
half 
At the Fifth Team’s 
Activity Centre for 
Elders; recorded and 
transcribed 
Mrs VBA, Mrs VTA and Mrs 
VCH, elder women (Non-
decision makers) 
March 08, 
2013; half an 
hour 
At the VA Village’s 
Activity Centre for 
Elders; recorded and 
transcribed 
Mr VF and Mr VT March 13, 
2013; an 
hour 
At the Fifth Team’s 
Activity Centre for 
Elders; recorded and 
transcribed 
Mrs VSL, an elder woman, 
who has signed the contract 
and moved out at 2009 
March 18, 
2013; half an 
hour 
At Mr X’s home; 
unrecorded, take key 
points during interview 
Mr VF March 26, 
2013; fifteen 
minutes 
At the Fifth Team’s 
Activity Centre for 
Elders; recorded and 
transcribed 
Mr VF, Mr VL; Mr VN, a 
middle-age man 
April 02, 
2013; an 
hour and a 
half 
At the Fifth Team’s 
Activity Centre for 
Elders; recorded and 
transcribed 
Mr VF and Mr VT April 20, 
2013; an 
hour 
At the Fifth Team’s 
Activity Centre for 
Elders; recorded and 
transcribed 
Mr VH and his wife Mrs VWI, 
middle-age couple, who run a 
wine shop in the village 
April 24, 
2013; fifteen 
minutes 
At the tea room of the 
wine shop, partially 
recorded and 
transcribed; take key 
points during the 
unrecorded interview 
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Mr VF April 27, 
2013; fifteen 
minutes 
At the Fifth Team’s 
Activity Centre for 
Elders; recorded and 
transcribed 
Four  N Tenant A, a street cleaner, 
and Tenant B, a street stall 
keeper 
February 28, 
2013; fifteen 
minutes 
At a rest point in the 
village; recorded and 
transcribed 
Tenant Mr TH and his wife 
tenant Mrs TW, a middle-age 
couple and labourers, who 
have lived here for more than 
ten years 
March 08, 
2013; half an 
hour 
At the courtyard of 
tenant’s house; 
recorded and 
transcribed 
Tenant E and F, street 
cleaners 
March 23, 
2013; half an 
hour 
At a rest point in the 
village; recorded and 
transcribed 
Table 3. 9 Summary of interviews 
The interviews were conducted during December 2012 and May 2013. The result 
was fruitful. From interviews with villager, company representatives and tenants, I 
have accumulated considerable data. When the marginal output decreased to the 
extent that I felt I had collected sufficient data and few new things could be 
generated if I kept interviewing them, I perceived it as a signal to stop the field 
research. From government officials, I did not acquire what I want to know from 
them. That was because it was hard to get access to them, and even when I had 
opportunities to interview some of them, they refused to contribute their 
knowledge to the topic. Therefore, 29 participants were interviewed in total. It was 
not enough since there was a lack of voices from officials, but I had to accept the 
result since there were few things I could do to improve the situation. More details 
about the interview process as well as a reflection will be introduced in the next 
three sections.  
3.3.3 Contacting Indigenous Villagers 
Instead of contacting interviewees in the order of Tier One to Tier Four, I 
categorised them, based on their roles and positions, into the group of villagers 
and the group of non-villagers (the authority representatives, the developer 
representatives and tenants), and I started with interviewing villagers, then the 
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others, since villagers seemed to be more accessible and they were also key 
informants.  
To some extent, indigenous villagers still have a patriarchal tradition within the 
family. The power of making decisions for big issues like children’s education, 
marriage arrangements, and family assets management, usually remains in the 
hands of the family’s elder men. Furthermore, characterised as a “left-behind” 
village, in terms of indigenous families, the village has many empty-nesters and 
few young generations. Young people tend to live outside the village to access 
better living conditions, education and job opportunities. Based on these factors, 
all the indigenous villagers are categorised into decision makers and non-decision 
makers. However, it should be noted that the boundary between these two 
categories may not always be clear or definitive in some cases. For instance, it is 
impossible that a man makes his decision absolutely independently. More or less, 
the decision is affected by his wife, children, neighbours, close friends and relatives. 
Nevertheless, what the thesis concerns more is what the decision is and what are 
the reasons, rather than who actually contributes more to the decision-making. I 
give the tag “decision makers” to the elder men since I consider them as an access 
to the information the thesis requires.  
Decision Makers 
Decision makers (DMs) are made up of mostly elder men, usually aged over forty. 
Only a small number of DMs were younger than this. To contact indigenous 
villagers, at first, I introduced myself and had casual conversations with villagers 
that I met. A difficulty then arose as it was not easy to meet indigenous villagers. 
The population of migrants heavily outweighs the population of indigenous 
villagers. The estimated proportion is roughly 5:1 or more. Most shops and street 
stalls seen in the village were run by migrants as well. The opportunities, therefore, 
to find indigenous villagers in public areas were limited. When I had a better 
understanding of the village’s surroundings, I finally found a mechanism for 
meeting indigenous villagers and DMs. Many elders live on rental income and have 
no jobs. They spend a lot of their time socialising with their peers in the village, 
usually in places such as the chess room, public activity room, tea house and local 
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temples, to relax, play board games, watch TV or chat. These locations enabled me 
to meet research participants from this group.   
However, it was still difficult to recruit DMs to the research and to conduct 
interviews with them. Some company representatives viewed the elder group as 
“stubborn” (as they said), due to their negative and hostile attitude towards the 
programme and representatives. The attitude seems to be derived from the fact 
that they valued their property a great deal in financial (as well as other) terms but 
the price offered was far less than their expectations. Born and raised in the village, 
and having spent all their lives there, the elders had built a special emotional bond 
with their houses and land. The village was regarded as both a physical and a 
spiritual hometown. Furthermore, there was a prevailing misunderstanding 
among villagers. They confused the urban requisition policies with the rural 
policies, and believed that they deserved the high compensation level formulated 
in the urban policies. Therefore, the price they expected was more than the price 
offered, so they felt angry and even insulted about the cheap price. This resulted in 
many elders refusing to be interviewed on this topic and being angered and 
distressed about discussing it. Some even responded by yelling angrily that, “I will 
not allow CCP to rob the land from me”, “only shameful heirs would sell their 
ancestors’ land for such a cheap price” or “if I sell the land, how could I face my 
ancestors when I meet them down there?” Therefore, an investigator like myself 
was not particularly welcome. It was a huge challenge to conduct an in-depth 
interview, or even to just have a conversation with them on this topic.  
Two factors helped me eventually to accomplish the interviews successfully. The 
first was being able to speak the South Fujian Dialect (SFD, distinct from 
Mandarin). Due to the Chinese context, the elder group were mostly illiterate or 
only had a basic schooling. Many of them could not speak Mandarin proficiently. 
SFD was their mother tongue and the language they used in daily conversations. It 
was an important cultural symbol used to identify whether someone belonged to 
their community or not. Even though I was an outsider, being able to communicate 
with them in SFD helped to break the ice when we had just met and to bridge the 
distance and mistrust that they may have felt towards me. Another minor point is 
that, my family name is Hong, which happens to be one of the top ten family names 
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among indigenous villagers. Several villagers mistakenly believed that I was 
originally from VA Village or had some kinship-relations. It somehow reduced their 
hostility towards me, although I clarified it immediately once I realised that they 
had made a mistake.  
The second one was patience. Although I kept being rejected, I kept trying. At the 
end of the conversations, I would also ask the villagers to introduce me to other 
DMs who may want to talk about the topic. Finally, a villager led me to a hangout 
spot, the 5th Team’s Activity Centre for Elders, and introduced me to some elders 
who appeared more willing to engage with the research. After several rounds of 
conversations, I identified that two elder men there (villagers Mr VF and Mr VT) 
were figures in the leadership of DMs, who had participated in organising a series 
of collective resistance actions before, e.g. raising a fund to hire lawyers from 
Beijing to sue the governmental department. I knew that they should be 
knowledgeable insiders, and were exactly the key informants I was looking for. 
Afterwards, in order to build mutual trust with them, I visited the spot as 
frequently as possible. They only came there occasionally, so I had to be lucky to 
meet them. During my field research, six indigenous villagers, including the two 
leaders, were regular visitors, and on average, they visited the centre two to four 
times a week, from around 9-10:30 AM. They were all middle aged or elder men 
and the DMs of their family. Sometimes only one came; sometimes as many as five 
or six came. The centre was used as a place to relax and socialise. They chatted, 
played pool, tasted tea, read newspapers or watched TV there. In my first few visits, 
they did not find my attendance annoying, but equally they did not want to share 
too much information with me. After several rounds of meetings, we became more 
familiar, and built a mutual trust. As they gradually began to treat me as an insider, 
they talked to me more and more casually and frankly contributing a great deal to 
the data. More details about interview dates, length and so on are provided in the 
above table (3.9).  
Non-decision Makers 
Non-decision makers usually included, but were not limited to, dependants, 
teenagers, young adults or other female members in families. As mentioned, VA 
Village is a “left-behind village” or “empty-nest village”. Young generations of 
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indigenous villagers tend to live out of the village. Even those who remain living in 
the village were often devoted to study or to work outside the village. It was hard 
to meet them in the daytime. Furthermore, these young villagers usually did not 
have many concrete details to contribute to the topic. Company representatives 
confirmed that they had not had much experience in contacting young people, 
since they did not participate in the programme. Therefore, young villagers were 
excluded from the interview plan. On the contrary, elder women were easier to 
find. They had more spare time to hang out around the village and were often 
willing to talk to me. Since the field research mainly focuses on DMs, only three 
non-decision makers were interviewed in the group.  
3.3.4 Contacting Other Stakeholders 
Unlike villagers, this group of informants were much more challenging to contact 
and interview, except for tenants.  
Representatives of the Authority Group 
The authority group was the most difficult one to get access to. Generally, in 
China’s current political situation, officials do not accept ordinary people’s 
requests for an interview, unless the interviewer has some good reasons to 
convince them to do so willingly, or the interviewer has a powerful social network 
to force them to participate. I started to make contacts with officials as soon as the 
field research began, hoping to gain a chance to conduct an interview, but the 
efforts were in vain. The topic was politically sensitive, which made it unwelcome. 
Then, I started to examine my social networks (personal connections), and tried to 
discover something useful from others’ social networks, e.g. close relatives, friends 
and classmates. It took time, but finally I was introduced to four officials for one-off 
interviews. One was in Tier One and the other three were in Tier Three. One 
preferred to be interviewed via telephone, while the others accepted face-to-face 
interviews. Only a low-ranking official agreed to the interview being recorded. 
However, the quality and outcome of the interviews were not as good as I had 
expected. Part of reason could be my lack of good interview skills.  Other reasons 
were the sensitivity of the topic and the fact that the power relationships were 
unbalanced. I was perceived to be in a lower position, and it turned out that the 
higher the positions the interviewees held, the more evasive they appeared to be in 
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talking about the topic. They were extremely cautious and reticent in interviews, 
avoiding discussions like arguments, conflicts, or any other controversial issues 
that had happened. Sometimes they simply refused to answer specific questions 
and sometimes they just gave what appeared to be generalised, mundane and 
‘bureaucratic’ answers. Especially the official interviewed via telephone, who 
tended to break off the conversation after a short period. Given the fact that the 
topic is controversial, this phenomenon is understandable, as Weiss (1994: 20) 
indicated, a person who is more central to the system would be less willing to 
describe and admit the system’s failings.  
Representatives of the Developer Group 
Representatives of the developer group were in Tier Three. Interviewing them was 
easier than with the authority representatives. The main respondents in this group 
were CB Company and its partner CC Company. I managed to contact and 
interview a company representative via my personal social network and, as a 
result, interview some others through him using a snowballing approach. Finally, 
the participants I interviewed comprised the programme manager, who was in 
charge of the programme, and four company representatives, who were in charge 
of negotiating with villagers. Compared to interviewees from the authority group, 
surprisingly, they were more willing and open to discuss arguments, conflicts and 
tensions in the programme. The reason for this could be that most conflicts 
happened in the past at a time when the developer used a strategy considered 
controversial, and the staff involved in those conflicts were different from the 
present ones. In contrast, the current strategy was considered to be much more 
successful and to have gained more progress. The main difficulty with conducting 
the interviews lay in a situation that was unexpected. My questions were 
frequently either not understood or were challenged by the interviewees. Part of 
the reason could have been my lack of experience in interviewing. Another 
speculation was that they did not understand my research. They considered 
themselves, exclusively, professionals in this field with a rich working experience 
and a profound understanding of the issue. For example, they could name many of 
the villagers, and were even familiar with their background, family issues, social 
networks and personal habits. 
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Therefore, they treated our relationship as expert vs. outsider. In interviews, 
sometimes they found my questions difficult to interpret in their own way. They 
seemed to expect questions soliciting their subjective knowledge, e.g. attitudes, 
opinions, evaluations, and particularly on topics like suggestions towards urban 
village policies. When it came to questions concerning objective “truth”, e.g. 
concrete descriptions about their biographies, experience, and details of events 
that happened in VA Village, they would doubt my questions and research. They 
did not feel they wanted to talk about these “minor and useless” issues. Comments 
included: “the question does not help you to understand urban villages because 
this is unique, only exists in this village”, “I don’t think this question is relevant to 
your research”, “why does this question matter” and “your research focuses on a 
wrong direction, you should focus on…”. Actually, in interviews with villagers, the 
same problem happened. They wanted more to talk about the dark side of society 
and the corruption of the authority as if it were a journalistic interview, rather 
than specific and personal daily issues. Occasionally, villagers even doubted 
whether I, a young student without sufficient social experience, could truly 
understand the complexity of the topic. In all such circumstances, I would answer 
their questions honestly by explaining my research purpose again, trying to 
convince them that their answers to the questions were useful and important for 
the research. In spite of this, interviews with them were fruitful.  
Tenants 
Tenants were the main residents of the village. Basically, they were low-income 
migrants from rural areas. They came to the city to seek better opportunities to 
earn money and chose to live in the urban village primarily for its low rent and 
good location. It was easy to find and interview them. However, it turned out that 
they did not have much knowledge to contribute to this topic. They did not 
participate in the programme and furthermore, they barely had any 
communication or contacts with indigenous villagers, even though some of them 
had dwelled there for as long as ten years. Most migrants spoke Mandarin, usually 
with a strong accent from their rural hometowns, rather than South Fujian Dialect. 
It seriously hindered their communication with villagers. What made the 
communication more difficult was that, indigenous villagers also appeared to have 
72 
 
discriminatory attitudes towards tenants, considering them as the underclass, who 
were uneducated, behaving unmannerly, struggling to live and worked as low-end 
labourers like shop keepers, gate keepers, street venders, maids, cleaners or waste 
recyclers. Tenants had a fluid existence. When their living environments became 
worse, tenants would simply move to another urban village. Six tenants were 
interviewed during the field research.  
3.3.5 Analysing Interview Transcripts 
The approach of issue-focused analysis is adopted to analyse the interviewing data. 
The interests of the research are embedded in how actions are taken and how 
conflicts are generated. In interviews, respondents had been directed to contribute 
their biographical experience and knowledge on specific events and processes, like 
story-telling. Consequently, the interview data is conceived of as “stories”. 
However, the stories were not linked logically and coherently. The researcher 
needed to develop key themes and establish a framework to organise them. 
Therefore, an issue-focused analysis was applied. Through the analysis, the 
seemingly chaotic materials were extracted and re-organised into an issue-focused 
description, which “is likely to move from discussion of issues within one area to 
discussion of issues within another, with each area logically connected to the others 
(Weiss, 1994: 154).”  
Before the analysis, a transcript of interviews was needed. During the fieldwork, 
audio-recordings were transcribed as soon as possible when they were generated. 
It helped to minimise potential disturbances caused by problems like fuzzy sounds, 
chaotic discussions and poor recording quality, with the assistance of fresh 
memory about the interviews. Another merit of this practice was being able to take 
advantage of the informative transcripts for the interviews that followed. 
Particularly, the interviews in the early stages of the research were useful as 
learning experiences to eliminate any bias that might exist in the investigator’s 
initial understanding, as:  
Our construction is never exactly right. When we actually interview someone in 
the situation, we inevitably discover that we didn’t understand fully, and perhaps 
not at all.  
73 
 
Weiss (1994, 52) 
When the field research was completed, the work of transcribing was also almost 
completed. The final combined interview transcripts comprised a total of around 
380, 000 words. Before the analysis, the final transcripts were scrutinised several 
times to familiarise the researcher with the content.  
In the transcribing process, a linguistic problem was encountered. Most interviews 
with villagers were conducted by communicating in South Fujian Dialect. SFD is so 
distinct that some vocabularies, expressions and idioms in SFD do not have exact 
counterparts in Mandarin and its writing system. There was a danger that part of 
the respondents’ authentic meanings might be lost in the compromise of using 
similar Mandarin expressions. When excerpts of such transcriptions were 
translated into English and quoted in the thesis, the meanings could be distorted 
further. This situation had the potential to generate bias in a readers’ 
understanding. Nevertheless, such negative influence is reduced to a minor issue 
since the thesis provides detailed interpretations where the excerpts are used. 
Generally, the advantage of mastering a dialect to communicate with respondents 
far outweighs the disadvantages it had.  
The issue-focused analysis includes four steps, which are coding, sorting, local 
integration and inclusive integration. Before the coding, a broad and sketchy 
framework is developed from research questions and the interview guide, see the 
following table (3.10).   
Category Sub-category 
Planning process Previous process 
Current process 
Policy-making Process of policy-making 
Participation 
Decision-making Information acquiring 
Power, resources 
Considerations 
Policy interpretation 
Issue and event Cause 
Action 
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Result 
How conflicts develop  
Stakeholders’ relationships  
Table 3. 10 Initial framework from research design 
The table was used as an initial reference for coding. It was not fixed and was 
revised within the process. Categories were expanded from a word to a short 
phase based on the text. When excerpts included in a category became too large 
because the category was too broad and general, it was divided into narrower 
categories. When an excerpt could not be coded by existing categories, a new one 
was created and added to the table. The transcript was read and coded selectively, 
either line-by-line or trunk-by-trunk (or topical unit by topical unit). It was 
unnecessary to code every word, sentence and paragraph. For example, texts 
irrelevant to the research topic or research questions, or repeated and redundant 
texts, were not coded. Once the work of coding was finished, all the codes 
(categories) were reviewed to make any necessary refinement and revisions, e.g. 
conceptualise and theorise names of codes further, merging similar codes, delete 
unrelated and unimportant codes.  
When the work of coding was finished, the analysis moved to the next step of 
sorting. Excerpts labelled under the same code were extracted and filed into a 
corresponding folder with the code title. The operation was assisted by a computer 
and word processing programmes. The result of sorting was a set of file folders, 
each of which contained excerpts with the same code.  
The next step was local integration, in which materials of the file folder were 
interpreted and summarised into the main line and variants (Weiss, 1994: 158-
160). The research has an exception that, in some topics, two distinct 
interpretations were identified from the group of villagers and the group of the 
authority and the developer. There is an example from the file folder of 
“interpretation of the new compensation scheme”. Respondents from the former 
group believed that the scheme had enjoyed an outstanding compensation level, 
much higher than what the policy formulated. On the contrary, villagers claimed 
that it was substandard since there was a new regulation, which formulated that 
the requisition price for houses must refer to the market price of the nearby 
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commercial housing. Therefore, rather than define them into main line vs. variant, 
I labelled them as the developer’s view vs. the villagers’ view. In addition to the 
summary of the material, I also wrote down my interpretation and reflection of the 
material, e.g. why there was a divergence and how this material might link to the 
broad theme of the thesis.  
The final step was inclusive integration, in which a framework was developed to 
knit the collection of excerpt files into a single coherent story, moving logically 
from one area to the next, and leading to some general conclusions (Weiss, 1994: 
160-162). It required the researcher to scrutinise the analysis from local 
integration to find interrelations. When I went through all kinds of divergences 
and my reflections, I was enlightened with the thought that perhaps they were 
derived from the distinct backgrounds the two groups had, in terms of knowledge 
structure, social experience, education level, information acquiring and 
interpretation etc. In fact, many divergences were generated due to villagers’ 
misinterpretations. Consequently, a key theme was developed, which aimed to 
explore the characteristics of decision makers in ordinary villagers, their social 
networks and information interpretation. Based on this, I realised social capital 
theory could be a potential theory to apply to the research. Then another key 
theme was conceived, about how cooperation was formed or declined between 
two groups during the programme. Eventually, a logical framework emerged and 
refined to present the fieldwork findings.  
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Chapter Four - Theoretical Framework 
4.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to review social capital theory and discuss how it is 
applied as theoretical framework for the thesis. The chapter covers Bourdieu’s, 
Coleman’s and Putnam’s conceptualisations of the theory, the key contemporary 
criticisms about it, the theory’s application in the field of urban regeneration and 
how this thesis will use the theory. The chapter is structured as three parts: review 
of social capital theory (Section 4.2), social capital theory in urban regeneration 
(Section 4.3) and the theoretical framework (Section 4.4). The chapter concludes 
that social capital theory is an appropriate framework for this study and the 
review of the literature has enabled the research questions to be identified.  
4.2 Review of Social Capital Theory 
The theory of social capital has been developed in recent decades. Pierre Bourdieu 
is the first scholar who develops and theorises the term ‘social capital’ 
systematically. In The Forms of Capital (Bourdieu, 1986), he criticises economic 
theory for using a single form of capital to explain the function of the complicated 
social world. This approach simplifies ‘universe of exchanges’ into ‘mercantile 
exchange’, characterised by the principle of ‘the maximization of profit’ (Bourdieu, 
1986: 242). Instead, Bourdieu attempts to develop a new framework, in which he 
argues that capital has three fundamental forms: economic capital, cultural capital 
and social capital. Economic capital is the root of all forms, and the other two are 
the disguised forms of the first one. There is also a fourth form named symbolic 
capital, which arises from the three forms. He defines social capital as:  
Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked 
to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of 
mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group 
– which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned 
capital, a “credential” which entitles them to credit, in the various sense of the word. 
(Bourdieu, 1986: 248-249) 
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Bourdieu’s understanding of social capital has two important features in this work. 
First, he emphasises the function of relationships. It is presupposed that such 
relationships derive from ‘material and/or symbolic exchanges’, ‘the application of 
a common name’, or ‘a whole set of instituting acts designed simultaneously to 
form and inform those who undergo them’ (Bourdieu, 1986: 249). A fundamental 
element to unify and maintain a group is that the membership of the group 
continuously profits members, either consciously or unconsciously. Second, he 
highlights the role of leadership in a group. The delegation system ‘is the basis of 
the existence of the group’ (Bourdieu, 1986: 251). It enables the group’s social 
capital to be concentrated totally in the hands of group leaders, to stand for the 
group, to act on behalf of the group, and to exercise the power generated from the 
capital of collectivities. A key feature of Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of social 
capital is that it does not exist equally among groups in society. It is used to confer 
advantages arising precisely because it is uniquely held by elite groups. This is in 
contrast to the conceptualisation of social capital by Putnam (2000), who appears 
to suggest that stocks of social capital can be unlimited and enhanced across 
groupings in society. Schuller et al (2000: 5) critique Bourdieu’s work, arguing that 
a major weakness is that it is not being based on an empirical study. The concept 
largely remains undeveloped and it is used more metaphorically rather than 
analytically. Nevertheless, Bourdieu’s work is ‘crucial in establishing social capital 
as a field of study’, which has prompted further theoretical and empirical 
investigation in this field.  
James Coleman, a North American sociologist, develops the concept further 
(Coleman, 1988). Coleman does not refer to Bourdieu in his work, and their 
conceptualisation about social capital is not the same. In contrast to Bourdieu who 
treats social capital as elite groups’ particular sources, Coleman extends it to 
ordinary groups and even to deprived communities. Coleman’s work derives from 
his attempt to develop a social theory to describe and explain social actions, based 
on two prevailing models from sociology and economics. In his conceptualisation, 
social structure, the key component from a sociological perspective is introduced 
and integrated into a rational action paradigm, the basis of the economic model. 
Social capital theory is then developed as a conceptual tool to assist the work. 
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Coleman does not define the term straightforwardly; instead he argues that social 
capital is ‘defined by its function’ (Coleman, 1988: 98). In his framework, social 
capital is ‘a particular kind of resource available to an actor’ (Coleman, 1988: 98). 
To be more specific, it is treated as a person’s ‘organisational resources’ deriving 
from the ‘changes’ within his social networks that can be used to facilitate certain 
actions, which ‘would not be possible in its absence’ (Coleman, 1988: 98-100). For 
Coleman (1988: 101-105), there are three forms of social capital. The first can be 
described as reciprocal social capital, generated from the sense of ‘obligation’ 
people feel in doing things in return for those who hold the corresponding 
‘expectations’, under a certain degree of ‘trustworthiness’ within a group (Coleman, 
1988: 101-102). The second can be described as informational social capital, which 
benefits a person by providing him with information from ‘channels’ inherent in 
his social networks in order to facilitate actions (Coleman, 1988: 102-104). The 
third can be described as normative social capital, which is characterised as ‘fragile’ 
but ‘powerful’, constituted from ‘the existence of an effective norm’ within a 
‘collectivity’ to facilitate certain actions and even prevent others from acting on 
some occasions, e.g. to ‘inhibit the activities of criminals’ (Coleman, 1988: 104-
105). A necessary condition for the first and third forms of social capital is the 
‘closure’ of the group’s social networks, which enables the ‘proliferation of 
obligations and expectations’, as well as ‘sanctions’, seen as a kind of punishment, 
or a  negative ‘externality’ imposed by actions (Coleman, 1988: 105-108). He also 
argues that an organisation brought into being for a certain set of purposes can 
also generate social capital to aid other sets of purposes. Coleman’s contribution to 
the development of social capital is significant. His work has influenced policy 
makers, and his relatively straightforward account of the concept draws 
widespread attention from social researchers, strongly shaping the contemporary 
debate (Schuller, 2000: 6-7).  
Although Robert Putnam’s background is mainly as a political scientist, he has 
undertaken considerable work (Putnam, 1993a, 1993b, 1996, 2000) that draws 
much attention to social capital and brought the concept into wider academic and 
policy-making debates. His understanding of social capital comes from his 
empirical study investigating the relationship between traditions of civic 
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engagement, quality of government and community development in northern and 
southern Italy. He found that social capital plays a crucial role in economic 
development, particularly in solving the ‘dilemma of collective action and the self-
defeating opportunism’ (Putnam, 1993a: 167). Putnam gives a definition that:  
Social capital here refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and 
networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated 
actions. 
(Putnam, 1993a: 167) 
Networks, norms and trust are viewed as three key components of social capital in 
Putnam’s definition. He also elaborates on their functions (Putnam, 1993a: 171-
174). Trust is necessary to sustain and facilitate cooperation, which then generates 
further trust sequentially. Trust can arise from the other two components, norms 
and networks. Influenced by Coleman, Putnam views norms as a kind of 
mechanism that ‘transfer(s) the right to control an action from the actor to others, 
typically because that action has “externalities”’ (Putnam, 1993a: 171). Such 
mechanisms exist when there is an absence of markets as well as individuals’ 
effective interventions over the rights of control of the action that poses ‘similar 
externalities for a set of others’ (Putnam, 1993a: 171). Norms are formed in a 
different way to trust. They are ‘inculcated and sustained by modelling and 
socialization (including civic education) and by sanctions’ (Putnam, 1993a: 171). 
Of all kinds of norms, the most important one is reciprocity, which includes two 
sorts:  balanced (or specific) and generalised (or diffuse). The former refers to ‘a 
simultaneous exchange of items of equivalent value’, while the latter refers to ‘a 
continuing relationship of exchange that is at any given time unrequited or 
imbalanced, but that involves mutual expectations that a benefit granted now 
should be repaid in the future’ (Putnam, 1993a: 172). The function of the latter one 
is emphasised, since it is highly productive. Social networks are categorised as of a 
horizontal type, which ‘brings together agents of equivalent status and power’, and 
a vertical type, which ‘links unequal agents in asymmetric relations of hierarchy 
and dependence’ (Putnam, 1993a: 173). In the real world, networks exist in a 
mixture of two types. Networks of civic engagement are made up of ‘intense 
horizontal interaction’ (Putnam, 1993a: 173). The denser such networks are, the 
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more likely a collective action will form. Putnam details how this works: networks 
of civic engagement, firstly, ‘increase the potential costs to a defector in any 
individual transaction’; secondly, they ‘foster robust norms of reciprocity’; thirdly, 
they ‘facilitate communication and improve the flow of information about the 
trustworthiness of individuals’; and fourthly, they ‘embody past success at 
collaboration’. In contrast, a vertical network is less helpful (Putnam, 1993a: 173-
174). Regardless of its density and importance to its participants, such a network 
is not able to sustain social trust and cooperation. The reasons are that the 
information flows are less reliable among subordinates and upper levels, and 
sanctions that enable norms of reciprocity are more difficult to effect within such 
networks.  
The definition of social capital then changes slightly in his following work: 
By ‘social capital’ I mean features of social life – networks, norms and trust – that 
enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives. 
(Putnam, 1996: 56) 
Several new points appear from the refined definition:  Putman emphasises 
‘participants’ as the heart of the notion of civic life; he treats social capital as a kind 
of instrument by mentioning the phrase ‘more effectively’; he provides the concept 
with the property of communitarianism by mentioning ‘shared objectives’ (Baron 
et al. 2000: 9-10). Later, Putnam gives another more concise definition:  
Social capital refers to connections among individuals – social networks and the 
norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them. 
(Putnam, 2000: 19) 
This definition shifts the emphasis from trust to reciprocity, and treats both as 
elements of norms that arise from social networks, constructing social capital from 
two components, namely networks and norms (Baron et al, 2000: 11; Field, 2003: 
32). He also introduces two distinct forms of social capital: bridging (or inclusive) 
and bonding (or exclusive). Bonding social capital is ‘inward looking’ and more 
likely to ‘reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups’; while bridging 
social capital is ‘outward looking’ and tends to ‘encompass people across diverse 
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social cleavages’ (Putnam, 2000: 22). Each form has its own unique function. The 
bonding form is ‘good for undergirding specific reciprocity and mobilizing 
solidarity’, which plays the role of ‘a kind of sociological superglue’, although it 
potentially ‘bolsters our narrower selves’; and the bridging form is ‘better for 
linkage to external assets and for information diffusion’, which ‘provides a 
sociological WD-40’, being able to ‘generate broader identities and reciprocity’ 
(Putnam, 2000: 22-23). Bonding social capital could have ‘negative external effects’, 
for it may create ‘strong out-group antagonism’ when it has ‘strong in-group 
loyalty’ (Putnam, 2000: 23). Influenced by Putnam’s work, Woolcock (1998; 2001) 
developed a third type, called ‘linking social capital’, which referred to links 
between individuals with different levels of power and social status.  
Two features of social capital are introduced by Putnam to enhance his conceptual 
framework. First, most components of social capital, such as trust, social norms 
and networks, are ‘moral resources’, these are ‘resources whose supply increases 
rather than decreases through use and which become depleted if not used’ 
(Putnam, 1993a: 169). In his example, if two persons show trust to each other 
more frequently, their mutual confidence will become greater. Second, Putnam 
initially understands social capital as ‘ordinarily a public good’, and suggests that it 
‘tends to be undervalued and undersupplied by private agents’ (Putnam, 1993a: 
170). In Putnam’s other example, a person’s reputation for trustworthiness 
benefits not only its owner but also those who cooperate with him, since it 
facilitates their ‘mutually rewarding cooperation’, despite the fact that such 
benefits to others are likely to be underestimated (Putnam, 1993a: 170). Therefore, 
it is argued that social capital tends to be produced as ‘a by-product of other social 
activities’ (Putnam, 1993a: 170). Later on, he revises his narrative and considers 
social capital ‘simultaneously a private good and a public good’ (Putnam, 2000: 20). 
Service clubs, for example, raise funds for public interest and at the same time 
provide members with connections that can be used for personal interest (Putnam, 
2000: 20). This feature is a mix of both Bourdieu’s and Coleman’s theories.  
Based on his framework, Putnam attempts to explain his observation that more 
and more Americans are bowling alone rather than in a team. Through the analysis 
of a range of statistical data, he develops a comprehensive social capital index 
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which includes fourteen indicators to measure a group’s social capital (Putnam 
2000: 291).  
Index Sub-index 
Measures of 
community 
organizational 
lift 
Served on committee of local organization in last year  
Served as officer of some club or organization in last year 
Civic and social organizations per 1,000 population 
Mean number of club meetings attended in last year 
Mean number of group memberships 
Measures of 
engagement in 
public affairs 
Turnout in presidential elections 
Attended public meeting on town or school affairs in last year 
Measures of 
community 
volunteerism 
Number of non-profit organizations per 1,000 population 
Mean number of times worked on community project in last year 
Mean number of times did volunteer work in last year 
Measures of 
informal 
sociability 
Agree that “I spend a lot of time visiting friends” 
Mean number of times entertained at home in last year 
Measures of 
social trust 
Agree that “Most people can be trusted” 
Agree that “Most people are honest” 
Table 4. 1 Components of comprehensive social capital index 
Sources: Putnam, 2000: 291 
To sum up, the existing literature shows that the definition of the concept varies, 
according to the position, the discipline and the background of the theorists 
conceptualising social capital. Despite the differences, there is a common 
understanding of social capital which considers personal networks, together with 
interpersonal trust and shared sets of values within a group, as key elements in 
facilitating collective actions for a mutual goal. These elements give rise to 
cooperation formed to achieve collective interests that are hard to gain if group 
members act individually.  
Social capital theory has many merits that have received recognition from 
academics. It systematically reveals the function and importance of networks, as a 
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beneficial resource in facilitating cooperation to achieve mutual goals. The focus of 
analysis is shifted from individuals to groups, and linked between micro-, meso- 
and macro-levels (Baron et al, 2000: 35-36). Therefore, to some extent, the theory 
is helpful to explain some phenomena. Within a continuous development of the 
theory in recent years, many applicable theoretical frameworks are constituted, 
and have been embraced by policy makers and scholars from a range of disciplines, 
e.g. sociology, politics, economics, health, social work, history, education and 
criminology (Woolcock, 1998: 193-196; Field, 2003: 44). For example, social 
capital has had an impact on the development of sociology (Portes, 1998: 50). 
Coleman (1988) in his own work demonstrates the effect of social capital on aiding 
the formation of human capital in the next generation. Through empirical evidence, 
he shows that sufficient social capital within the family (a child’s relations with 
other members) enables a child to make the best use of others’ human capital in 
his intellectual development, while high social capital outside the family (parents’ 
relations with other parents and institutions in the community) seems to have a 
significant correlation with students’ low dropout rate from formal education. This 
finding is supported by other independent researches, e.g. a case study of Mexican-
origin students’ performance in Californian high schools shows that students with 
higher grades are usually associated with greater level of social capital (Stanton-
Salazar and Dornbusch, 1995:130). This finding is highly rated, as ‘one of the most 
robust empirical regularities in the social capital literature’ (Glaeser et al, 2002: 
455).  
In the area of economy, there are many contributions as well. For example, Putnam 
uses the theory to explain the relationship between a region’s social capital and its 
economic property in his Italian case study (Putnam, 1993a). Due to historical 
reasons, North Italy is more civic and enjoys a higher level of social capital than the 
South. He claims that this is pivotal in solving the dilemma of collective actions. In 
his analysis, a community with dense networks of civic engagement and norms is 
able to spot, punish and inhibit defection e.g. opportunism, cheating and shirking. 
Therefore, successful cooperation is easier to form, through which economic 
development as a whole is more advanced. Although such a mechanism has not 
been robustly proven by any convincing empirical evidence, it is supported by 
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many relevant researches, as summarised by Field (2003: 50-57). For example, in 
labour markets, research found that social networks play an important role in job 
seeking (Granovetter, 1995; Calvo-Armengol and Jackson, 2004). Empirical studies 
in different circumstances and countries show that, for example, unemployed 
people use social networks in job searching in Sweden (Korpi, 2001: 166), and 
laid-off workers find jobs with the assistance of kin and close neighbours in China 
(Zhao, 2002: 563-564). Furthermore, social capital makes commercial activities 
more competitive, e.g. by spreading information and providing business 
opportunities (Hendry et al, 1991: 16; Mulholland, 1997: 703-706), or by 
establishing a consistent and stable management style (Hendry et al, 1991: 17). 
Last but not least, social networks and clusters facilitate the exchange of business 
innovation and knowledge (Porter, 2000).  
However, social capital theory has also received continuous and sharp critiques 
since it was developed. Specifically, for example, even Coleman’s and Putnam’s 
influential works are criticised. Portes (1998: 5) finds Coleman’s work problematic 
in using vague definitions and the overemphasis of strong ties, which may be less 
powerful than weak ties in some areas. Putnam’s definition suggests that social 
capital facilitates cooperation to achieve ‘shared objectives’ (Putnam, 1996: 56). 
Doubts emerge about the exact extent of the sharing, as well as whether is it 
necessary for objectives to be shared (Baron et al, 2000: 10). On a more general 
level, other weaknesses of the theory are found. Fine (2010: 125-126) summarises 
prevailing criticisms in the following form which are likely to have been ‘both 
recognised and accepted at a level of 99% or more’.  
Number Item 
1 Social capital is totally chaotic in definition, method and theory;  
2 Social capital is indiscriminately deployed across applications and 
can be more or less anything, in principle if not in practice;  
3 Social capital is parasitic on, and crudely simplifying of, other social 
theory; 
4 Social capital misunderstands both social and capital; 
5 Social capital is complicit with mainstream economics, ‘economics 
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imperialism’ and rational choice theory;  
6 Social capital neglects the economic, power, conflict, the state, 
gender, race, class, ethnicity, global, context, etc.; 
7 Social capital is self-help raised from individual to community level;  
8 Social capital has discarded Bourdieu but is bringing him back in 
piecemeal, alongside other omitted factors;  
9 Social capital induces hack academia (‘hackademia’) in publication, 
research and funding; 
10 Social capital fails to address criticism other than incorporating it 
as another factor; 
11 Social capital is Third Wayism as a weak response to neo-
liberalism; 
12 Social capital has been heavily promoted by the World Bank as a 
rhetorical device associated with the shift from the Washington to 
the post-Washington Consensus; 
13 Social capital is a peculiar end-of-millennium product of the 
retreat from the dual extremes of postmodernism and neo-
liberalism.  
Table 4. 2 Summary of criticisms 
Source: Fine, 2010: 126 
The following commentary will focus mainly on two key weaknesses: definition 
and measurement. As showed in Table 4.2, the term suffers from conceptual chaos. 
A series of ‘ambiguities and contradictions’ are identified in the literature about 
the term’s conceptualisation, e.g. whether components such as networks, norms 
and trust are ‘desirable ends in themselves’ or ‘a means to the end of local 
economic development’ (Flint and Kearns, 2006: 34). The strength of being widely 
applied in a range of disciplines and contexts is associated with the weakness that 
the concept seems to ‘lose any distinct meaning’ because of its versatility (Portes, 
1998: 3), and therefore is perceived as ‘an elastic term with a variety of meanings’ 
(DeFilippis, 2001: 782). For example, there is debate from sociologists and 
economists around the understanding of trust in social capital, regarding whether 
it is ‘a strict historical norm or a rational choice based on information’, and finally 
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the theory accepts and includes both, as forms of ‘ generalised trust’ and 
‘particularised trust’ (Patulny and Svendsen, 2007: 34-35). Furthermore, the term 
is viewed as a flawed analogy of capital, since an individual’s social capital has 
features e.g. being acquirable without calculation or material sacrifice, lacking the 
characteristic of transferability in use, and being problematic to measure over time 
etc., which are distinct when compared to other kinds of capitals, e.g. physical 
capital (Sobel, 2002: 144). Physical capital refers to physical objects such as tools 
or machines that facilitate economic production. It costs people something to gain 
physical capital. On the contrary, on many occasions, such as meeting new 
neighbours who have just moved in or making new friends in church, social capital 
is gained unconsciously as a by-product. It is also hard to transfer such a resource 
from one person to another, and monitor the change, in the way we are able to in 
the management of financial or physical capital.  
With regard to the measuring issue, three challenges are identified (Baron et al, 
2000: 26-31). The first one is a methodological issue. The diverse definitions 
require the use of ‘equivalent heterogeneity of measures’, but there is a lack of an 
appropriate technology, or a ‘methodological deflator’, to link the precision of 
results with the validity of the measures. For example, Baron et al (2000: 27) 
criticise the use of cross-country attitudinal survey data in the research conducted 
by Knack and Keefer (1997): ‘single questions about trust levels are used as 
indices of social capital, and then linked through sophisticated regressions to very 
broad measures of national economic performance, with conclusions drawn to 
several decimal points’. The second challenge is the explanation across time. It is 
difficult to distinguish dynamics and changes of components of social capital over 
time, such as trust or norms, and isolate them from others. The third one is the 
challenge of aggregation of data. Viewed from the definition of the concept, a group 
by which social capital is owned could be on any social structural level, from the 
individual to a nation, even the globe. It is also a contextual term. The 
measurement of social capital, including those measures that appear to be 
universal, such as the individual attitudinal survey, inevitably requires 
respondents to give their answers based on a certain social structural level. Then 
the difficulty emerges of how to aggregate the data across different levels. Franke 
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(2005), for instance, has contributed a detailed report, which summarises different 
types of techniques used for the measurement of social capital, and shows that 
they are all invariably limited within contextual situations and a given time.  
Despite these shortcomings, social capital theory is useful in this thesis. Firstly, 
regardless of all various definitions, I will mainly focus on the one theorized by 
Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam to avoid the chaos. Secondly, the measurement of 
social capital is problematic in quantitative research, but this is not the case in the 
qualitative field. In this thesis, conventional approaches in measuring social capital 
e.g. survey, questionnaire and statistical analysis will not be adopted. Instead, in-
depth interview, participant observation and qualitative analysis are used to 
estimate the level of social capital, e.g. high, medium, low or none. From another 
aspect of view, the theory is applied innovatively that I use the theory’s key 
concepts and framework as a lens, through which to facilitate the understanding, 
interpretation and organisation of the empirical findings. It is a tool rather than the 
core of the thesis. Therefore, some shortcomings are avoided and the rest are 
acceptable. The following empirical chapters will prove that the shortcomings 
listed do not significantly affect the usefulness of this tool.  
So far, how the concept of social capital has been developed and the theory has 
been discussed, as have debates around its strengths and weaknesses. In the next 
section, how the theory is applied in the area of urban regeneration will be 
presented, together with an examination of its gaps and weaknesses.  
4.3 Social Capital Theory in Urban Regeneration 
Urban regeneration is a global phenomenon, defined as ‘comprehensive and 
integrated vision and action which leads to the resolution of urban problems and 
which seeks to bring about a lasting improvement in the economic, physical, social 
and environmental condition of an area that has been subject to change’ (Roberts 
and Sykes, 2000: 17). To address the problems, in area-based initiatives like 
neighbourhood renewal programmes, a partnership is usually formed to include 
actors from three basic sectors: the public, private and community, to collaborate 
together. Social capital theory contributes a useful framework to understand how 
participants take advantage of their social capital to facilitate their cooperation 
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and collective actions, through which the process is shaped and developed. 
Therefore, there is a considerable research base regarding the use of social capital 
in the field of urban regeneration.  
Many efforts have been made to apply social capital theory to urban regeneration 
policy aimed at facilitating community renewal and economic development. The 
initiative seems to be derived from Putnam’s understanding about social capital. 
He claims that ‘all societies that face problems of collective action’ will evolve into 
two social equilibria: ‘always defect’ and ‘reciprocate help’ (Putnam, 1993a: 177). 
Both tend to be ‘stable’ and ‘self-reinforcing’ once attained (Putnam, 1993a: 177). 
A society trapped in the first one is doomed to ‘self-perpetuating backwardness’, 
within which it is ‘irrational’ for any member to pursue the second state (Putnam, 
1993a: 177). Societies in the situation of ‘always defect’ are worse off than those in 
a cooperative state (Putnam, 1993a: 178). Dense social capital helps such societies 
to break the balance and move toward the second equilibrium, by preventing 
‘opportunism, cheating and shirking’ in order to facilitate cooperation (Putnam, 
1993a: 178). Furthermore, social capital is also productive, viewed as ‘a vital 
ingredient’ for the world’s economic development, e.g. rural development, East 
Asia’s economic rise, as well as Western economies’ growth (Putnam, 1993b). 
Since social capital has these significant effects, it seems to be an ideal practice to 
develop an area by fostering a group’s social capital level through governmental 
intervention. Therefore, in the field of neighbourhood renewal, increasing focus is 
given towards ‘network strategies’ that aim to raise the stock of social capital 
(Munk, 2002). In the UK, for example, the diminishment of social capital is 
identified as an essential aspect in neighbourhood decline:  
The process [of decline][…] involves vital resources of ‘social capital’ — such as trust 
or community spirit — being undermined by the rapid turnover of people and 
increased fear of crime. It is on this foundation that social stability and a community 
ability to help itself is usually built — and its absence is a key factor in decline.  
(Social Exclusion Unit, 2001: 4) 
Consequently, more and more policies and programmes resonate with an 
understanding of social capital and, as such, seek to rebuild it. Under such contexts, 
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many research studies have been undertaken to improve the understanding and 
utility of social capital theory in practice. Forrest and Kearns (2001) characterise 
the concept into eight ‘manageable elements’, to make the concept more applicable 
in the policy perspective. Purdue (2001), by using social capital and social 
entrepreneur approaches, sheds light on the role of effective leadership in 
neighbourhood regeneration partnerships. These studies broaden the theoretical 
understanding of social capital, and promote the use of the theory in empirical 
research.  
Many empirical studies of urban regeneration show the merits of social capital and 
confirm its value in practice. Bull and Jones (2006) conducted comparative 
research to examine two different types of governance in urban regeneration 
between Bristol and Naples, which provided many insights to help understand the 
role of social capital in its use. It is suggested that a place’s ‘past political history’ 
and ‘nature of local social networks’ are two important criteria for exploring the 
function of social capital. Bristol enjoys a civic tradition and a high level of 
engagement in its voluntary and community sectors, which successfully promotes 
the genuine participation of residents and other groups in regeneration 
programmes. Disadvantaged groups are empowered to protect their interests 
effectively against the powerful social actors. Naples has the opposite political 
background. Therefore, to protect the public interest, the traditional common-and-
control approach, in which the government plays the dominant role and the public 
participation is limited or non-existent, is adopted in the regeneration programme. 
Although the planning process seems to be non-negotiable, eventually a 
compromise is reached under the intervention from an upper level authority that 
is brought in by commercial sector’s linking social capital. The paper makes an 
important contribution in that it implies that various forms of social capital, 
combined with the ‘uneven distribution of power and resources’, should be 
considered in such programmes when democratic participation is applied, rather 
than an ‘uncritical advocacy of pluralistic participation’. Social capital theory 
proves to be a useful analytical tool in this analysis. Another qualitative research 
study conducted by Zhai and Ng (2013) presents the strength of the theory. In this 
case, a Muslim community in Xi’an successfully counteracts a regeneration 
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programme conducted by the local government, and safeguards their living space. 
The analysis finds that factors, including religion, ethnicity, kinship relationships, 
place attachment, the commercial usage of the community and the usage of 
mosques as a socialising space as well as decision-making places, have played an 
important role in promoting the group’s cohesion to fight collectively for their 
mutual interest. The framework of social capital helps to understand these factors 
in their interpretation.  It is noteworthy, that these research studies have been 
primarily qualitative.  
There are also some empirical research studies that expose the theory’s weakness 
and doubt the effectiveness of social capital as an analytical concept. In Putnam’s 
model, social capital is ‘disproportionately important’ to the welfare of people in 
poor communities since they have few forms of alternative capital (Putnam, 2000: 
318). Thus, the poor are more likely to have a high volume of bonding social capital 
(kinship and friendship ties). However, this is questioned by a survey in six 
neighbourhoods at Bournville, Birmingham, England (Middleton et al, 2005). The 
statistical analysis shows that the poor do not always tend to have stronger family 
ties than the rich, contrary to the theory’s predictions. The research also suggests 
that social capital is ‘a product of wealth and demographics, rather than something 
that can be artificially increased and sustained by policy prescriptions’. Flint and 
Kearns (2006) found a similar result. By analysing a study of registered social 
landlords in Scotland, they confirmed that deprived communities have lower levels 
of social capital than more affluent areas, and commented that social capital is 
limited as a policy tool for reducing social exclusion and improving social cohesion. 
Another survey in two newly restructured urban neighbourhoods in Rotterdam 
also presents some empirical findings that bring controversy to the understanding 
of the theory (Kleinhans et al, 2007). The result of statistical analysis shows that, 
for example, newcomers appear to have access to a higher level of social capital 
than local residents; age, ethnic background and dwelling satisfaction are not 
significantly associated with social capital levels; negatively perceived 
neighbourhood quality is associated with active associational participation etc. 
These research studies indicate that social capital’s usefulness in practice could be 
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limited. Nevertheless, the thesis uses the theory in qualitative analysis and makes 
every effort to avoid such problems.  
This literature review reveals that there is a gap in the understanding of the theory. 
It seems that the theory does not perform well in quantitative statistical research. 
Reasons for this could be that the concept is defined chaotically, and the 
measurement is problematic, as discussed in last section. However, in terms of the 
framework and ideas inherent from the theory, it is useful for explaining and 
understanding certain phenomena in some qualitative researches. This thesis is a 
qualitative one, and will examine the value of social capital theory by using it to 
theorise and conceptualise the empirical findings in VA Village.  
4.4 Theoretical Framework 
This section develops and presents the theoretical framework that influenced the 
research design and shaped the analysis and interpretation of the empirical data 
and findings. One difficulty encountered in applying social capital theory to an 
empirical research project is the measurement issue. There is a lack of a clear 
relationship between the concept and the measurement of social capital, as well as 
a lack of sufficient theoretical development to address this problem when the term 
was being conceptualised (Paxton, 1999: 89-90). The weaknesses of the theory, 
especially the ambiguous and diverse definitions as discussed previously, raise 
further challenges. To address this measurement problem, a series of applicable 
models have been developed, characterised by multiple indicators to gauge social 
capital (Paxton, 1999; Paldam, 2000; Stone, 2001; Harpham, 2008). Specifically, 
Putnam’s claim of America’s declining social capital and the quantitative analysis 
through his framework of a ‘comprehensive social capital index’ (Putnam, 1995; 
2000: 291) sparked a fierce debate in the field, and consequently popularised the 
use of quantitative approaches (e.g. Uslaner, 2002). In such research, conceptual 
models of social capital are primarily combined with the use of survey and 
questionnaire methods to measure individuals’ level of social capital, and 
corresponding statistical techniques are applied to analyse the data.  
Qualitative approaches have also been used in the empirical investigation of social 
capital, for example, Putnam’s famous work, Making Democracy Work (Putnam, 
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1993). The research presented in this thesis utilises a qualitative approach, using a 
case study based on documentary analysis, interviews and observation as the main 
methods to generate the data. The key idea is to integrate the theory’s framework 
throughout the research, from the research design and data collection to the data 
analysis and the thesis writing. In the field work, this required me, in my role as 
investigator, to focus on some specific issues in the content of the interviews, 
based on the framework, such as participants’ collective networks, norms of how 
people treat others, collective resources between different levels of actors and 
collective actions for a shared purpose. Corresponding questions were asked 
directly to solicit data from respondents. Consequently, qualitative analysis 
methods combined with the conceptual framework of social capital were used to 
process the data and theorise the empirical findings.  
The theoretical framework adopted by the study applies the eight domains of 
social capital identified by Forrest and Kearns (2001), as presented in the 
following table (4.3). Using these domains enables the abstract theoretical concept 
of social capital to inform the implementation of qualitative research techniques, 
by providing manageable variables to disaggregate and observe individuals’ and 
communities’ social capital in practice. The eight domains not only cover all the 
classic elements in social capital, e.g. networks, norms and trust, but also some 
others that are important and interrelated to them, e.g. empowerment, safety and 
belonging. Through empirical investigation, this enables the researcher to focus on 
the eight specific topics in interviews. In the data analysis, it serves as a template 
to frame and theorise the findings.  
Domain Description 
Empowerment That people feel they have a voice which is listened to; are involved 
in processes that affect them; can themselves take actions to initiate 
changes 
Participation That people take part in social and community activities; local events 
occur and are well attended 
Associational activity 
and common purpose 
That people co-operate with one another through the formation of 
formal and informal groups to further their interests 
Supporting networks That individuals and organisations co-operate to support one 
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and reciprocity another for either mutual or one-sided gain; an expectation that 
help would be given to or received from others when needed 
Collective norms and 
values 
That people share common values and norms of behaviour 
Trust That people feel they can trust their co-residents and local 
organisations responsible for governing or serving their area 
Safety That people feel safe in their neighbourhood and are not restricted 
in their use of public space by fear 
Belonging That people feel connected to their co-residents, their home area, 
have a sense of belonging to the place and its people 
Table 4. 3 Eight domains of social capital 
Source: Forrest and Kearns (2001: 2140) 
Furthermore, three types of social capital are distinguished in the framework. 
They are, namely, bonding, bridging and linking social capital. The failure to 
differentiate between them in previous research has been criticised for causing 
empirical lags, as discussed:  
Empirical researchers face the daunting task of trawling through a morass of 
research into “the One” social capital concept each time they undertake research 
[…] We think that, in many cases, a failure to cut their task down to size by 
integrating the distinction between bonding and bridging networks into their 
research may be a key factor in such empirical lags. Most studies still tend to 
agglomerate social capital into the one catch-all concept, or else measure only 
bonding or bridging, but not both at the same time 
(Patulny and Svendsen, 2007: 33) 
The advantage of the distinction between types of social capital is that it enables a 
more accurate and fine grained empirical exploration through the segmentation of 
types, forms and outcomes of social capital and the explanation of specific aspects 
accordingly. As discussed previously, bonding social capital focuses on individuals’ 
strong ties within an exclusive and homogenous group, e.g. kinship or close friends; 
while bridging social capital focuses on individuals’ weak ties among 
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heterogeneous groups, e.g. friends of friends or loosely-connected acquaintances 
from associations. Linking social capital emphasises the links between individuals 
from different levels of power and social status. This form has, to date, attracted 
less attention and acceptance in the literature, for it has been criticised for being 
‘not so clearly a part of everyday social interaction’ compared to the other two, and 
‘overlaps with other concepts such as confidence in government and democratic 
performance’ (Patulny and Svendsen, 2007: 33). Nevertheless, the study 
differentiated these three forms of social capital in the investigation. Specifically, 
the field research examined the bonding social capital within different stakeholder 
groups (villagers, developers, officials etc.), the bridging social capital between 
these groups and the linking social capital between them and higher ranking 
authorities. The framework of eight domains is applied accordingly when it is 
possible and necessary. Trust and norms, adapted from Patulny and Svendsen 
(2007: 35) and their example, could be characterised as particularised trust and 
micro norms for bonding domains, while generalised trust and macro norms were 
investigated for bridging domains, and also for linking domains perhaps. Belonging, 
on the contrary, seems to reside in bonding domains exclusively, since the sense of 
belonging is a strong emotional tie with a place and its people.  
In addition, different elements of Bourdieu’s, Coleman’s and Putnam’s 
conceptualisations of social capital are included in the framework to undertake the 
investigation and analysis. As reviewed before, their definitions of the term are not 
the same, since they are developed according to their different theoretical and 
normative stances and their varied empirical and methodological approaches. 
Bourdieu considers social capital to be more a limited private resource. The 
membership of an elite school or a prestigious club, for example, is valuable since 
it is exclusive. On the contrary, Coleman, as well as Putnam in his initial work, 
treats social capital as more of a limitless and self-reinforcing resource, with all 
individuals and groupings potentially having access to networks and forms of 
social capital; and that social capital can be increased simultaneously for different 
groups to benefit each group (and wider policy aims such as urban regeneration). 
Putnam then changes his view and considers social capital as simultaneously a 
private and a public good (Putnam, 2000: 20), which is a mixture of previous two. 
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A reflection of how these differences appear to work in practice, as well as their 
relative strengths and weaknesses, will be discussed in the conclusions.  
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Chapter Five - The Government’s and the Developer’s Policies 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapters Five, Six and Seven present the empirical findings of the research. This 
chapter introduces the context of the government and the developer by analysing 
their policies and strategies. First, general policies, which include policies of or 
above district-level, will be discussed briefly in Section 5.2. Second, specific 
policies regarding the programme in VA Village, as well as the developer’s two 
strategies for policy implementation, are then examined in Section 5.3.  
5.2 General Policies  
General policies are crucial in establishing a framework for the implementation of 
rural land requisition programmes. This section firstly briefly introduces the 
policy-makers involved, and then moves on to describe the framework for policy-
making processes. The second part analyses policies in greater detail and examines 
the rationales underpinning them.  
5.2.1 General Policies and Policy-makers 
Legislation Law of PRC categorises the state’s legislations into several types: the 
constitution, laws, administrative regulations, local regulations/autonomous 
regulations/separate regulations and rules. Rules include two sub-types: 
departmental rules and local governmental rules. These are permanent forms of 
legislation implemented for the relative long term. In addition, there is a type of 
legislation named “regulatory documents”, which are more temporary and 
implemented for the shorter term. They are made by the government from the 
provincial level to district level and are fundamental in exercising the 
government’s power. They are considered the basis of the administration but their 
legitimate status is controversial, since there is no specific legislation prescribing 
their existence, policy-making processes and effectiveness (Jin, 2003). 
Nevertheless, regulatory documents are widely applied by the state and their 
effectiveness is widely recognised. The priority level of all kinds of legislations and 
the policy-makers are categorised in the following table (5.1). 
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Level Category Policy-makers 
1 The Constitution National People’s Congress 
2 Law 
3 Administrative Regulation The State Council 
4 Departmental Rule Departments of the State 
Council etc. 
Local Regulation at provincial level/ 
Autonomous Regulation/ Separate Regulation 
People’s Congress at provincial 
level 
5 Local Governmental Rule at provincial level Provincial governments 
Regulatory Documents at provincial level 
6 Local Regulation at comparatively-larger-city 
level 
People’s Congress at 
comparatively-larger-city level 
7 Local Governmental Rule at comparatively-
larger-city level 
Government at comparatively-
larger-city level 
Regulatory Document at comparatively-larger-
city level 
8 Regulatory Document at district level or county 
level 
District level or county level 
governments  
Table 5. 1 Priority levels of legislations 
Accordingly, all of the official policies related to this programme that I have 
collected and examined are categorised in the following table (5.2):  
Level Category Policy-makers Title 
2 Law National People’s 
Congress 
Land Administration Law of the 
PRC (2004 revised) 
3 Administrative 
Regulation 
The State Council Regulation for the Implementation 
of the Land Administration Law of 
the People’s Republic of China 
(1999 published) 
4 Departmental Rule Ministry of Land Measures for the Announcement of 
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and Resources of 
the PRC 
Land Requisition (2002 published) 
Provincial-level Local 
Regulation 
People’s Congress 
of Fujian Province 
Regulation of Fujian Province on 
Land Administrative Law of the 
People’s Republic of China (1999 
published) 
6 Comparatively-larger-
city-level Local 
Regulation 
People’s Congress 
of Xiamen City 
Some Regulations of Xiamen City 
about Land Administration (2000 
published) 
7 Comparatively-larger-
city-level Local 
Governmental Rule 
People’s 
Government of 
Xiamen City 
Regulations of Xiamen Urban 
Planning (2001 revised) 
Comparatively-larger-
city-level Regulatory 
Document 
People’s 
Government of 
Xiamen City 
More than 35 documents 
8 District-level 
Regulatory Document 
People’s 
Government of HL 
District 
More than 8 documents 
9 Programme Policy VA Village 
Headquarters 
Policies and scheme for the 
programme in VA Village  
Table 5. 2 Relevant policies 
The policy-makers are all based in permanent institutions except those at level 9. 
The policy-making process takes a top-down approach, with lower level policies 
framed by the higher level. From the national level to the district level, policies 
shift from the general to the specific. The national policies (levels 2 and 3) 
establish a general framework for land management in China. Although only select 
items from these policies involve rural land requisition, they are important for 
providing the general principles for lower level policies.  
Policies become increasingly specific as the level goes lower. Policies made at 
levels 7 to 9 are specific for the issue of rural property (land and houses) 
requisition. Xiamen city covers a large geographical and administrative area and 
different administrative districts have varying levels of economic development and 
living conditions. Thus, compensation standards formulated in the city’s policies 
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are developed in flexible ranges, rather than universally applied standard fixed 
figures. Based on the municipal policies, the district governments narrow the 
ranges down to specific figures in their own policies. However, as they are within 
an administrative district, although urban villages are distributed in different 
locations, which largely affect the properties’ value and villagers’ income level 
from rental businesses, the district policy officially is a one-size-fits-all approach 
and all programmes conducted in the same district should implement the same 
policies. Therefore, the policy-maker in VA Village’s programme is highly 
restrained by Huli District’s policies when drafting the programme’s policies and 
compensation scheme, without independence.  
5.2.2 Objectives of Policies 
The framework of the policies derives from the Constitution (e.g. its Item 10) and 
Land Administration Law of PRC (e.g. its Chapter 5). This framework is then 
further developed by increasingly specific details by the sequential policies at 
provincial level, municipality level and district level. Four important objectives of 
the policies are identified. This section illustrates two objectives, and the other two 
will be illustrated in Section 5.3.2, since it requires some calculations. The first 
objective is establishing a dual land system controlled by the state exclusively. The 
rural land requisition process in the system is illustrated in the following figure 
(5.1) (He et al, 2009: 1933).  
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Figure 5. 1 The institution of land requisition and property rights redistribution  
Source: He et al, 2009: 1933 
Land ownership is dual. Urban land is owned by the state while rural land is 
owned by villager collectives. Land use rights (or de facto rights of land) are also 
dual. Rural land use rights belong to villagers. Specifically, rural land includes 
mainly residential land and farmland, which is respectively ring fenced for 
villagers’ settlements and agricultural use. Urban land use rights may be gained 
through the urban land market, and its utility is more varied, although mainly for 
commercial development. Villager collectives cannot change the utility of rural 
land or capitalise on rural land in the land market. The only way to develop rural 
land is to transfer its classification and designation to urban land. Transferring 
usually occurs one way only, from the collective to the state, and the requisition 
process is exclusively controlled by the state.  
The second objective is favouring the state in rural land development by 
empowering the state to dominate the rural land ownership requisition process. 
Rural land requisition and development is beneficial to the state as it gains 
102 
 
considerably from it. Item 47 in Chapter 5 of the Land Administration Law of PRC 
(2004) prescribes that “to requisition a piece of rural land, the actor who conducts 
the requisition should compensate property owners based on the original utility of 
the land”. Specifically, it legislates that the lump-sum cash compensation for 
farmland is six to ten times the value of the land’s average annual agricultural 
output in the last three years. The compensation package (cash compensation, 
reward, and relocation) for other types of rural land are based on the standard of 
the compensation for farmland, decided by provincial or autonomous governments, 
or directly-controlled municipalities. As indicated previously in the literature 
review, the land’s agricultural output is usually significantly lower than its 
potential value for commercial development. The compensation level is, therefore, 
often so low that landowners perceive the offer as unfair and refuse to take it. On 
the contrary, local governments are authoritarian and have a strong incentive to 
facilitate such transfers and compensation mechanisms since both the land lease 
revenue and the taxation from the consequent land development are a 
considerable fiscal income.  
The Fujian Government develops the principles with more specific contextual 
details in Regulation of Fujian Province on Land Administrative Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (1999): the compensation for farmland and green crops refer to 
the farmland’s average annual output and crops’ average price in the last three 
years; the compensation for land attachments (houses and other constructions) 
refers to the re-construction costs, factoring in levels of depreciation. Based on this 
framework, Xiamen City Government formulates regulations with more concrete 
details in establishing its own compensation standards7. For rural land, a price 
range is prescribed, according to the land’s utilities. Specifically, the price cap is 
2480*10 per mu (equals 37.20 Yuan/m2) for paddy field and the price floor is 
2480*1.6 per mu (equals 5.95 Yuan/m2) for un-cultivated land. For houses, the 
price and compensation depend on the property’s legal status and the number of 
the household’s qualifying members. Furthermore, for all households, if the 
                                                        
7 E.g. see Temporary Regulation of Xiamen City on the Compensation Standard for Land Requisition 
(XMGOV[1999]ComprehensiveNO.92) and Regulation of Xiamen City on the Compensation for the Demolition of 
Houses on Collective Land (XMGOV[2003]NO.173) 
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average legally defined house area is less than 30m2 per capita (only qualifying 
household members are counted), then the household could receive a flat with the 
size of 30m2 * number of qualifying household members (it is called the 30m2 
Quota). For households that have a legally defined house area of more than 30m2 
per capita (only qualifying household members counted), the household could 
receive a flat with the same area. Households that prefer cash compensation rather 
than a replacement flat are enabled to receive lump-sum cash compensation at the 
amount of flat size multiplied by the price (2400-2700 Yuan/m2). This level of 
compensation is not attractive and few households therefore choose the cash 
compensation option. The majority of households do not have a house with a legal 
status at a size of more than 30m2 per capita (only qualifying household members 
counted). In most cases, they receive a flat in the 30m2 Quota. In addition, the 
regulation partially compensates villagers for their ‘illegal’ houses, at the price of 
20%-40% of the re-construction cost. In 2005, a new policy was launched, the 
Regulation of Xiamen Government on the Improvement of the Land Requisition 
Policies (XMGOV[2005]NO.176). It once more raised the compensation standard. 
This policy was still in use, as one of the main policies, in May 2013 when the 
research fieldwork commenced. There are also some other minor policies issued 
by the authority as amendments to raise the compensation standard slightly, based 
on economic growth and currency inflation.  
5.3 The Developer’s Policies and Strategies 
This section introduces the developer and the local authority by examining the 
developer’s policies and strategies in detail. Section 5.3.1 briefly describes the 
context of the programme. Section 5.3.2 explores the programme’s Official Policies, 
including policy-making, interpretations and objectives. Section 5.3.3 introduces 
Strategy One and Section 5.3.4 discusses how it failed. Sections 5.3.5 to Section 
5.3.8 specifically focus on Strategy Two, analysing its decision-making, its survival 
under pressures, its budget control and challenges.   
5.3.1 Context of VA Programme 
As indicated in the literature review, there are government-led, developer-led and 
villager-led paradigms in development partnerships. Programmes in Xiamen city 
are all conducted as the first type, except one village, the case study example, 
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which is the second type. In the programme, the municipality authorised CA 
Company, which has strong financial resources, to take charge on behalf of the 
state, as an approach to funding the programme. In return, the developer was 
promised a share of 55% of the land lease fee at the end of the programme. Then, 
as one of the nine Headquarters in Huli district, VA Village Headquarters was 
established by Huli district government as a temporary quasi-administrative 
institution to implement the land requisition programme. It was supervised by 
both the developer (CA Company) and local governments (Construction Bureau of 
Huli District Government and Bureau of Land Resource and Real Estate 
Management of Xiamen Municipality). The latter bureau is the city’s authority in 
land requisition. Its’ services include adjudicating big disputes occurring in land 
requisition, interpreting policies and storing land registration archives. It is also in 
charge of providing professional training and issuing certificates for company 
representatives regarding land requisition.  
The total number of staff members in VA Headquarters is around 40. They come 
from different institutions. The commander of VA Headquarters is a senior official 
from the district authority, and the deputy commanders are senior officials from 
the local street office. Commanders only come to the Headquarters’ office 
occasionally, and are supposed to have veto powers on some important decisions. 
The programme manager is Mr PM, appointed by the developer (CA Company). Mr 
PM is also the manager of CB Company, the subsidiary of CA Company. He is the 
CEO of the headquarters. He works in the office every day except the vacation of 
Chinese New Year, taking care of all issues arising.  Under his leadership there are 
various departments in the headquarters, including the negotiation team, the 
demolition team, the publicity team and the logistics team. Specifically, there is no 
financial accounting department either in VA Headquarters or in CB Company. 
When a purchase contract is signed, examined and approved, Mr PM will report it 
to CA Company to claim the fund and pay it to the property owner once received. 
The staff members in the four teams are mainly appointed from commercial 
companies and the local street office. CB Company, as the developer’s subsidiary, 
has staff in every team, but primarily focuses on the negotiation team and the 
logistic team. CC Company, as a partner commissioned by the developer, only 
105 
 
works in the negotiation team. CD Company is the partner who conducts the 
demolition work, making up the demolition team. SO Street Office, as the grass-
roots state-agency, is forbidden from involvement in the negotiation of purchase 
contracts and only works in the publicity team.  
The implementation of a requisition programme can broadly be categorised into 
four stages. Each stage has specific and distinct activities and objectives8. The first 
is the Preparation Stage. This includes all the preparation works, e.g. the 
application, examination and approval of the programme, the arrangement of the 
partnership between the developer and the government, the field research, cost 
and risk assessment, programme scheme drafting etc. At the end of this stage, if the 
programme is initiated, a briefing will be published in the local newspaper to 
inform the public. The second stage is Implementation Stage, including two sub-
stages. In the Purchase Contract Signing and Examining Stage, both private and 
collective properties are requisitioned and compensated for. To accomplish this, 
the implementers contact, discuss, draft and sign purchase contracts with property 
owners. Contracts should be audited by different groups of implementers and 
relevant governmental departments. When 90-95% of private properties on the 
land have been purchased, the programme enters the Forced Purchase Stage. If an 
agreement cannot be reached in the negotiation over three rounds, then forced 
demolition of properties may be executed. The third stage is the Closing Stage 
where the implementers submit all documents to the relevant governmental 
departments for examination and audit. The fourth and final stage is the Finance 
Settlement Stage when the implementers submit the clearance of expenses to the 
relevant governmental departments to claim the funding. 
The VA Programme was in the Preparation Stage during 2006 to 2007 and it 
moved into the Purchase Contract Signing and Examining Stage in late 2008. At 
this point the implementers encountered a series of collective resistances from 
indigenous villagers. As a result, the programme proceeded slowly and once was 
suspended. By May 2013, the programme had been stuck in the Purchase Contract 
Signing and Examining Stage for nearly five years. This situation makes the 
                                                        
8 E.g. XiamenHuliGovOffice[2012]NO.47 
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programme a special one, for it becomes a long-term programme. Unlike short-
term programmes, which usually have a single fixed set of policies throughout the 
whole process, this one has updated its policies, and compensation scheme 
accordingly, many times, for reasons that include policy change, economic growth 
and currency inflation.  
Therefore, these sets of policies could be split into two categories. The first one is 
Official Policies, including Original Official Policies, which were developed in the 
Preparation Stage, and Revised Official Policies, which were updated during the 
Implementation Stage. The second one is Strategies, including Strategy One and 
Strategy Two.   
Time For Paperwork For Practice 
Preparation stage Official Policies Strategy One 
Implementation stage (2008-2011) 
Implementation stage (2012-May 2013) Strategy Two 
Table 5. 3 Policies and strategies 
In the programme, those implementing it practiced Official Policies with their own 
strategies, instead of following them strictly. The high-rank policies have imposed 
many restraints upon the developer’s policy-making. The developer could not 
make their own policies independently, based on their understanding of the 
specific context and their experience. At the same time, the authority did not 
implement their policies and supervise developers’ practice strictly. As a result, the 
developer drafted their Official Policies in accordance with the government’s 
policies for official documentation and authorisation, but in reality, they actually 
practiced them in combination with their own strategies. From 2008 to 2011, the 
developer followed a prevailing strategy in the field of land requisition. It was 
called Strategy One and turned out to be problematic. In late 2011, the developer 
changed the programme manager. The new one, Mr PM, adopted a completely 
distinct strategy and implemented it in 2012. This was Strategy Two. It soon 
gained popularity among indigenous villagers and 2012 became a milestone in the 
programme’s development.  
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5.3.2 Official Policies 
Policy-making of Official Policies 
Rural land requisition of urban villages is not a purely commercial activity. It not 
only requisitions collective-owned properties e.g. the land and collective houses, 
but also all indigenous households’ private properties, mostly houses they live in 
and they make a livelihood from. The complicated socio-economic impact it has 
makes this a significant political issue. Thus, the government attempts to regulate 
the whole process through a series of policies. In the Preparation Stage, the 
developer was required to submit a set of policies detailing compensation 
standards to the government for programme application. Once approved, the set of 
policies became the programme’s Original Official Policies. However, the developer 
had very limited independence in the policy-making of these Original Official 
Policies. The high-rank policies had formulated very specific prescription on 
compensation standards, especially those issued by the district government. 
Actually, the developer could not adjust compensation standards flexibly, based on 
their strategy, financial resources or the specific context of the village. Mr SOC, the 
actor appointed by SO Street Office to the publicity team in VA Headquarters, 
described the situation thus:  
The compensation standard in policies about demolition and relocation are 
unified by the municipality, and the specific implementation scheme is made by the 
district government. The district government is in charge of a programme’s 
specific implementation while the municipality is in charge of the direction and 
basic principles of a programme… It’s impossible that you (the developer) make 
policies by yourselves… The Bureau of Land Resource and Real Estate 
Management of Xiamen Government owns the right of policy interpretation 
regarding the (compensation) standard and relocation. It’s not that the bureau 
would approve whatever you want. So you can’t do it in your own approach, or it’ll 
be out of order, because (programmes in) the whole city must be unified […]. 
Generally, the expense of a programme is largely dependent on two variables – the 
total amount of affected households who qualify for compensation, as well as the 
compensation standards for the rural land, private properties and qualifying 
affected households’ resettlements and subsidies. For the first variable, the 
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authority’s policies had already formulated detailed regulations for the 
identification of qualified affected households. The headquarters had never owned 
rights to decide issues e.g. whether a household was eligible for compensations, for 
which type of compensation package etc. The only right the headquarters had was 
to make judgements for affected households whose qualification status was vague. 
Nevertheless, even this right was taken back by the government several years ago, 
as company representative Mr CRD said:  
[In the past,] as long as we hold a meeting in the headquarters, and the 
examination was approved, we could decide whether villagers who have fuzzy 
qualification status could be entitled to compensations or not, but now [in recent 
years] this right was taken from our hands to the construction bureau of the 
district government.  
For the second variable, the situation was the same. Compensation standards had 
mostly been formulated in detail with specific prices in the district government’s 
policies. The headquarters were empowered for decision-making only in some 
certain circumstances, such as, when a price was formulated within a range, the 
implementers could decide the exact price from the range based on the real 
situation. For example, the compensation price of crops and plants on the land was 
given in ranges, since the exact price could only be made by an implementers’ 
evaluation of their growth stage and quality etc. It was more reasonable therefore, 
that the decision was made by on-site evaluation than beforehand. However, in the 
programme that mainly concerned residential land, it only had a minor influence. 
Therefore, in making Official Policies, the developer had little independence in 
budget control by designing their own standards. Original Official Policies were 
revised several times between 2008 and2011, but the influence of the revisions 
was minor. In late 2011, when the new manager Mr PM took the office, he did not 
update the Revised Official Policies much either. He knew that it was important to 
keep the programme’s Official Policies in accordance with the high-rank policies in 
order to maintain the government’s authority.  
Interpretations of Official Policies 
The interpretations of Official Policies are different according to the stances 
stakeholders hold. The authority and the developer (in Strategy One) perceived the 
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compensation standard prescribed in Official Policies as reasonable. Their view 
seems to be based on the institutional aspect and the properties’ costs and revenue 
from rental business. The majority of houses in the urban village are illegally 
constructed with substandard conditions. Without title deeds, such properties are 
not protected by laws and are at high risk of being demolished by administrative 
force at any time.  
Therefore, compared to what the Official Policies offered, the construction costs 
villagers have spent, the revenue the houses are able to generate and the value of 
such houses are all relatively low. For rural land, it is forbidden by law for it to be 
used for commercial development. Although rural land is developed for rental 
business and brings a certain amount of revenue for households currently, it 
suffers from the potential of risk and uncertainty in the future. Therefore, the land 
has limited economic output and usage as long as it remains as rural collective-
owned land, and will not generate as much money as villagers expect. Furthermore, 
villagers will be able to enjoy a much better living environment in their in-situ 
resettling flats after the programme. This interpretation is part of the concept the 
programme officers propagandise to villagers in their publicity. The following 
Planning Image shown is printed in one of the developer’s brochures. The 
highlighted buildings in the middle are resettling flats. It is important to note that 
it is just a planning image for the use of publicity.  
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Image 5. 1 Planning image 
Source: The publicity brochure produced by the developer 
In another interpretation, indigenous villagers as well as the programme manager, 
Mr PM, viewed the issue from a market aspect, taking account of the fact that VA 
Village is in a good location, surrounded by prosperous urban built-up areas, on 
which much commercial housing is developed. The commercial housing price and 
their land lease fee are extraordinarily high. After the programme, VA Village’s 
land is likely to be leased for another development of commercial housing, which 
will generate considerable land lease revenue and taxation. Compared to the 
potential profit value VA Village’s land has, the compensations offered by the 
Official Policies is disproportionally low. For a better understanding of this 
interpretation, the calculation below illustrates how large the gap is between the 
cost and the revenue of the programme. The following table (5.4) lists some key 
figures for the calculation:  
NO. Item Figure 
1 Village land area  235,163.54 m2 
2 Village’s built site (area of all houses 
and buildings) 
44,400 m2 (non-residential) 455,600 m2 
(residential) 
3 Households  663 
4 Population (Indigenous villagers) 1906 
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5 Land area for the construction of the 
in-situ resettling flats (in planning) 
25,842.052 m2 
6 Built site of the in-situ resettling flats 
(in planning) 
97,807.67 m2 
7 Land lease fee of the nearby land 5438.66 Yuan/m2 in 2005; 6799.85 
Yuan/m2 in 2005; 35492.41 Yuan/m2 in 
2010 
Table 5. 4 Key figures to estimate the cost 
Note: The current exchange rate is around 10 Yuan to 1 Pound.  
Figure 2 is estimated by the developer at Preparation Stage. No. 3 and 4 are from 
VA Village’s Chronicle (2010). Figure 7 is from the website of Xiamen Municipal 
Bureau of Land Resources and Real Estate Management9, and the three pieces of 
land are leased for real estate development, school buildings (a kindergarten and a 
primary school), and real estate development respectively. The land used to be the 
village’s farmland and they are located beside the village, just across a street. Other 
figures are from official documents. For simplicity, hypothetically all the 1906 
villagers and 663 households are assumed to qualify for compensation and at the 
highest standard.  
The calculation process is listed in Table 1 in Appendix 3. The result shows that the 
gross expense is around 803,338,211.8 Yuan, while the gross income is around 
1,138,428,404 in 2005 or 7,429,324,072 in 2010. It is a simplified estimation and 
due to the lack of data the estimated expense may not be entirely accurate. Some 
items are also not included in the calculation, for instance, the land area leased for 
commercial development is not accurate. Indicated by the planning image (Image 
5.1), a part of the land is planned for the construction of roads, lanes, public green 
spaces and amenities, e.g. a post office, a kindergarten and a waste-recycling centre. 
According to interviews with company representatives, a shopping mall will be 
built as well, although this is not shown in the planning image yet. Every qualified 
household member is eligible to purchase a quota of 5m2 of shops in the shopping 
mall at a favoured price. All the items mentioned above are not included in the 
                                                        
9 See http://tz.xmtfj.gov.cn/jyzq/jyxydcr/jyjg_4144/ 
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calculation, due to the lack of necessary data. Nevertheless, the results of the 
analysis still indicate that the estimated gross expense and the gross income are 
not of the same magnitude. The gap is so significant that even the inclusion of some 
omitted items is unlikely to close the gap. As a result, since the gap is so large, the 
indigenous households and Mr PM found it hard to accept the interpretation of 
reasonable compensation from the government and the developer (in Strategy 
One).  
Objectives of Policies 
Section 5.2.2 has discussed two objectives of the policies. This part continues to 
discuss them further, based on the above calculation. As mentioned previously, a 
policy objective is to gain a considerable fiscal income for the state by controlling 
the compensation expenses and keeping these low. The land lease fee would be 
distributed to the state and the developer. According to Item 55 in Law of Land 
Administration of the PRC, 30% of the money from the land lease fee will be 
submitted to the central government, and 70% will belong to the local government. 
In the government-led paradigm, the local government pays the expense and is 
responsible for its own profits and losses. In the developer-led paradigm, the 
situations are varied. In this specific case, the developer covers all the expenses, 
and takes 55% of the land lease fee. For the rest, the central government takes 
30%, the municipality takes 5% and the district government takes 10%. The 
consequent long-term taxation from the land redevelopment contributes 
substantially to fiscal income as well. Therefore, through the application of this 
programme, the state wins in all ways, while the developer must balance the 
expense with the 55% revenue in order to generate profits.  
The third policy objective is to alleviate the burden on governmental finances. As 
previously discussed, most programmes are enacted through the government-led 
paradigm. All expenses are covered by governmental finances. Despite the 
potential profits, officials need to consider the overall budgets as well, especially 
when more than one programme is being implemented simultaneously. For 
example, if there are N government-led programmes at the same time, and the 
overall compensation standard is raised X times, then the total budget will be 
raised N*X times. This is the “magnifying effect” in running multi-programmes. 
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This effect, even if the compensation standard is increased by a modest amount, 
means that the overall impact could be significant and, indeed, overwhelming for 
governmental finances.  
The effect can be illustrated by a calculation. The potential land lease fee is around 
7.4 billion Yuan in 2010. It should have been higher in 2012 because of the 
increasing housing prices. If we assume that it is a government-led programme, 
officials decide to invest 20% of the land lease fee as the programme budget, keep 
50% as profit, and the remaining 30% goes to the state, then the local 
governments need to prepay 1.48 billion Yuan. This is a considerable amount for 
the local governments. The following table (5.5) lists the local governments’ 
income/budget in 2012.  
Districts Income/budget (Billion Yuan) 
Xiamen City 73.946 (income) 
Siming District 13.30218 (budget) 
Huli District 8.80876 (budget) 
Table 5. 5 Local governments’ revenue or budget in 2012 
Note: The current exchange rate is around 10 Yuan to 1 Pound.  
Source: Local government’s financial bureaus10 
 The table indicates that 1.48 billion Yuan is a substantial amount of money for 
local governments and is the financial situation for running only one programme. If 
there are many programmes simultaneously, the magnifying effect will make the 
financial burden even higher High-ranking policy-makers may anticipate this risk 
and therefore formulate these low compensation standards to ensure that the 
overall expenses are affordable for local governments. Inviting a developer with 
financial resources from the private sector is another approach to solve the 
funding issue.  
The fourth policy objective is to restrain the state-owned developers’ tendency to 
abuse governmental financial provision and to do so by setting policies on a one-
                                                        
10 The websites are: http://www.xmcz.gov.cn/czsj/czsj2/2012/02/09/33609.html 
http://www.siming.gov.cn/zfxxgk/gkml/czzj/czyjs/201303/t20130307_61859.htm 
http://www.huli.gov.cn/main/a/2013/h27/a173296_177679.shtml 
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size-fits-all basis. In government-led programmes, the local governments would 
usually establish state-owned developers to conduct programmes, rather than do 
it directly. A problem arises that the state-owned developers are not responsible 
for overall budget control, since all costs are to be covered by the government. 
They may even have a tendency to abuse the governmental finances to facilitate 
the work, as company representative Mr CRD described:  
They (state-owned developers) are fed by the government […] Like TD Company 
and HF Company, if they are able to requisition and demolish a village within 10 
million Yuan, but [they anticipate that] it will take five years, then they may spend 
15 million Yuan instead, to facilitate it, because they can claim all of it [from the 
government]. They don’t need to digest it by themselves. However, our company, 
CB Company [and its owner CA Company], it’s an [financially independent] 
enterprise, responsible for its own profits and losses. That’s the problem. So, it’s 
easier for them, the other two companies [TD and HF Company], to run such 
programmes, because they have the God of Wealth [the government], because they 
don’t need to pay the costs.  
Therefore, designing policies as one-size-fits-all could be seen as a strategy for 
budget control. It is a simpler and easier solution for the government, compared to 
the solution of customising compensation standards based on villagers’ specific 
contexts one by one, although the latter is more reasonable since locations affect 
rental incomes and property values very significantly. To some extent, the strategy 
successfully restrains state-owned developers’ behaviours and controls the budget 
as well.  
The side effect of the strategy is that private-sector developers in developer-led 
programmes are restrained by it as well. This programme is a good example. The 
developer of CA Company has abundant financial resources and furthermore, the 
village has a good location and prosperous rental business, which makes its 
property value higher than that in other villages. It was reasonable that the new 
programme manager Mr PM offered a much higher compensation standard than 
the policies prescribed for affected households, in order to facilitate the progress 
of the programme. However, the authorities were annoyed by what Mr PM had 
done. It not only violated their policies and authority, but also impaired their 
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interests, since his high compensation standards encouraged and justified villagers 
in other government-led programmes to claim the same standards. Under the 
magnifying effect, if such claims were approved, it would impose huge pressure 
upon the government’s finances. Therefore, even in developer-led programmes, 
officials did not want developers to bring their own ideas to the programme, even 
if this resulted in sacrificing developers’ own profits and benefited villagers. 
Officials preferred them to follow official policies, whilst at the same time making 
the best use of developers’ financial resources.  
5.3.3 Strategy One 
Strategy One was deployed mainly during 2008-2009. From 2009-2011, the 
programme reached an impasse.  This strategy reflected the developer’s 
considerations regarding how to implement the programme, how to compensate 
affected households and to what kind of financial standard.  It also encompassed 
what form of actions to take when difficulties arose, how to maximise the 
enterprise’s interests, how to take the risk of violating the government’s policies 
and also how to take advantage of the village’s context etc. Strategy One was 
designed to favour the privileged group, gain their support, and use their authority 
together with others to facilitate the process when necessary. Accordingly, affected 
households were differentiated into two groups. The first was the privileged group, 
which included households that had influence, power and public resources in the 
decision-making of VA Village’s public affairs, especially on the issue of land 
requisition, e.g. village cadres and villagers who had superior social status. The 
second was the ‘ordinary’ group, which included the majority of ‘ordinary’ 
households. The compensation standard is claimed to be the same for both groups, 
but the privileged group manage to enjoy some “extra benefits” and “extra 
considerations” covertly, as a means to gain their support for the programme. Once 
gained, their influence, power and authority would be used to facilitate the 
progress when necessary.  
Four ways are identified to distribute extra benefits. The first was to influence the 
privileged group with material benefits directly. According to ordinary villagers, 
luxurious cashes, cigarettes, liquors and holiday trips were alleged to be delivered 
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to this group. Nevertheless, there was no evidence to support this argument, 
except descriptions provided by villager Mr VF:  
The developer took 100 million Yuan for... [the number was] speculated by us… for 
the committee, as ‘the committee’s office expenses’, anyway, it’s what happened 
here… at the previous period [from 2008 to 2009], to demolish our village, [the 
develop] sent a carload of liquor, Wu Liang Ye Liquor, cigarettes, a carload of 
Zhong Hua Cigarette, to their the committee office to let them enjoy as much as 
they want. We actually witnessed it previously. 
The developer sent the so-called ‘villager representatives’ to Hong Kong, to 
Thailand, to Yunnan to have a vacation, and paid for their expenses, according to 
the positions they hold, how important they were. Anyway, I mean, the developer 
paid to make these people become their lackeys. 
The other three approaches took place within the compensation process. Generally, 
to requisition a private house, a team made up of four officials would be formed, 
including two company representatives from CB Company and CC Company for the 
negotiation of contracts, one officer from the village committees as facilitator and 
one officer from the SO Street Office as the state agency for publicity. The team 
would knock on the door, meet the decision maker of the household, introduce 
them to the compensation policies, negotiate and persuade them to take the offer, 
draft and sign contracts. Meanwhile, the team would examine household members’ 
qualifications for compensation and relocation flats. The team would also measure 
the size of household’s properties and calculate the final compensation packages. 
In the measurement and calculation, the process could be manipulated to make the 
compensation higher or lower than it should be.  
It was also claimed that the qualification examination was manipulated. Rumours 
common among ordinary villagers were that leaders in village committees had 
assisted their unqualified relatives to register their Hukou in VA Village in order to 
enjoy the compensations, under the help of the developer. But, again, the research 
found no further evidence to support the allegation.  
The third way took place through the measurement of properties. Before 2010, 
policies did not require the use of a more accurate means such as laser-mapping 
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equipment. After 2010, it became mandatory in new programmes. In this 
programme, to measure the size of properties, a soft measuring tape was used 
manually by company representatives. In practice, villagers alleged that the tape 
would be held either tightly or loosely, depending on whether the decision maker 
of the household was perceived as being in the privileged group or the ordinary 
group. The privileged group, it was claimed, managed to gain a favourable 
measurement result.  
The fourth way was to fabricate the calculation result. Some villagers claimed that 
company representatives sometimes simply fabricated the measuring results in 
the record as they wished. Theoretically, this was possible. Between the developer 
and the privileged group, they could exaggerate the compensation packages in the 
contract without others’ awareness since the public could not check these 
contracts personally. Between the developer and the ordinary group, tricks, hoaxes 
and cheating would happen. Most household decision makers were illiterate or 
had limited schooling, suffering from difficulties in the comprehension of policies 
and details of the calculation. It was hard for them to detect whether the 
calculation was fair or not and they doubted that company representatives would 
act honestly on their behalf. Mrs VSL, an illiterate divorced indigenous villager, 
signed contracts and moved out of VA Village in 2009. She described her feelings 
about the process she experienced:  
It [the negotiation and contract signing] was as casual as trading things in the 
vegetable market. They just came [to my home], did some measure things, then 
somehow reported you a number and asked whether you wanted to take it or not. 
She claimed that she had no idea of how the offer was calculated and she perceived 
that she might have been cheated. Eventually, she had to accept the offer only 
because of her personal family circumstances. This example shows that 
manipulation was theoretically possible.  However, company representatives 
claimed that it was absolutely ridiculous and impossible; they earn monthly wages 
from the company and therefore there was no benefit or incentive in fabricating 
calculations.  Although, in other programmes it was reported that certain actors 
did conspire with property owners, fabricated the calculation and shared the extra 
benefits, those making this claim believed that it rarely happened in this 
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programme, since it was highly risky. Officials had to sign the calculations and take 
the responsibility for them and fabrications would be easily spotted by contract 
examiners. Instead, the Miss X example could be interpreted in another way. Since 
villagers were in a much more disadvantageous place when they dealt with 
company representatives, and did not trust them, they developed “persecutory 
delusions”, which made them perceive the result as unfair (to use a term quoted by 
a company representative).  
Since there was a lack of evidence on these allegations, it was impossible to judge 
whether the four ways claimed by villagers to distribute extra benefits were true 
or not. The following analysis is provided to help understand the issue. The 
conclusion finally drawn is that the second (manipulate qualification) and fourth 
approaches (fabricate compensations) tended to be untrue, and the first (deliver 
benefits of materials and services) and third approaches (holding the tape loosely 
in measurement) could be existed. I have interviewed actors from the developer to 
establish their views on this. However, the majority of the staff in 2013 was not the 
same group of staff who practiced Strategy One. Additionally, company 
representatives said that they had no idea about the extra benefits. Nevertheless, 
they explained that the measurement issue could be true and admitted that there 
might be “acceptable measuring errors” which were deemed acceptable as long as 
they were not “too far away” from what they should be. Actually, encouraged by 
Strategy Two, they claimed that they held the soft tape really loosely in current 
practice to benefit all villagers. Furthermore, they believed that the rumour of 
distributing extra sets of flats to powerful leaders was over-exaggerated, since it 
was too risky. The distribution of flats was all on record and traceable. Such blunt 
fabrications would draw the government’s attention easily, which was called by 
one interviewee “a suicide action”. Nevertheless, they admitted that they heard 
that the practice at that time was known as “not transparent and not public”. The 
new programme manager Mr PM confirmed that:  
[This] was how they did it before I came here [in late 2011] – they gave 
members of village committees extra considerations, gave officials extra 
compensations. 
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Regardless of the facts, the implementation was believed by the majority of 
ordinary group villagers as being unfair. The perception seriously reduced 
villagers’ trust of the developer and hindered the implementation of the 
programme. When the developer found that the progress was stalled, they took 
advantage of the support they had gained from the more powerful groups. They 
conducted a series of collective actions, which even involved the use of violence, to 
force members of the ordinary group of villagers to obey. These actions took place 
during 2008-2009. They are discussed specifically in Chapter Seven.  
5.3.4 How Strategy One Failed 
Strategy One failed because the developer did not consider the specific context of 
VA Village in the decision-making process. CB Company used to be a private-
owned company. Mr PM had been the company manager for many years, 
conducting such programmes many times. In 2005, the authority changed the 
approach and insisted that private-owned companies should not be involved in 
rural land requisition anymore. As a result, CA Company, a giant shareholding 
enterprise controlled by the municipality, was appointed to purchase CB Company 
to take over the programme. However, the group had no experience in operating 
rural land requisition. The group asked Mr PM to remain as manager in order to 
assist them. However, in developing the programme’s strategy, the group and Mr 
PM had a major debate, as Mr PM mentioned:  
They [the group] asked me to conduct the programme, so I came up with some 
ideas, but they did not accept it. So they fired me and conducted the programme in 
their own idea. When the programme was stuck, they finally hired me back to do it.  
As a professional, Mr PM was more experienced than the group in such 
programmes. He anticipated that the lack of transparency, and perceived that 
insincere and unfair practice would jeopardise the programme. In Mr PM’s 
strategy, he insisted on conducting the programme in a transparent way, treating 
all affected households equally and sincerely, providing them with more attractive 
compensation standards than the policies prescribed. Nevertheless, the group did 
not appreciate his proposal and fired him.  
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Following this, the group started to design their own strategy. Their decision-
making process could be summarised as “replication and revision”. Since the group 
had no experience in rural land requisition, experiences of other programmes 
became crucial as important points of reference. It happened that there was an on-
going programme in Lingxia Village, a nearby village in the same district and the 
progress on this programme had been smooth and was expected to finish soon. 
Lingxia Scheme strictly followed the government’s policies and the group was 
highly inspired by it and believed that the Lingxia Scheme and the government’s 
policies were feasible. As a result, the group adopted the government’s policies, 
simply by replicating the Lingxia Scheme in the VA Scheme, in a hope for the same 
successful outcome.  
The revision they added in the practice was to favour the privileged group with 
extra benefits, gain their support and use their power to facilitate the process 
when necessary. During that period, the majority of indigenous villagers did not 
perceive the value of their properties as highly as they perceived them in later 
years. The group believed that the replication of Lingxia Scheme would satisfy 
ordinary villagers easily. Even if not, then they could cooperate with the powerful 
cadres to facilitate the process by coercion. The local governments and the village 
committees were authoritarian and powerful, while ordinary villagers were just a 
vulnerable and marginalised group. Ordinary villagers seemed to have no chance 
to win in this conflict and therefore had no choice but obey. At that time, forced 
requisition and demolition took place frequently in rural land requisition in China. 
Under such circumstances, the group finally made Strategy One.  
The implementation from 2008 to 2011 turned out to be a failure. This was 
because Lingxia Programme enjoyed some special conditions. The most important 
one was the good timing of Lingxia Programme, as explained by company 
representative Mr CRD:  
In 2008, Lingxia Scheme owned the highest [standard] in SO Township (SO Town 
became SO Street Officer later). None of such programmes has ever been completely 
accomplished in Huli District… The reason why Lingxia Programme becomes the 
first one … is just that it has a good timing. At that time, 2008, Lingxia Scheme was 
better than Xiangdian Scheme [another accomplished programme that used 
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standards from old policies. it was not completely requisitioned and demolished 
because there were some nail-households left]… The whole Lingxia village was 
demolished into an empty field 
The latest (the second) version of Xiamen’s policies regarding the 
compensation standard for villagers’ private properties was published in 2005. 
Huli District Government followed it and updated the district’s policies in late 
2006. The Lingxia Programme, launched at the beginning of 2008, became the 
first one to practise the district’s updated policies. Therefore, compared to the 
others in the district, the Lingxia Scheme seemed to be extraordinary and 
attractive. Households in Lingxia Programme felt lucky and privileged as they 
enjoyed the highest compensation standard in the whole district. Furthermore, 
Lingxia village was located in the suburb area of the district close to the airport. 
The area was scarcely populated at that time due to the lack of development 
and the inconvenience of public transportation. The rental business in Lingxia 
village was not as prosperous as others, particularly VA Village. Lingxia village 
had fewer tenants, indigenous villagers constructed fewer rental housing and 
the rent was lower as well. Therefore, their properties’ value was low and 
therefore villagers perceived the compensation offer within the Lingxia 
Scheme as reasonable.  
The VA Programme and Lingxia Programme had similarities and differences. The 
VA Programme was implemented only half a year later than the Lingxia 
Programme. They are located in the same district and their linear distance was 
only 2.4 km. However, compared to the similarities, their differences are more 
significant and important. First, VA Village is located in the city’s manufacturing 
zone, surrounded by many labour-intensive factories, which brought with it a 
considerable amount of tenants and, as such, its rental business was prosperous. 
Second, the area of VA Village and its surrounding were planned as an 
administrative, residential and transport centre of Huli District. Many office 
buildings of the district government and the city’s coach terminal station had been 
built there. Three competitive educational institutions (a kindergarten, a primary 
school and a high school) had built their new campuses there. Therefore, 
properties in VA Village were more valuable than those in Lingxia village and the 
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villagers in VA Village did not have an interest in their scheme directly replicating 
the scheme in Lingxia’s.  
On the contrary, VA villagers preferred to compare their programme with the 
Mucuo Programme, rather than the Lingxia Programme. Mucuo village is in Siming 
District, the other district in Xiamen Island. The Mucuo Programme had several 
significant features. First, Mucuo village enjoyed a good location, close to a 
Software Park and a coastal tourism area. Second, Siming District Government had 
accumulated considerable experience from its urban regeneration initiatives in the 
past. This legacy made them tactically astute in conducting such programmes. 
Before the initiative of the Mucuo Programme, Siming government sometimes sent 
city management inspectors, security policemen, industrial and commercial 
inspectors etc. to Mucuo village for administrative management. The actions 
seriously depressed the village’s rental business, without people’s awareness of 
their connection to the following rural land requisition programme. As the most 
developed district of the city, Siming government had more financial resources and 
fewer urban villages to manage. The potential magnifying effect was not as 
significant and the government was agreeable to formulating policies with high 
compensation standards. Indeed, the Mucuo Scheme had the highest compensation 
standard in the city when it was launched. As a result, compared to the Lingxia 
Programme, the Mucuo Programme attracted more attention from households in 
the VA Programme. Inspired by the Mucuo Scheme, especially the compensation 
standard of 1,000 Yuan/m2 for private houses, households from VA Village 
requested the same standards. They claimed that if the request was fulfilled, they 
would cooperate happily. Otherwise, they refused to sell their properties.  
In my interviews, company representatives admitted that this earlier request was 
reasonable, compared to villagers’ radical requests in the contemporary situation. 
If the developer knew the process would develop in such circumstances, they 
would regard this as a precious opportunity to finish the programme once for all. 
However, at that time, the developer did not support the villagers’ petition. They 
insisted on the Lingxia Scheme and Huli government’s policies. Firstly, they 
believed the success of Lingxia Programme proved that the compensation 
standard was reasonable. Secondly, to improve the compensation standard, the 
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enterprise’s profits would be compromised. Thirdly, they could play the trump 
card if villagers did not cooperate. According to Strategy One, they could use 
support from local cadres and joint-enforcements from the local government to 
facilitate the implementation.  
The implementation of Strategy One reflected the lack of administrative 
supervision. As discussed previously, the government attempted to restrain the 
developer from applying their own ideas by formulating detailed one-size-fits-all 
policies. The absence of proper supervision enabled the practice of Strategy One. 
The developer, as a commercial enterprise, even a state-controlled one, had the 
incentive to pursue profits efficiently, rather than perform what policies were 
prescribed on the behalf of the government or villagers. The developer would 
balance the risk and revenue based on the context to apply their own idea for their 
interests. As a result, policies were violated and Strategy One was developed. Mr 
PM criticised this, stating:  
All enterprises are the same that their goal is to make profits and develop 
themselves. The so-called sense of social responsibility is bullshit. There is no 
difference [between private enterprise and state-owned enterprise].  
They were competing for interests with villagers by using whatever possible means, 
cheating, hoaxing or deceiving. The negotiation was not public, and the standard 
was not public. If you had a good relationship with me then you were able to get an 
offer with higher standard than others.  
In his understanding, Strategy Once failed because the developer was too greedy 
and the negotiation process was not equal, transparent and sincere.  
5.3.5 Strategy Two 
Strategy Two was adopted in 2011 and had been implemented since 2012. When 
programme manager Mr PM returned to the office, he proposed his idea once more 
to the enterprise’s leadership. It caused a fierce debate once more, as Mr PM 
mentioned: 
I returned to the company in October 2011… When I returned, I took the position as 
the programme manager, to lead the whole programme. When I was back, the 
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conflict between my idea and the company’s previous idea can only be described as 
extremely fierce.  
To adopt Mr PM’s idea was a hard decision for the group, since it would 
significantly compromise the enterprise’s interests with the property owners. The 
key factor that made the group concede to Mr PM’s idea was that the programme’s 
progress had been stalled for a long time, especially so in 2011. Furthermore, such 
programmes had specific political connotations. The failure of the programme 
would impair the group’s relationship with the local governments and the group’s 
social image with the public. Therefore, to finish it as soon as possible became a 
more prioritised target than pursuing maximum profits. In the absence of a better 
alternative, the group eventually adopted Mr PM’s strategy.  
The proposed Strategy Two was characterised by two main points: the first one 
was to run the programme in a transparent, fair and equal way, abolishing the use 
of violence and threats; the second was to break the price ceilings imposed by the 
authority’s policies and return all the profits that the developer was promised to 
have (55% of land lease fee) to property owners as compensation.  
To accomplish the first point, many new rules were established. The primary one 
was that both the privileged group and the ordinary group would be compensated 
equally and treated fairly by the developer. Any extra benefit distributed to certain 
households previously was claimed back at the beginning of 2012. In the 
measurement of house size, now the company representative would hold the soft 
tape really loosely, to give everybody as much benefit as possible.  
The second one was the establishment of “the retrospect policy”. It prescribed that 
90% of the affected households who had signed contracts and moved out were 
able to claim the difference in the event that the programme’s compensation 
standards were raised afterwards. Previously, the standards were raised many 
times due to changes in government policies. It gave property owners a perception 
that the standard would always be higher in the future and therefore they tended 
to keep holding their properties in the hope of achieving a higher offer. The 
retrospect policy institutionally ensured that the early contract signers would not 
risk any loss because of standard improvements. In contrast, the earlier they 
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signed contracts, the more choices were available to them in selecting the location, 
layout, floor level and so on of the resettlement flats. To restore the weak mutual 
trust between the developer party and ordinary households, the programme 
executed the retrospect policy at the very beginning of 2012. Company 
representatives actively contacted all the early contract signers and invited them 
to the Headquarters to have a re-calculation under the new standards and collect 
the balance. Mr PM reflected that:  
So this time when we returned, when we’ve made the new standard, we 
then executed the new standard. We give the balance to those who were 
compensated in a lower standard, and, meanwhile, we took back the 
balance from those who have taken extra benefits […] no matter you took 
the extra benefits for what kind of reasons, we took them back […] the 
practice made cadres from the village committee astonished and speechless, 
and made ordinaries cheerful. Then we’ve won ordinaries’ trust, and then 
we are able to continue the requisition and demolition. It’s as simple as that. 
The third rule was to keep contracts transparent. Any villager who suspected that 
someone might have enjoyed a higher standard than others was welcome to check 
those contracts personally at the Headquarters. This ensured that there would be 
no secrets in any of the contracts and as a result, this process did not encounter 
difficulties.  
To achieve the second point of Strategy Two, the “VA Scheme” was made the 
programme’s internal scheme in order to significantly improve the compensation 
standards. At the same time, the programme’s Official Policies strictly stuck to the 
government’s policies so as to maintain the government’s authority. The decision-
making process of VA Scheme, the huge difficulties encountered in its 
implementation and the related solutions will be discussed in the next section.  
The VA Scheme prescribed all the compensation standards. It was characterised by 
three main components. The first one was compensation formulated by the 
programme’s Official Policies. It included everything offered by the government’s 
policies, e.g. resettlement flats, compensation for houses and other attachments, 
financial aid for home moving and transitional living etc. The second component 
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was replicated from the Linbian Scheme. Linbian village was a nearby village 
undertaking another urban village redevelopment programme. The Linbian 
Scheme was based on the government’s policies, but with some revisions. It was 
characterised by the invention of “the 400,000-scheme” and “the 2,500-scheme” as 
compensation for houses (see Table 1 in Appendix 1). Households could have 
whichever was greater. These two schemes were replicated by the VA Scheme. 
However, Item 6 in VA Scheme did not exist in its Linbian counterpart and was in 
fact proposed by VA villager representatives and adopted by Mr PM.  
The third component included many extraordinary extra rewards. These were the 
programme’s own innovation, based on Mr PM’s ideas and discussions with others 
actors. The developer expected that they would bring critiques and pressure from 
the government and other programme managers. To minimise the impacts, the 
developer practised them whilst maintaining a low profile. Thus, these rewards 
were not printed even in any public materials, unlike the other part of the scheme. 
Nevertheless, the practice of this component still faced many difficulties, which 
will be discussed in the next section. They are summarised from my interviews, see 
Table 2 in Appendix 1.  
When launched in 2012, the VA Scheme caused a sensation in the village and soon 
gained popularity. This may be illustrated by a comparison. Only around 260 
contracts were signed in total from 2008 to 2011. However, nearly 240 new 
contracts were signed in the single year of 2012. Furthermore, some problems that 
had troubled the developer for a long time were solved as well. In the past, many 
households who had signed contracts and received compensation refused to hand 
over their properties to the developer for demolition. Households argued that they 
would not fulfil their obligations prescribed by contracts because such contracts 
consisted of unequal and un-transparent compensation standards. This was an 
issue that was addressed by the new scheme. The retrospect policy enabled 
households to claim the balance between current and previous compensation 
levels. The villagers were happy with this and subsequently delivered their houses 
for demolition.  Although the VA Scheme was welcomed by villagers, it was 
condemned by other programme managers and the government. The following 
section discusses what difficulties it faced and how it survived.  
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5.3.6 How Strategy Two Survived 
When Mr PM took office as the new programme manager in late 2011, he started 
to replace Strategy One with Strategy Two. In Strategy Two, his concept was to 
conduct the programme in a transparent, equal and just way, and to significantly 
improve the compensation standard. A question raised, was to what extent 
improvements should be made to make the compensation standard reasonable. 
His idea was that the only way to convince villagers was for the developer to 
return all its profits from the programme (e.g. the 55% land lease fee) to all 
affected households as their compensation. Mr PM explained in an interview:  
His [the villager’s] demand for compensation could be infinite, because he thought 
that it was you who wanted to demolish my [house], so that I was able to claim an 
extremely high compensation. Then how to calm down such infinite desire? […] 
The only and most important point was that, no matter how valuable your land 
[and houses] were, I returned all of them [their value] to you, to make you 
reasonable. If you still claim more, then it was you who were behaving 
unreasonable […] If we could find a point on which we could reach an agreement 
based on our mutual interest, then the conflict would be solved […] 
As a programme manager of a commercial enterprise, it was a difficult decision for 
him to make such a compromise for villagers. He admitted that it was only because 
he was cornered, without better alternatives. The long-term interplay had made 
households smart, experienced and sophisticated in dealing with programme 
officials, as he said in an interview:  
At present, this is the last option, no alternatives. At the very beginning [of the 
programme], if you solved the problem regarding villagers’ livelihood, you 
probably would not have to return all the profits from the land lease to villagers. 
You could keep a big proportion of it. However, when you were gaming with 
villagers for several rounds, they gradually became smart. At that time, when the 
standard they preferred was increased, you were unable to go back to the 
alternatives that would have worked at the very beginning […] 
Therefore, the extent of the improvement was that the enterprise would gain zero 
profit, even suffering from a financial loss in the programme. Instead, the 
enterprise aimed to bid the land use rights after the programme, and to pursue 
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profits from its commercial development. When the idea was clear, a series of 
sessions were held within the Headquarters to draft details. Different groups of 
actors were invited to participate in the scheme-making, including actors from the 
Headquarters, cadres from the village committee, household team leaders and 
especially dozens of villager representatives. Attendants were able to contribute 
their ideas for discussion. Afterwards, a draft policy would be made by Mr PM 
accordingly. Then drafts would be discussed until a final version was produced. 
Viewed from the result, the whole policy-making process could be summarised as 
“replication and revisions” as well.  
The basic framework of the new scheme – the first and second component – was 
replicated from the Linbian Scheme. At that time, the Linbian Scheme was famous 
for its highest compensation standard in Huli District. It was based on the 
government’s policies but also broke the price ceiling prescribed in official policies 
by increasing the price for properties and offering some extra rewards for 
households. This also indicated that the government did not enforce their policies 
strictly. The specific context decided the extent to which the authorities would 
tolerate such violation of policies by the developer. The result was that the 
government did not intervene in the implementation of the Linbian Scheme. The 
scheme gained success in Linbian village and was then widely replicated by many 
others, such as the Wushipu Programme. Therefore, it was regarded as safe to 
replicate the Linbian Scheme for the VA Programme too.  
However, the similarities and differences between VA Village and Linbian village 
were similar to those between VA Village and Lingxia village. Linbian village was 
not far away from VA Village, but its location was worse off. It had fewer tenants 
and a lower rental price level, as described by company representative Mr CRD, 
who had participated in the Linbian Programme before:  
Many [Linbian] villagers enlarged their houses illegally, just as a preparation for 
the requisition and compensation […] because the rent for a room [in Linbian 
village] was only 150 or 180 [Yuan] and the renting rate was not as high as VA 
Village’s. It’s limited by their [inferior] location. Its location was bad. We could 
only go working by a private car because no buses went there. The nearest [bus] 
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stop was Gaolin stop … and then you needed to walk for half an hour to reach the 
village.  
Mr PM realised that simply replicating the Linbian Scheme without any 
improvement would not succeed. Therefore, based on the Linbian Scheme, he and 
the Headquarters added many more extra rewards, as the third component of 
Strategy Two, to ensure that the entire 55% land lease fee was returned to affected 
households as compensation. Under the third component, many more resettlement 
flats and shops were distributed to households. The commercial housing price was 
so high that even the resettlement housing was worth at least 10,000 Yuan/m2 in 
Xiamen Island, although it had inferior construction quality. Thus, offering a 
household one more square metre flat at the favoured price (around 5,000 
Yuan/m2) was equivalent to a monetary reward of 5,000 Yuan. This considerable 
reward had a significant potential impact.  
Eventually, the VA Scheme offered the highest level of compensation ever in 
Xiamen. In early 2012 when it was launched, it did not cause too much concern for 
other programmes due to its good timing. The special context in 2012 was that 
there was only Wushipu Programme being conducted in Xiamen Island and this 
had been suspended for a while. Thus, the overall impact was minor for other 
actors, especially for the government’s finances. Mr PM seized the opportunity. He 
communicated and negotiated intensively with the district government, and finally 
convinced them to ‘turn a blind eye’ to the VA Scheme. Company representative Mr 
CRD described in an interview:  
It was discussed in a meeting in VA Headquarters, and leaders from the district 
government acquiesced to the decision [gave many extra rewards for households] 
because [they knew] it was true that VA Programme had difficulties [in 
implementation]. 
However, the situation changed quickly. Many other programmes were initiated 
one by one in the city, from late 2012 to early 2013. The impact of the scheme 
became increasingly significant. Company representative Mr CRD and programme 
manager Mr PM indicated that:  
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Mr CRD: “[…] the problem was that, villagers tended to compare [compensation 
standards] with each other. In 2013, the government officially forbade it [the 
reward]”  
Mr PM: “[…] we are afraid that the government may change the policy [their 
attitude to what the developer did]. Since we follow principles of the market 
economy, it’s possible for us, a commercial enterprise, to share profits [with 
villagers]. However, in Huli District, most programmes are government-led. Once 
the government is involved it’s impossible [for him] to share profits [with villagers], 
because higher [compensation] standards bring higher financial burden. 
Therefore, they claim that it is the high standard in our programme that is 
responsible for the slow progress in their programme. Therefore, we become the 
target of their condemning […]” 
The extraordinary rewards offered in the VA Scheme attracted much attention 
from villagers in other programmes, who then demanded the same treatment. It 
was difficult for these government-led programmes to adopt the same scheme, 
since the expense was unaffordable for the government, due to the magnifying 
effect. Following this the VA Scheme was condemned by other programme 
managers as they ascribed the increasing difficulties in implementing their 
programmes to the negative impact of the VA Scheme. The government then 
changed its attitude, intervened and stopped the VA programme’s practice of extra 
rewards, as Mr PM said:  
In last year [2012], at the very beginning, the government supported us, but later 
they banned it and asked us to stop some rewards we offered to villagers, like the 
extra quota of resettling flats and its favoured price. They asked us to stop it 
immediately. [However], once we stopped it, the programme would be sentenced 
to death […] 
The intervention caused three main difficulties for the developer making it difficult 
for him to continue practising the VA Scheme. The first one was the registration of 
resettlement flats. All resettlement flats needed to be registered with the 
government in order to have title deeds. Due to the intervention, flats distributed 
as extra rewards could not be authorised and therefore were not able to be issued 
with title deeds. The second difficulty was the supply of resettlement flats. A 
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number of the programme’s resettlement flats were supplied by the government. 
The developer’s stock could not afford to meet the scheme’s need without more 
supply and the developer was not able to ask for help from the government.  
Eventually, to solve the two difficulties, the developer decided to fill the gap by 
providing their own commercial housing as replacements for resettlement housing. 
They purchased a piece of land near VA Village, constructed commercial housing in 
the design of resettlement housing and then distributed them to households at the 
same price as other resettlement housing, around 4,000-5,000 Yuan/m2. All costs 
were supposed to be covered by the enterprise’s profits from the programme (55% 
of land lease fee). Actually, Mr PM estimated that the enterprise had to pay more 
than that and would suffer a loss finally. Accordingly, two sets of contracts were 
drafted by the developer, known as “the city-contract” and “the district-contract”. 
The compensation standard in the city-contract was based on the programme’s 
Official Policies. This contract was used to run the paperwork with the government. 
The district-contract was drafted under the VA Scheme, which contained not only 
everything offered by Official Policies, but also all the other extra benefits. The 
district-contract was privately used as an agreement between the developer and 
households.  
Even though the developer managed to compromise its own interests to bypass 
the two difficulties to continue the practice of offering extra houses, it did not 
result in households from other programmes stopping their request for the same 
treatment. As discussed previously, rural land requisition had political 
connotations, whether in a developer-led paradigm or a government-led paradigm. 
Even in a developer-led paradigm, the developer was supposed to represent the 
government and perform on its behalf. Therefore, households from other 
programmes were not concerned about whether the rewards were provided 
through commercial activities or governmental aids. Instead, they cared more 
about what the benefit was and requested the same rewards. The developer 
therefore still faced pressure and accusation from others.  
The third difficulty derived from the one-child policy. In the reward the 
qualification was broadened for household members to receive compensation. 
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Specifically, children or babies who were born in violation of one-child policy were 
eligible to enjoy the same full compensation as others. This released a signal for 
households that they were encouraged to give birth to more babies in order to 
enjoy more rewards. The check and balance was that the value of the 
compensation package they were able to receive from the programme by having 
more than one child outweighed the punishment imposed by the government. 
Therefore, the reward was seen as the sabotage of the state’s birth control, which 
seriously crossed the authority’s red line. Company representative Mr CRD 
described that:  
It took place in last year [2012]. To facilitate the process, we actually did it [the 
third reward]. When we did it, the district government kept objecting to it. And the 
reason was simple, that, we [the government] took an extremely great effort to 
control the birth rate, while you gave villagers a signal that, since you gave 
compensation for these babies. The fine was only around 100,000 Yuan, but each 
one baby could get 50m2 flat and other compensations. It was profitable. Villagers 
were encouraged to have extra births…. This year [2013], the district government 
official announced that all extra births were no longer able to get compensations. 
So this year [2013] the progress was stalled  
As a result, the developer was forced to stop offering compensation for a 
household’s extra babies and children in 2013. The developer then faced a 
dilemma. If they lowered the compensation level to ease the tense relationship 
with the government, households would be disappointed and the programme 
would slow down; if they kept offering the high level compensation, they would 
suffer further pressure from the government. Programme manager Mr PM’s 
strategy in solving the dilemma was to finesse his relationship with the 
government, as he mentioned in an interview:  
If an enterprise wants to survive in such circumstance, to keep the programme 
moving forward, the only way is to befriend with the government while keep away 
from their policies […] so it was one thing that we promised we would stop it, and 
it was the other thing that we [continued to] did it, and we did it covertly.  
The developer’s special power relationship with the government enabled the 
adoption of the strategy. Officially, Huli government was in charge of all such 
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programmes within its district, including this one. Therefore, CB Company should 
have been under Huli government’s regulations and supervisions. However, the 
partnership between CB Company and Huli district government was more than 
that. CA Company, the owner of CB Company, was the largest and most influential 
shareholding cooperation controlled by the municipality. With CA Company’s 
support, CB Company was empowered in its interaction with Huli district 
government. Mr PM knew this and took advantage of it. As a result, most of issues 
could be negotiated between the two groups to reach an agreement and none of 
them was able to play a dominant role in the negotiation. As a result, Mr PM 
managed to resolve tensions, the district government continued to maintain a 
blind eye and Strategy Two survived. Nevertheless, Strategy Two also faced 
challenges from its own capacity (a budget issue) and the villagers (a trust issue).  
5.3.7 Budget of Strategy Two 
The idea of the so-called “return of all the developer’s profit to villagers” had been 
doubted by many villagers, even though Strategy Two gained widespread 
popularity from affected households in VA Village. Therefore, it is important to 
examine the interior scheme specifically to understand to what extent it really 
fulfils the idea. Due to the lack of detailed data, it is impossible to produce a 100% 
accurate calculation. Nevertheless, a simplified and general example is helpful and 
illustrates the point, as shown in the following tables.  
NO. Item Figure 
1 Village land area  235,163.54 m2 
2 Village’s built site 44,400 m2 (non-housing) 
455,600 m2 (housing) 
3 Households  663 
4 Population (Indigenous villagers) 1906 
5 Land area for the construction of 
the in-situ resettling flats (in 
planning) 
25,842.052 m2 
6 Built site of the in-situ resettling 
flats (in planning) 
97,807.67 m2 
7 Land lease fee of the nearby land 35492.41 Yuan /m2 in 
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2010 
Table 5. 6 Key figures in the calculation 
Note: The current exchange rate is around 10 Yuan to 1 Pound 
Figure 2 is estimated by the developer at Preparation Stage. NO. 3 and 4 are from 
VA Village’s Chronicle (2010). Figure 7 is from the website of Xiamen Municipal 
Bureau of Land Resources and Real Estate Management11, and the three pieces of 
land are leased for real estate development, school buildings (a kindergarten and a 
primary school), and real estate development  respectively. The land used to be the 
village’s farmland and they are located beside the village, just across a street. Other 
figures are from official documents.  
The calculation processes are based on a form produced by the developer, see 
Appendix 2. The details of the calculation process see Table 2 in Appendix 3. The 
result shows that the cost is around 3,723,122,973 Yuan. The land lease fee 
continues to use the result from previous calculation, which is 7,429,324,074 Yuan 
(in 2010). The Land Administration Law of PRC (2004 revised) legislates that the 
land lease fee shall be distributed between the central government (30%) and the 
local governments (70%). In this developer-led programme, the developer and the 
local governments have an agreement to share the 70%: 5% for the city 
government, 10% for the district government and 55% for the developer. The 
developer is responsible for its own profits and losses. Theoretically, the developer 
is supposed to gain 7,429,324,074 X (100% - 30% - 5% - 10%) = 
4,086,128,241(Yuan) from the programme. The expense of the programme to the 
developer’s potential revenue is 91.12% (3,723,122,973/4,086,128,241). As with 
the previous calculation, this is a simplified and general calculation. Some figures 
may be out-dated or inaccurate and some items are missing due to lack of data. It is 
worth noting that in reality, the size of the land leased would be smaller, since 
some of the land was designated for lanes, public green space, community facilities 
etc. Therefore, the developer’s real revenue could be lower, and the revenue 
calculated could be over-estimated. On the other hand, the potential expense could 
be less than estimated. The programme still needs to run for a long time before it 
                                                        
11 See http://tz.xmtfj.gov.cn/jyzq/jyxydcr/jyjg_4144/ 
135 
 
finishes and the expense continues to accumulate. Therefore, the ratio of expense 
and revenue should be higher than 91.12%. Nevertheless, the simplified 
calculation supports the developer’s statement of the idea.  
To make sure that the result is not coincident, another approach of expense 
estimation will be used to triangulate the findings. CA Company is a listed 
shareholding corporation, and CB Company is its wholly-owned subsidiary. The 
data of the group’s investment to the programme could be traced from the group’s 
public financial reports, as shown in the following table (5.7). The figures are book 
balances at the end of the year.  
Year Noncurrent liabilities that due within one 
year 
Short-term 
loan 
Long-term 
loan 
Sum 
2009 0.38 0 0.72 1.1 
2010 0.635 0.077 1.416 2.128 
2011 0.064 0.41 2.43 2.904 
2012 0.1175 0.3 2.3945 2.812 
Table 5. 7 CA Company’s investment to the programme by 2012 
Notes: The unit is billion Yuan. 10 Yuan equals 1 Pound approximately.  
Source: CA Company’s annual financial reports12 
Reports also show that the registered capital of CB Company is 0.35 billion Yuan. 
Therefore, CB Company received at least 3.2 billion Yuan investments in total by 
2012. If the entire fund was used for the programme, the expense of 3.2 billion 
Yuan was close to the calculation result of 3.7 billion Yuan. Furthermore, even 
though the programme achieved progress in 2012, the pace was slowing down by 
2013. Only 50% of households had signed contracts by May 2013. Presumably the 
expense would keep accumulating, as programme manager Mr PM said in an 
interview, “viewed from the current situation, our enterprise would lose money, 
instead of making profits”. Although the developer had made a significant 
compromise, the developer still faced many challenges from villagers.  
 
                                                        
12 See http://stockdata.stock.hexun.com/2009_zcfz_600153.shtml 
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5.3.8 Challenges from Villagers 
An important principle of Strategy Two was that all households should be treated 
equally and fairly. However, this was doubted by a group of villagers. They 
admitted that the compensation standard had a higher level than before and was 
higher than other current programmes but they still had a sense that some 
households had managed to enjoy a better standard than others. Whether this was 
true or not and how such perceptions were generated became two important 
questions that required answers. This section will examine how the huge amount 
of investment was distributed among villagers, why it was perceived as unequal by 
some villagers and the challenge the programme faced because of this. A simplified 
and general calculation again illustrates this.  
Summarised from interviews and the calculation form (see Table 1 in Appendix 2), 
there are ten variables that will affect a household’s compensation package (see 
Table 2 in Appendix 2). In most cases, the first four variables – ‘number of qualified 
household members’, ‘built site with title deeds of the house’, ‘built site without title deeds 
of the house’ and ‘ground floor area’ – are most significant to the magnitude of the 
total compensation, while others are of lesser significance. The new scheme in 
Strategy Two offers every household the option to purchase a car park slot, and 
every qualified household member the option to purchase an extra 30 m2 flat and 
extra 10 m2 shops per capita. They are all offered at a favoured price, much lower 
than the current market price. Therefore, we can assume that all households will 
purchase them. Another new reward is the broadening of qualification for 
compensation. A household is able to have more qualified members for 
compensation if a member is newly married or reaches marriageable age. 
Variables 6 and 7 – ‘land attachments’ and ‘interior attachments’ – are difficult to 
accurately quantify due to the lack of specific context. For variables 9 and 10, 
which are ‘moving out before deadline’ and ‘sign contracts within a group’, most 
households who decide to sign contracts would find a group to enjoy the group 
reward and move out before the deadline to gain another reward. Therefore, for 
simplicity, we can assume that all households will benefit from two rewards. 
Firstly, examples 1 and 2, as shown in the following table, will be used to exemplify 
that a house’s legal status is not influential in the magnitude of total compensation.  
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NO. Variables Example 1 Example 2 
1 Number of qualified household members 3 3 
2 Built site with title deeds of the house 0 100 m2 
3 Built site without title deeds of the house 100 m2 0 
4 Ground floor of the house 120 m2 120 m2 
Table 5. 8 Two examples 
The calculation process is shown in Table 3 in Appendix 3. The result is that the 
equivalent value of the requisitioned house in example 1 is 37,331 Yuan/m2, while 
it is 37,631 Yuan/m2 in example 2. The comparison exemplifies that, in the new 
scheme, the difference of the house’s legal status is not a significant influential 
variable. Specifically, Item 15 of Several Regulations of Xiamen City about Land 
Administration (2000) formulates that every household can only have a piece of 
residential land and the standard is given as: 60m2 for a household with 4 
members or below; 70m2 for a household with 5-6 members, 80 m2 for a 
household with 7 members or more. In practice, the registration of property 
certificates for residential land and houses were strict and tight. Especially, after 
1993, no new certificates had been issued for households. According to the 
developer’s field research, for most households in VA Village, the average legal 
house area was around 30m2 per capita or below. Only a limited number of 
households had a large amount of legal area in their houses, inherited from other 
family members. As previously mentioned, compared to population, the house size 
and land area are more important in deciding the magnitude of the total 
compensation than the legal status of the house. For simplicity, in the following 
calculation, assume that all houses are illegally built.  
NO. Variables Example 3 
1 Number of qualified household members 5 
2 Built site with title deeds of the house 0 
3 Built site without title deeds of the house 1000 m2 
4 Ground floor of the house 200 m2 
Table 5. 9 Example 3 
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The calculation process of example 3 is shown in Table 4 in Appendix 3. The 
following table is a summary of all calculation results from a range of selected 
representative examples:  
Size\Members 1 2 3 4 5 
50,60 33,754 51,108 68,462 85,816 103,170 
100,120 19,857 28,654 37,331 46,008 54,685 
200,120 10,648 13,407 19,606 48,008 28,343 
400,150 6,236 8,585 10,934 13,047 15,344 
600,150 4,634 6,157 7,723 9,223 10,816 
800,200 4,238 5,289 6,339 7,510 8,684 
1000,200 3,891 4,731 5,572 6,016 7,308 
Table 5. 10 Price matrix of some cases 
Notes: The unit is Yuan/m2. 10 Yuan equals 1 Pound approximately. 
Figures in the first column are house size and land area, and the unit is m2. Figures 
in the first row are the number of qualified household members. The rest are the 
equivalent value for the requisitioned house. The matrix exemplifies why 
households with a smaller house and more qualified members were more eager to 
sign contracts. When households received a compensation package from the 
developer, they tended to calculate a price by discounting all they received e.g. 
resettlement flats, shops and car park lot into a monetary sum, and by dividing the 
sum with the house area to calculate the equivalent value of the house. Then 
households would compare the price with each other. Although their calculation 
process might not be exactly the same as the thesis shown, the idea was the same 
and the matrix could more or less reflect the pattern. Theoretically, in some 
extreme cases, households were even able to enjoy an extraordinary price, as high 
as 103,170 Yuan/m2, from the requisitioned houses. This was much higher even 
than the commercial housing price within Xiamen Island, which was around 
10,000 to 30,000 (Yuan/m2) in 2013.  
When the house size becomes larger and qualified household members become 
fewer, the price decreases drastically. This reveals why some households feel that 
that they have received satisfactory compensation from their houses while some 
139 
 
do not. The idea of Strategy Two was that compensation standards should be the 
same for all. It is true that the rules and company representatives’ services for 
every household were fair and equal. Villagers’ perceptions of unequal and unfair 
were derived from the comparison of the equivalent price. Such a comparison was 
too one-sided to reflect all the benefits they have, e.g. the better infrastructure. 
Furthermore, although families with a smaller house size and a larger number of 
qualified members enjoyed a higher price, households with a larger house size will 
always enjoy a larger amount of the equivalent sum. To some extent, such a 
pattern of distribution is fair and reasonable.  
Another big challenge the developer faced was that households not only compared 
the price with other households, but also with the compensation standard 
prescribed by some irrelevant policies. Specifically, there was a policy regarding 
urban land requisition, but this was perceived by villagers as an applicable policy 
in their own programme, which was referred to as “the New Regulation”. From it, 
villagers believed that the compensation standard for their houses should be “the 
Nearby Market Price (jiu-jin-shi-chang-jia)”. This issue is discussed in detail in 
Section 6.4.2. The following is an excerpt from an interview with elder leader Mr 
VF:  
Question: “In 2008, villagers just claimed 1,000 [Yuan/m2, same for the followings]. 
However, even though now the scheme has the highest standard in Xiamen, why do 
many villagers still refuse to accept the offer?” 
Mr VF: “You don’t know the reason? Of course we villagers know. The government 
has already prescribed a [new} price for compensation, which is the Nearby 
Market Price. For example, these [he pointed to the nearby commercial housing] 
are sold at the price of 18,000, so that the NMP should be 12,000 to 15,000 at least. 
It can’t be 6,000 only [as provided by the developer]. Many villagers have been 
aware of it. It’s impossible that nobody knows it.” 
[…] 
Mr VF: “At the beginning, if the developer [was willing to be] offered 2,000, rather 
than 6,000, the whole village could have been demolished already. And villagers 
wouldn’t have sued them, would they? Now it’s different. Even if you gave villagers 
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10,000, they may not accept it … because we should get 12,000. You know, the 
NMP is 20,000. According to the state’s [new] policy now, the price for 
compensation should be the NMP. It’s not that the price should be exactly the same 
as the NMP, but it should be close to the NMP. For example, the NMP of VA Village 
is 20,000, and then [the compensation price] should be at least 15,000, right? Or 
12,000. In my understanding, now all villagers believe this” 
The price of 6,000 Yuan was achieved via the calculation mentioned above. It 
seemed that 6,000 Yuan was a frequently identified price among households. The 
cases that the price of 6,000 Yuan represents in the matrix are also likely to better 
match the actual situations. Influenced by the NMP from the New Regulation, their 
objective was set at the range of 12,000 to 15,000 Yuan, only slightly lower than 
the nearby commercial housing price of 18,000 Yuan. However, it was an 
unreasonable claim. As analysed previously, almost 55% of the land lease fee had 
already been invested by the developer in the programme. Presumably, even if the 
investment was increased to 100% of the land lease fee, it was difficult to reach 
villagers’ objectives. This was what programme manager Mr PM referred to as an 
“endless claim”. Although the improvement from Strategy One to Strategy Two was 
significant and gained popularity, many villagers did not appreciate it as much as 
programme officials thought they should. Elder leader Mr VT evaluated the 
improvement as “a bit” in an interview:  
The programme was stuck, and after three or four years, now they raise the 
compensation standard a bit, but compared to the state’s New Regulation, there is 
still a huge gap to the NMP 
Therefore, this was the challenge the developer faced in the new stage. Villagers 
claimed an unreasonably high standard, but at the same time, they honestly 
perceived their claim as rightful and reasonable, because it was supported by the 
state’s policies, although this was a mistaken understanding of applicable policies.  
5.4 Conclusion 
To sum up, this chapter introduces the context of the government and the 
developer via the analysis of their policies and strategies. Section 5.2 focuses on 
the general policies, which are derived from the national level to the district level. 
Due to lack of relevant data, the analysis is limited. Nevertheless, it sheds light on 
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their rationale that the rural property requisition process is strictly controlled by 
the state, and the profit from it makes a great contribution to public finance. 
Section 5.3 specifies the developer’s strategies. Specifically, Strategy One failed 
because it attempted to replicate a scheme which was successful in another 
programme, without any adaptions based on VA village’s context. On the other 
hand, Strategy Two was considered much more progressive since it truly practised 
the idea that all the potential profit the developer was able to receive would be 
returned to affected households. The next chapter will introduce the background 
of the indigenous villagers.  
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Chapter Six - Two Groups of Indigenous Villagers 
6.1 Introduction 
The last chapter introduced the context of the government and the developer 
through the analysis of their policies and strategies. This Chapter continues to 
introduce the context of VA Village through the analysis of two distinct groups of 
villagers in VA Village. They are the privileged group and the ordinary group, 
mainly represented by the VA Village Committee and the leadership of elders, 
respectively. Both of them played a significant role in the programme and, as such, 
affected the process profoundly.  Sections 6.2 to Section 6.4 discuss the ordinary 
group. Section 6.2 introduces three important characteristics of the leadership and 
decision-makers of the ordinary group. Section 6.3 discusses how elder villagers’ 
different views of value affected their decision-making process. Section 6.4 
illustrates how the elders had a serious information misinterpretation problem. 
Section 6.5 examines the privileged group and their important characteristics. 
Section 6.6 theorises the findings with the social capital framework.  
6.2 Leadership and Decision-makers of Ordinary Households 
The ordinary group and privileged group had different backgrounds in terms of 
social status, financial resources and power. A serious trust issue existed between 
them. The ordinary group was always suspicious about whether the village 
committee would really deal with requisition issues on their behalf. Their 
observations confirmed their assumptions that the answer was in the negative. In 
the programme, sometimes these groups had completely opposite attitudes and 
responses towards the developer. Bounded by mutual interests, the ordinary 
group gradually formed into a loosely organised group with their own leadership 
to make collective decisions and organise collective actions. This section 
introduces their three main characteristics.  
6.2.1 Role of Elder Men 
The programme involved around 663 households with 1906 indigenous villagers 
(based on the 2007 Census). The majority of households belonged to the ordinary 
group. In each, not every member participated in the programme. Usually, a 
household was represented by its elder man as the decision-maker and participant 
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of the programme. Most of these elder men were more than 40 years old. Among 
the elder men, the seniors, who usually had good reputations, wide social 
networks and better educational experience, were honoured as intelligent and 
knowledgeable persons and became the leadership of the ordinary group. This 
outcome was generated by three key factors.  
First, elder men possessed authority in the family.  Although the village was 
encircled by prosperous urban areas, it remained a rural enclave, marginalised by 
mainstream society. The impact of modern and Western ideology had not yet been 
strongly influential enough to challenge their traditionally rural culture and 
lifestyle. In their circle, elder men were respected as the authority of the family and 
it was their duty as well as obligation to make decisions for the family. For example, 
arranged marriages remained prevalent in the village. Therefore, issues regarding 
property requisition and compensation were in the charge of elder men.   
Second, the village suffered from ageing and empty-nest problems. The one-child 
policy was narrowing the foundation of the village’s population pyramid, making it 
an elder-dominated society. Furthermore, the young indigenous villagers tended to 
move out of the village. The young generation who had grown up in recent decades 
had been influenced and assimilated by mainstream society. On one hand, the 
village no longer had farmland and did not provide promising careers; on the other 
hand, urban areas managed to provide employment opportunities and better living 
conditions. As a result, young people moved out to pursue a better life and living 
conditions that could be found in the urbanised areas, rather than staying in the 
village. By contrast, it was more difficult for elders to adapt and get used to an 
urbanised lifestyle and, as such, they preferred to stay in the village. Therefore, the 
younger generation’s outward migration left families with just elders, and they 
then became, what are known as, ‘empty-nest’ households. According to the 
Chronicle of VA Village and research interviews, among the 1,906 villagers, it was 
estimated that nearly 200 indigenous villagers were more than 60 years old, and 
400 were between 40 to 60 years old.  
Third, elders had more social experiences and spare time to engage with 
requisition issues. Younger people were more likely to be working class or 
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students. They were unfamiliar with both official village affairs and with local 
politics and had little spare time for participation. During my research I tried to 
interview young indigenous villagers but they knew little about the issues of 
development and demolition. In contrast, born and raised in VA Village, elders had 
wider social networks with other villagers, and were familiar with village affairs 
and norms. Furthermore, elders had more spare time. When they were free from 
agricultural activities, they became professional landlords who lived off rents 
rather than paid employment. Participation in the processes of rural land 
requisition was time-consuming because of its long term nature, and this required 
participants to have sufficient time capacity to be actively involved.  
With all the necessary elements for participation, elder men became household 
representatives in the programme, as reflected in an interview with company 
representatives Mr CRD:  
To a large extent, elders make decisions [for their families] … it’s impossible for us 
to circulate the publicity to every single villager. We did publicity one household 
by one household, to decision-makers of the family, or those who are family 
breadwinners. Usually if the person is the breadwinner, then he is the decision-
maker as well … when we visit a household, if the young members happen to be 
home, they were welcome to join us, but usually they won’t  
There were many villager associations in the village, including the youth 
association, the women’s association and the elder association. Among them, the 
elder association was the most powerful and controlled the most collective 
resources. As mentioned in the literature review, it was found that many 
shareholding institutions were established in urban villages to take charge of 
collective properties. VA Village’s elder association became one of them. It 
managed many collective properties such as the elder recreation centres and 
collective rental buildings, which generated considerable monthly incomes. It also 
had influence in public issues. Village committees occasionally would consult the 
elder association for their opinions when they were going to make some important 
public decisions, not only to show respect but also to gain support.  
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Although the elder association seemed to be powerful, it was not a political or 
administrative unit. It was more like an informal club, and its main duty was to 
serve elders. It managed and maintained elder recreation centres to provide 
venues for elders’ daily communication, interaction and recreation. It collected 
rents from its collective rental buildings and managed the fund and sent 
consolation and subsidies to the poor elders when they had difficulties, e.g. when 
ill or injured. It also distributed subsidies and material supports to poor elders on 
special occasions, e.g. the Elder Day (9 September in lunar calendar) or Chinese 
New Year. Members of the elder association were bounded together mainly by 
their age rather than any political affiliation. Therefore, it was supposed to be a 
loosely-organised unit made up of the majority of the ordinary group, rather than 
the privileged group. However, when the village was pushed into the requisition 
programme and the ordinary group had a need to form their own leadership, the 
elder association spontaneously took the responsibility and formed leadership 
over the ordinary group. Chapter Seven will illustrate this in more detail.  
6.2.2 Limited Education Experience 
Most decision-makers were elders, but the majority of elders were illiterate or had 
received only very limited schooling. Elders mainly grew up in the Maoism era, 
when the state was ignorant mentally, poor materially and disordered politically. 
During this period the state could not keep citizens from starvation, let alone 
afford opportunities for schooling them.  
This characteristic of the elder’s background was crucial to understanding their 
decision-making and actions. Compared to the programme implementers, they 
were clearly disadvantaged. First, facing massive amounts of information, for 
example in meetings with officials, they often tried to recall these by memory 
rather than by using written notes. Their memory however, was not reliable, in 
terms of both the quantity and quality of what they remembered and their 
recollection often became confused and muddled, as reflected in an interview with 
an illiterate elder villager Mr VS:  
I also have many other issues to complain, but I just cannot recall it at the moment. 
For an illiterate person, I can only tell you whenever I recall it.  
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Many details of the process were confused as well. The chaos of dates was an 
example. According to paper evidence, it was on 25 August 2008 that villagers 
sued the government, and it was on 22 August 2009 that the forced demolition of 
Mr VG’s house took place. Since the day and month were similar, many villagers 
mixed them up, as shown in an interview with an illiterate elder villager, Mr VS:  
Question: “What action did the developer take after the launch of the programme 
in 2008?”  
Mr VS: “They once tried to conduct a forced demolition, which became problematic. 
It’s on 22 August 2008. They sent people to demolish [Mr VG’s house] by force, and 
we villagers gathered up to protest it” 
[…] 
Mr VS: “We hired lawyers to sue the government. In fact we won it, but it seemed 
that the government somehow manipulated the result secretly. We sued the 
district government for trying to demolish [our property] by coercion and 
arresting villagers [illegally]”  
Question: “When did it happen?” 
Mr VS: “In 2009” 
Mr VS remembered things only by memory. He confused the dates, even though he 
had kept a copy of the court judgement and a copy of an agreement for 
reconciliation, on which the dates of the events were clearly written.  
The second disadvantage for this group was that their information sources were 
limited. They were not able to browse information from the Internet, or gain 
access to interior information from the developer or the government. Instead, the 
majority of information they obtained and relied upon came from daily 
communications, observations and public media including television, radio and 
newspapers (the latter only for elders who could read). Due to censorship, 
information gained from public media was supposed to serve the authority’s own 
purposes and most information was in favour of the state. However, the state had 
weaker censorship on the Internet where more diverse information could be found. 
Some anti-requisition actors even delivered their ideas to the public via the 
Internet. Full texts of policies regarding rural land requisition could be 
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downloaded from the Internet as well, which were important but the elders group 
did not have access to these through this mechanism.  
Third, elders had problems of interpretation, being unable to decipher the 
information they gathered. Interviews revealed that elders had many 
misunderstandings of a number of key issues. Although many of them denied it in 
interviews, the fact is that it is common and this is investigated in detail in Section 
6.4. The misunderstandings created further deterioration in their relationships 
and trust with the other groups of stakeholders and as a result, generated 
unnecessary conflicts.  
Although elders were greatly disadvantaged, they did not seem to worry or even 
consider that they were in a more disadvantaged position. Instead, many of them 
over-estimated their capacity, e.g. their abilities in communication and negotiation. 
This confidence may have derived from a pride in the rich social experiences and 
life wisdom they had accumulated. This was illustrated in an interview with 
illiterate elder Mr VS and literate elder Mr VF.  
Question: “How did company representatives spread the publicity to you?”  
Mr VS: “They propaganda you how wonderful the offer is, but we calculate it and 
find it not true. Anyway, if, in terms of the statement of contracts, I think, though 
I’m illiterate, I could read several characters, so I know something, and it’s not 
true. In recent years, within the process of the programme, I’ve kept watching 
news on TV, and then I gradually know something. Otherwise, I’ll never 
understand it. Otherwise, for an illiterate like me, how could I argue with the 
government? Thanks to my eloquence, though I haven’t got education before, 
when I hang around in VA Headquarters, sometimes I go there, and I can debate 
heatedly with them about the compensation offer […]”  
Question: “Have any company representatives visited you and negotiated the offer 
with you?”  
Mr VF: “I don’t know [whether they’ve visited] other villagers, but they’ve never 
visited me. My stance is against the demolition programme, so that they not dare 
visit me. They know my capability. I’m telling you the fact. I’m not boasting. They 
know my capability so that they do not dare to talk with me”  
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In these interviews, Mr VS used “eloquence” and “heatedly” to describe his 
debating with company representatives. Mr VF believed that no representatives 
visited him because they were afraid of his capacity. Furthermore, many elders 
strongly doubted that, as a young student, I was able to handle this complicated 
topic, due to their perception of my lack of rich social experience and necessary 
knowledge, as revealed in an interview with elder literate leaders Mr VF and Mr VT. 
Mr VF: “You just step into the society, but me, I’ve lived longer than you. I have the 
advantage of old age. Let me tell you something, the local government is very dark 
in the present society … you the intelligent, look nerdy, you know what I mean?”  
Mr VT: “It’s not what I like to say, but the truth is that I think so far you’re 
incapable or naive. Seriously, you just step into the society, what kind of paper are 
you able to produce (laugh)?”  
Both elder leaders valued their rich social experience and their insights of the 
society generated from it and believed it outweighed a PhD candidate’s capacity.  
In contrast, later in my interviews with company representatives, they generally 
thought that most elders’ debating skills were poor, and the arguments they made 
were usually unreasonable, ungrounded and absurd. My following interviews 
found that the reasons and evidence elders used in constructing and arguing their 
cases were frequently based on rumours, misunderstandings and irrelevant 
policies, a finding discussed further in Section 6.4.  
6.2.3 Networks and Mutual Help 
Elders’ networks and mutual help played an important role in their information 
acquisition, decision-making and collective actions. Suffering from a lack of 
education experience, elders had low-levels of educational human capital. 
Nevertheless, the high-level of bonding social capital they had partially 
compensated for this shortage.  
Face-to-face interactions inhered in social networks was identified as the main 
approach for the ordinary group in order to socialise as well as to share 
information. There were many occasions that provided such opportunities. 
Religious events occupied an important role in elders’ life. There were four ancient 
temples within the village, all built in the Qing Dynasty with hundreds of years of 
history. More than ten important religious rituals were held annually, e.g. rituals of 
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“chi-xiang-wei”, “zou-nian-zai” and “zuo-hao-shi” and, in addition, monthly rituals 
were held as a routine. With these rituals, traditional dramas were performed 20-
30 times annually, and outdoor movies were filmed frequently. Another important 
part of socialising was daily recreation. Walking around the village, playing board 
games, tasting teas, visiting friends, hanging about in elder centres or just chatting 
with acquaintances on the street corners, accounted for elders’ daily activities. All 
these occasions enabled them to have casual conversations, exchanging the most 
recent information and opinions. At the same time, the frequent interactions on a 
daily basis enhanced their mutual trust and broadened their personal social 
networks with the group.  
Mutual help inhered in reciprocity and trustworthiness was identified as an 
important factor in the decision-making process. When negotiating with company 
representatives, the majority of ordinary villagers found they were unable to fully 
understand policies and were not confident enough to deal with these individually. 
This means that they would therefore appreciate others’ experience, knowledge 
and assistance. They would prioritise their peers (mainly friends, relatives and 
neighbours) when asking for help. Even though most households had better 
educated members, e.g. the younger generation who had received proper 
schooling and had more capacity to understand the policies, the elders still 
appeared to prefer to seek advice from their age peers rather than the younger 
family members. As discussed above, it was also the case that younger family 
members were usually occupied with working or studying or lived outside the 
village. Their age peers seemed to be more suitable since they were always 
available when needed, as reflected in interviews with company representative Mr 
CRD and an officer from the street office Mr SOC:  
Mr CRD: “No, [they don’t take their children to accompany them in negotiation]. 
They can always find relatives available in the village. For example, if I can’t 
understand [policies and schemes], I would probably find someone from my 
relatives who have already signed it or who may understand it. Actually, when the 
village is being requisitioned and demolished, the whole group of villagers would 
be each other’s relatives. Well, as long as it would not impair villagers’ own 
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interests, when you ask them to assist you, villagers would be glad to do what they 
can. After all, they belong to the same village.  
Mr SOC: “It’s impossible that we could sign the contract with a household 
immediately after a single round of negotiation. It’s even possible that we 
negotiate with a single household for ten or twenty times. Sometimes we visit but 
nobody is home. Then it’s a waste of time. Eventually, he is home, it turns out that 
he doesn’t prepare all necessary documents. We don’t know what the hell he is 
doing, but anyway we can’t proceed [without necessary documents]. When he’s got 
all documents, there would probably be some other troubles, like, he insists [that 
we] interpret the policies, how we’ll compensate him, how we’ll resettle his 
household etc. We tell him, but he’s unable to understand it. So he insists to invite 
his relatives to accompany him tomorrow. [We come in tomorrow,] and his 
relatives can’t understand it either. Then he insists to ask help from neighbours, in 
another negotiation … Some villagers just couldn’t accept our offer easily, and they 
can’t understand it either, even though we explain it again and again. It’s not as 
easy as you may imagine. After all, most villagers haven’t received much education 
before. These old peasants have these educational [illiterate] problems. You see, 
now many houses are owned and managed by elder villagers. Well, the elders, 
after our negotiation, they always insist to understand how to calculate the 
compensation, and to calculate it again all by themselves, and then compare it 
with other villagers’ compensation. He understands it, but he just must compare it 
with others, knowing how others do it. It’s so complicated” 
Mutual help was available in decision-making when households required 
intellectual assistance on requisition issues, a position that suggested there was a 
high level of mutual trust between ordinary villagers, rather than with the 
developer or actors from the government. The networks and mutual help benefited 
the ordinary group by facilitating the information circulation. Villagers were able 
to deliver or acquire information either in daily interactions or in the process of 
decision-making. Especially, villager elites could circulate their knowledge 
efficiently. The illiterate villagers were able to learn the interpretation from others 
as a compensation for their own limited capacity.  
However, there were disadvantages in such an information circulation system. 
First, it was a closed network with limited information sources. The content was 
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dominated mainly by individuals’ experiences and information from public media 
e.g. television, radio and newspaper. Second, most villagers were unable to 
authenticate what they heard or to circulate information to others without bias. 
For example, there was a wide circulation of an interpretation of the policy named 
the “the New Regulation” which caused much negative influence. Even though the 
new scheme offered promising compensation, many villagers still criticised it for 
being lower than it should be. Their claim was derived from the standard of “the 
Nearest Market Price” prescribed in the New Regulation. In fact, this term did not 
exist in any requisition policy. The term and the regulation were a result of 
villagers’ misinterpretation of Regulation on Requisition and Compensation of 
Housing on State-owned Land (2011). This regulation is non-applicable in the 
requisition and compensation of houses on rural land. Nevertheless, the 
misunderstanding was widespread in the networks and strongly believed by the 
majority of villagers. This illustrated both the information network’s function and 
reach, but also its limitations.  
Third, the network had weaknesses in how it spread some forms of information. 
Villagers selected what they believed to be the most valuable information, often 
the most interesting and general parts. The detailed and complicated information, 
which could have important value in negotiations, would be omitted. For example, 
most villagers knew that there were two seals stamped on a signed contract, and 
neither were governmental seals, but few knew what the exact two seals they were. 
Only a few knew that they were seals of CB Company and CC Company. The 
villagers cared more about whether the government sealed the contract or not, 
than what the exact seals were. They believed that having governmental seals 
stamped on the contract would make it more official and legal.  
Another example was the circulation of policies. Most villagers could name several 
important items of the compensation scheme, e.g. the prices for houses with or 
without title deeds, the quota of 50m2 resettlement flats per capita etc. In contrast, 
very few, if any, of them had ever read or researched the core policies of the law 
system, which was a series of relevant documents from the national level to the 
district level, as described in Chapter Five but the majority of villagers did not have 
the capacity to access and interpret these policies, as indicated by villager Mr VS:  
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We are all farmers. We don’t have much schooling. How could we know? We don’t 
know which department of the government we should contact, to get it. The 
government doesn’t come and tell us either. At least the village committee should 
circulate it to us. None!  
An item mentioned by some core policies prescribes that every household was 
able to have at most 30m2 quota as the structure adjustment of their resettlement 
housing, at a favoured price. Usually, there were no flats in the limited housing 
sources that exactly fitted the area where a household could purchase, so the 30m2 
adjustment was given to make the choice more flexible. This beneficial item was 
widely applied in practice, including in the VA Village programme, although it was 
not clearly mentioned in the compensation scheme. Most of the time, company 
representatives would help households select a combination of flats to make the 
best use of the 30m2 adjustment. Its value was equivalent to nearly 210,000 Yuan, 
a considerable amount. Nevertheless, the information had not been widely spread 
in the network, since only these who had signed contracts knew about this item.  
6.3 Different Views of Value 
Indigenous villagers in VA Village were a marginalised group. Being an enclave, the 
village enabled them to live right inside the prosperous urban built-up area and at 
the same time, keep a rural lifestyle within the community. Therefore, their 
identity was a mixture of both urban and rural resident. Like urban residents, they 
live in the same city and share the same urban infrastructure. Unlike urban 
residents, they own the land collectively, and own houses privately. This section 
explores some characteristics of elders’ interpretation of the issues they cared 
about but that could often be omitted or not be understood by outsiders. They 
greatly appreciated their properties as well as the value and lifestyle generated 
from them, e.g. the permanent usage of the property, the monthly continuous 
income, and their emotional attachment to ‘their place’. They valued their homes 
and therefore, found it difficult to easily accept the radical and disruptive changes 
arising from the development programme. This form of value given to their 
properties strongly influenced their decision-making in the programme.  
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6.3.1 Concerning Permanent Property Use Right 
Influenced by the traditional Confucianism culture, Chinese people, especially 
villagers, tend to feel obliged to have descendants to carry on the family bloodline, 
as an important way to worship ancestors. They devote themselves to providing a 
better life for their descendants. As a result, in addition to compensation standards, 
another important concern in households’ decision-making was the provision of 
houses for their future generations.  
Throughout the whole programme, the developer put effort into promoting the 
notion of “property right exchange” in their publicity for villagers. The notion 
indicated that the programme could significantly benefit villagers by replacing 
their houses with resettlement flats. The replacement sounded desirable, since 
villagers’ houses were often of an inferior quality, and mostly were without legal 
property rights and therefore risked being demolished forcibly, while resettlement 
flats were of a better quality with legal property rights. The improvement of the 
living environment was significant as well. However, villagers had different 
evaluations of these. They admitted that the new environment was attractive, but, 
compared to the property rights, what they were concerned about most, were their 
descendants.  
They preferred their houses rather than resettlement flats for many reasons. First, 
the size of resettlement flats they were entitled to was comparatively small. For 
the majority, their housing size would be smaller after the replacement and they 
worried that this would be too small to house even current family members 
discounting any new members that might eventuate in the future. This was 
indicated in an interview with Mr SOC, an actor from the street office:  
They told us their difficulties, like, well, we [villagers] have five members in a 
family, so that the [resettling] flat is too small to live … my son is growing up, and 
soon he is going to get married, and then we’ll have a grandson. Now you just give 
me [a flat] for three people. Once our grandson is born, it’ll be too small to live … I 
have a son and a daughter and our family have four people. You just give me a flat 
for four people, but my daughter and my son are going to get married. They’ve 
already registered. We just haven’t held the banquet for the wedding yet. So our 
[son and daughter in law] are going to move in soon. We become a six-member 
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household. You never know that, perhaps they are going to have babies. Then we 
become an eight-member household. How could we live in such a flat?  
Second, households were unsatisfied with the limited property rights of 
resettlement flats. Based on current regulations, resettlement flats had more 
restrictions for capitalisation e.g. selling or mortgaging. Furthermore, both 
resettlement flats and commercial flats have only 70 years grant of property 
ownership rights. So far, no regulations prescribe what will happen to the housing 
and the land when this term ends. In contrast, houses on rural land enjoy 
permanent property ownership and land use rights, and can be inherited from 
generation to generation. Once the household have more members and require 
more living space, the house will be extended and enlarged vertically, with more 
floors. Theoretically, the modification needs official approval to be a legal property; 
otherwise it is not protected by law and is at risk of being demolished forcedly by 
the authority. In the case of VA Village, the authority had not issued any certificate 
to households for decades. Nevertheless, villagers did not seem to mind this since 
the advantage was significant. The construction was also flexible. The household 
could invest in it according to their affordability and demand, as discussed by 
elders Mr VL and Mr VN:  
Mr VL: “Who knows whether [my descendants] will have the flats to live or not? 
Damn it! It’s said that the flats are granted to you for 50 years or whatever. After 
50 years, when the term ends, damn it, my grandchildren, [my descendants] will 
have no flats to live. It’s a big problem!”  
[…]. 
Mr VN: “According to the law and regulations, our [rural] residential land use 
right is permanent. The [flats] that we purchase from the government only have 
70 years [property right]. However, could you know what’ll happen after 70 years? 
Now 90% people don’t know yet. Will you still own the land use right or will the 
government claim it back, nobody knows … but our residential land could [be 
owned permanently].” 
Mr VL: “Damn it! It’s so risky! We have so many households in a single [resetting] 
building, what will happen when the term ends? Where should we [our 
descendants] live if the government claims the land back?” 
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Mr VN: “Could they grant you [the ownership] of the land as well when you 
purchase the flats? Is it possible? Now you are affordable to the flats, but your next 
generation, like your son and grandson, may not be [affordable to the flats]. If they 
do have the capability to earn a big amount of money, are they able to enlarge the 
flats? Impossible! For example, in our village, even brothers raised up in the same 
family do not have the same capability [in earning money]. Some have more than 
one million Yuan but some even can’t afford to one hundred thousand Yuan … the 
land use right in our village is permanent. If I am not happy with the layout and 
the structure of the house, I am able to demolish it and reconstruct a new one 
whatever I like, as long as I have the capability [to earn enough money].” 
These ideas were very prevalent among villagers. As a result, the majority 
preferred houses in the village rather than resettlement flats in other localities. It 
seemed to be reasonable for villagers to make this choice, because a piece of rural 
land with permanent land use rights is supposed to be much more valuable than 
resettlement flats with only 70 years ownership. However, the so-called 
“permanent use right of the land” is just a theoretical notion. It was more like 
rhetoric. Officially, rural land is collectively owned, and any decision about the 
disposition of the land should be made by the majority of villagers. However, in VA 
Village, the village committee had the authority to dispose of the land without the 
majority’s consent. Many precedents proved this. In the 1990s, the authority 
requisitioned the village’s farmland successfully. Villagers were supposed to own 
permanent land use rights of farmland as well. In recent decades, the remaining 
residential land was requisitioned by the authority incrementally, because of 
various projects. Now the programme was initiated to requisition the entire village 
and had achieved considerable progress. Therefore, the law granted villagers 
permanent ownership of rural land, but also granted the government the authority 
to requisition it at a cheap price. The real value of the so-called “permanent land 
use right” might not be worth as much as villagers expected and this meant that, in 
practice, it was unrealistic to pass the properties down for endless generations.  
6.3.2 Preferring Sustainable Revenue 
A point worth noting was that villagers preferred sustainable revenue from rental 
business rather than the considerable lump-sum cash payment from the 
compensation. The continuous monthly income benefited villagers and enabled 
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them live a better life than before. They used the rent to cover their daily expenses, 
children’s college education and marriage arrangements etc. The developer’s 
publicity showed that the total value of a household’s asset could appreciate 
significantly from the requisition and compensation deal. In contrast, villagers 
valued more the monthly rents than the possession of a high value property. This 
was stated by villagers Mr VS and Mr VD:  
Mr VS: “Though the government is better now that they pay for the nine-year 
mandatory education, the college fee is [expensive], like, now my senior son’s 
college tuition fee is 20,000 Yuan each semester … and plus his living fees, it’s 
about 30,000 Yuan in total. If I don’t work, how could I pay for children’s 
education [Mr VS works as a full-time door keeper]? Apply for the government’s 
subsidy? We had no access to it through the back door! And now, I also have a 
daughter studying in high school, which costs 1,000 Yuan each semester. The 
[financial] burden of paying for children’s education is not that easy. Now it 
happens that I have some rents just enough to make the end meet. It’s impossible 
that I’ll allow them to demolish my [property]. That’s why I don’t agree … After the 
demolition, first, I won’t have any rental income, because the size [of resettling 
flats] is just enough for my family. [Second], the more the rental income I am able 
to gain now, the more painful I feel [to lose it] and now the procedures [for the 
resettling flats] aren’t finished yet. You need to pay tax or something like that to 
[get the property right certificate of the resettling flats in the future after the 
programme]. When you lease the flats out [if any], you also need to pay the 
property maintenance fee and management fee. A suite of flat charges at least 400 
to 500 Yuan [monthly] and then there is not much [rent] left for us.  The interior 
[of resettling flats] are unconstructed. It only has a concrete floor and white walls 
painted with plaster simply […] I can’t even afford to the interior upgrading and 
decoration […]”  
Mr VD: “After the demolition, the resettlements would be commercial flats, which 
then could be sold and purchased, but actually peasants have nothing to do with 
such property right. It’s impossible for them to sell it, to start a business or 
whatever. It’s for residence. Does it matter whether it is valuable or not? The 
current houses are for residence, and the commercial flats are for residence as 
well […]”  
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Therefore, although households were able to capitalise more monetary value from 
their assets after the requisition, their monthly incomes would decrease and so 
they would not capitalise enough to meet the shortage of cash income. Few would 
capitalise on the assets for investment or business as well, because their identity 
was still linked to one of being ‘a peasant’ even though they did not own farmland.  
However, they had no experience, skills or knowledge in these new areas of 
economic and financial activity. They preferred to own the property and pass it 
down to accommodate future generations of their family. The programme changed 
villagers’ lifestyles dramatically, but it did not equip them with the knowledge, 
skills or forms of capital to live the new life. Simply giving them money and flats 
was not enough. Many villagers did not have specific forms of financial 
management skills. They had witnessed many precedents among their peers who 
had a better life after the requisition, but soon ended up in a problematic situation 
due to spending the money unwisely. Villager Mr VD explained that:  
 You can’t simply demolish their property. Without it, they are forced to be citizens, 
which is different from their [identity]. They used to be peasants, and do not have 
much knowledge. If they’ve been well educated and are able to make a livelihood, 
it’s fine, but they haven’t. What shall they do to make a living? […]  It was true that, 
after the demolition, everybody has had a very comfortable life for a few years. But 
after that they ended up in a messed up situation. We’ve got some villagers who 
signed the contract earlier, and now they are selling the resettling flats, selling the 
blueprint [of forward delivery flats].  
Furthermore, many villagers were in debt, relying on the monthly rental income to 
pay back loans. When the urban village was forming, the worse-off villagers did not 
have the financial capital to modify their houses to start a rental business. High-
interest loans from relatives or institutions became a popular approach. Similarly 
to paying a mortgage loan, they gave part of the monthly rental income to debt 
owners when a rental business was initiated. On average, it took as long as eight 
years to clear the debts for a household. Therefore, those who were still in debt did 
not feel ready to give up their houses and the monthly incomes until the costs were 
recovered and debts repaid. They needed the rents and would resist the 
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requisition until the last moment, to make the best out of the houses. Villager Mr 
VS described how:  
We all borrowed money from others to reconstruct our own house before. It takes 
at least eight years to recover the costs. For example, no matter a million Yuan is 
borrowed to construct a big house, or half a million is borrowed to construct a 
smaller one, it all takes eight years to recover the costs, including the interests. 
Now we finally just recover all costs, you are going to demolish our houses.  
The modification of houses was not only costly, but also challenging and 
painstaking, as villager Mr VD described:  
In the constructing period, it’s not that you’re able to construct whatever you want. 
City management inspectors kept coming and knocking them down. For example, 
this year he constructed a floor [on the top of the house], of which three rooms 
might be knocked down, and two rooms were left for leasing. In the next year, 
when he’s got [spare] money, then he would use it to repair the three rooms. [The 
house] was being constructed bit by bit. When they finally have some spare money 
to buy stuff, now you’re going to demolish it.  
Therefore, since the majority of households kept houses only for self-residence or 
leasing for rents, they could not benefit much from the appreciation of their assets 
in the requisition. What they preferred was a considerable amount of sustainable 
revenue from the rental business.  
6.3.3 Emotional Attachments 
VA Village had been a settlement on the site for more than 600 years. Many 
indigenous villagers, especially elders, were born and raised in the village. 
Although VA Village had become a marginalized and dilapidated community, 
villagers especially elders, had formed an emotional attachment to the land, the 
houses, the culture and the community. The attachment was implanted in their 
minds and emotions, which could not be priced. They referred to the land and 
houses as “ancestors’ land” and “ancestors’ houses”. Some even labelled villagers 
who had signed the requisition contracts as “unworthy descendants”. To some 
extent, such emotion decreased villagers’ willingness to sell their properties. This 
was reflected on by the street officer Mr SOC and company representative Mr CRS:  
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Mr SOC: “After all, this’s the place where villagers were born and raised up, so they 
definitely would feel some pressure when they (were told) to move to somewhere 
else. After all, they definitely prefer living here. You want to requisition and 
demolish the whole village. Then you definitely would face some difficulties … It 
takes time to make them [change] from disagree to agree. The change is gradual. 
Actually, that’s why we’re doing the publicity actively. We try to change their idea 
through the publicity.”  
[…] 
Mr CRS: “Some villagers can’t accept [the change], especially elders, these who are 
70 to 80 years old. After all, they’ve lived here for 70 to 80 years. He has an 
emotional attachment to the land. He can’t accept [the change] immediately. From 
a house to a flat is also a change. [Now] I have earth under the foot and sky above 
the head; later I’m locked in a room like a pigeon cage. It’s unacceptable for 
them … You need to unlock and open their heart firstly, and then have the 
negotiation of compensation. Make him accept it [the change], so he’ll talk, and 
then discuss something more specific […]”  
To minimise the change, an in-situ resettlement plan was adopted by the 
programme. In accordance with this, the redevelopment of the village, a part of the 
village land was set aside for the reconstruction of resettlement flats for villagers, 
as explained by company representative Mr CRD:  
We plan that a part of the land [used] for the construction of resettling flats, 
because we know that villagers have such ideas and thinking [about emotional 
attachments]. It’s a mean to facilitate the progress […] I think one problem exists 
that, what villagers do sometimes is a contradiction [from what they want]. The 
total amount of resettling flats is limited. If everybody wants to get a suite, it won’t 
be enough. So we put a restrain [that each household gets a suite]. For example, if 
your household is qualified to get 270m2 flats in total, then [your household] is 
able to get a 150m2, or a bit more, in-situ resettling flats for the 50m2 quota. For 
the rest part [120m2], you can get a built flat [in a nearby place]. However, they 
feel unhappy about the idea of getting the built flats in JS community [a place not 
far away from VA Village], saying that, well, from our ancestors to the generation 
of us, we’ve lived in VA Village, so why you ask us to live in FS community now?”  
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The in-situ resettlement flats were much more popular because villagers preferred 
to live in the same place where their ancestors had resided long ago. However, the 
demand for such flats significantly outweighed the supply. The alternative was 
some flats built in other communities but this reduced the attractiveness of the 
requisition deal for many villagers.   
6.4 Problematic Information Interpretation 
Elders had difficulty not only with information acquisition but also in information 
interpretation. What seemed to be a reasonable and perfect explanation to them 
could be entirely incorrect, but they were confident of their capability and did not 
reflect upon it. The prejudice elders felt towards the developer party meant that 
they tended to ascribe blame to them for the undesirable results of events that 
they could not explain otherwise. Furthermore, elders were often not able to 
interpret information correctly. They had drawn false knowledge from the 
misinterpretation of policies that were irrelevant to the programme as the legal 
grounds to justify their claims and perceived their claims as rightful. This made 
their interaction with the developer complicated and problematic.  
6.4.1 Prejudicial Interpretation 
Interviews found that elders had a strong sense of distrust and even hostility 
towards local public media e.g. the local newspaper and local journalists. Why they 
developed this distrust was a question that needed addressing, since it seemed 
that public media had little direct engagement in the programme. The question 
soon sparked elders’ discussion. Due to their historical engagement with 
journalists, they felt considerably disappointed with them and then they told me 
the donation issue. The following excerpts were from a group interview with 
elders, Mr VO, Mr VT, Mr VZ, Mr VJ and Mr VF:  
Mr VO: “During the Sichuan Earthquake Event [in 2008], we initiated a donation 
very, very promptly, just two or three days after the earthquake. We VA 
Community (and VB Community) had donated nearly 80,000 Yuan, and the 
newspaper agency came and planned to, to (report it) for us […]” 
[At this point villagers discussed it heatedly and disorderly for a while.]  
Mr VT: “Journalists even came […]” 
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Mr VO: “[They] just haven’t reported it in the newspaper.” 
Mr VZ: “Look at the amount we had donated written in the certificate of merit 
awarded by the Red Cross! They [journalists] even didn’t want to report this.”  
Mr VO: “These were all villagers’ warm hearts.”  
Mr VT: “[The earthquake] took place on 12 May, and we initiated the donation on 
14 and 15 May, without any mobilisation.”  
Mr VJ: “They [the media] just broadcast it for two seconds, maybe less. It was just a 
flash and it passed. All our efforts and expectations were in vain […]” 
Mr VF: “Our purpose for your visit today was to let you know how dark this society 
was, to tell you honestly.”  
Mr VT: “Journalists from the TV station came and filmed it, but they just kept it 
[the record] for themselves. They didn’t broadcast it!”  
Mr VZ: “We conducted the donation in the way like voting. For example, you 
wanted to donate three hundred [Yuan], and you two hundred [Yuan], and then 
people donated it one by one [in a queue]. They also filmed our donation one by 
one [in a queue], but they just didn’t broadcast it. The key point was that, the 
Sichuan Earthquake Event was a national issue […] 
Mr VT: “Because of the requisition and demolition programme, they treated us 
differently.” 
Mr VZ: “[…] yeah, they just refused to broadcast it.”  
Mr VO: “You see, it was just one community that had donated 80,000 Yuan! How 
many communities are there in the whole country and how many communities 
could conduct the donation in the way of one by one [in a queue] like us?”  
Question: “Did you invite journalists to come and report it?”  
Mr VZ: “Yes. We asked them to come here. You know, we villagers even queued up, 
and conducted the donation one by one [in a queue]! It’s not like, just we crowded 
disorderly to do it.” 
Mr VT: “This was not mobilized or organised by anybody, such as cadres from 
village authorities, or the street office or the district government. We villagers 
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organised it voluntarily! (Mr VZ: “We organised it all by ourselves.”) They came 
and filmed it, but just haven’t broadcast it. (Mr VJ: “We had donated 80,000 Yuan 
in total!”) Anyway, the point was that, because our village was being requisitioned 
and demolished, so we were treated differently.” 
Mr VZ: “Yes. It was one thing that our village was being demolished and it was 
another thing that we made a donation for the flood [the earthquake]. Isn’t it? (Mr 
VJ: “We villagers had such warm hearts!”) They just refused to report it 
deliberately.”  
[…] 
Question: “Was it broadcasted in the programme of Xiamen News?”  
Mr VZ: “No, it’s on the channel of XMTV-2. They filmed it, but, it’s just that, the vice 
mayor, who was newly promoted from our district government, manipulated it 
and put barriers to it, so that the broadcasting of it was banned.”  
Mr VO: “And reporting it in newspapers was banned as well” 
 
Image 6. 1 Certificate of merit (first one) 
Source: Taken by the author 
The certificate says “this certificate is specially issued to the whole villagers in 
VA and VB villages to honour their donation of 79502 Yuan in the Red Cross’s 
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activity of rescuing and helping for the earthquake incident.   Xiamen Red 
Cross Association Xiamen Red Cross Fund Association 15th May 2008.” 
 
Image 6. 2 Certificate of merit (second one) 
Source: Taken by the author 
The certificate says “this certificate is specially issued to the whole villagers 
and migrants in VA and VB villages to honour their donation of 2530 Yuan in 
the Red Cross’s activity of rescuing and helping for the earthquake incident.   
Xiamen Red Cross Association Xiamen Red Cross Fund Association 17th May 
2008.)” 
Elders’ accusations of the vice mayor’s manipulation of media could be clarified by 
analysing the logic and relevant resources on the Internet. First, elders over-
evaluated the extraordinariness of their donation. In their understanding, the 
donation was remarkable because it was voluntarily organised in just two days 
after the earthquake. Villagers queued up in an orderly manner to donate one by 
one. The amount raised was huge. Journalists had also come and filmed the whole 
process. Therefore, the elders believed that it deserved more length in the 
broadcasting footage than just two seconds. However, in the same period, in 
Xiamen, there were also many other individuals, communities and organisations 
that held donations, and the amounts raised were much larger than the VA Village 
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sum , mostly above six figures numbers13. Queuing up for a donation was a rare 
scene in VA Village, however it was commonly seen outside the village. The issue 
was remarkable for elders, but not for others. Filming the whole process did not 
mean that all footage would be fully reported. Therefore, elders misunderstood the 
issue.  
Second, villagers did not know the story holistically. In fact, the issue was both 
reported by Xiamen Daily and XMFC.com14. Xiamen Daily is the mainstream 
newspaper of Xiamen city. On 17 May 2008, it published nearly a 2000-word 
length article, HL District Lifts a New Climax of Donating Money and Materials for 
the Disaster Stricken Area in Sichuan, which reported a series of donations that 
took place all around Xiamen city, including government departments, companies, 
communities, and associations. To illustrate the donation in communities, the 
article took VA and VB villages’ donation as the example, even with an image (6.3). 
Some elders who made complaints above even appeared in the image without 
knowing it.  
 
Image 6. 3 Villagers queuing up for donation 
Source: Website of Xiamen Daily15 
                                                        
13 See official report http://www.xmnn.cn/zt/scdz/xmzy/200805/t20080517_565677.htm 
14 See http://www.xmfc.com/html/2008-5/18/200805181050374726.html 
15 See http://www.xmnn.cn/zt/scdz/xmzy/200805/t20080517_565677.htm 
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“Wenchuan Big Earthquake strikes everybody’s heart. In the very morning on 14th 
(May 2008), 600 residents of VA community, SO street, HL district, voluntarily 
gathered in the theatre square in front of TY temple in the community, to offer 
their compassion for the disaster area. When the journalists came to the scene, the 
theatre square had already been full of residents who were eager to donate, many 
of whom were elder residents with white hair, even some middle age women 
carrying babies on their backs, and even disabled elder residents sitting in 
wheelchairs. The scene was very moving. Resident Lin told journalists that after 
watching the disaster in TV and newspaper, many residents were eager to make 
donation, but they did not know where they could do it. A resident suggested 
everybody go to the theatre square to do it, and this gained residents’ positive 
support. Some even came here to make donation at 7 am in the morning. Such a 
scene has never been witnessed before.  
Fifty Yuan, one hundred Yuan, residents donated into the donation box, with their 
compassion and love. By 9 am on 14th, residents from VA and VB communities had 
already raised 79502 Yuan in total. The community contacted Xiamen Red Cross 
and hoped they could help them to pass the money to people in the disaster area as 
soon as possible.” 
XMFC.com also published a similar but shorter report, which praised and 
honoured the villagers’ actions. The video broadcasting in XMTV-2 was supposed 
to be the same, using footage of various donation events to report the topic.  
The event had many meanings. First, the elders were not able to gain holistic 
information from the outside world. They did not make the best use of the 
available information sources. A few elders read newspapers regularly, but their 
reading was not effective enough to process the information they were concerned 
with. Second, villagers tended to interpret issues from the prejudicial viewpoint 
that the government was against them.  Therefore, in the absence of sensible 
explanations, they tended to hold the government responsible for every 
unsatisfactory event that happened to them, even though there may have been 
another explanation. Another event discussed in Section 6.5.3 was also evidence of 
the villagers’ prejudicial interpretation. In the event, villagers wrongly accused the 
village committee of embezzling the land lease fee of A6 land. 
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6.4.2 Drawing False Knowledge 
From the national level to the district level, all policies form a clear and closed 
system, as discussed in Chapter Five. It was based on this that the rural land 
requisition programme is conducted. The majority of VA villagers did not 
understand or even know about the existence of this system, and the boundary 
that distinguished rural land requisition policies from other policies, especially 
policies regarding urban land requisition. Villagers seemed to believe that the 
policies were interrelated, and that they could use them to defend their interests in 
VA Village’s land requisition, despite their applicability, locality and characteristics. 
They often cited and quoted irrelevant policies and incomparable programmes as 
evidence to justify their claims, usually relating them to a higher compensation 
standard. A policy referred to as “the New Regulation (xin-tiao-li)16” with the 
prescription of “the Nearby Market Price (NMP, jiu-jin-shi-chang-jia)17”was the 
most widely known and frequently cited policy. Many mentioned it in interviews. 
Elder villager Mr VT gave an introduction about it in an interview:  
It’s the New Regulation that prescribes that, well, what we say doesn’t count, that 
the [compensation] stand should be the Nearby Market Price, and not only for the 
compensation of legal properties [but also for illegal properties]. There is [also] a 
new item in the New Regulation [prescribing] that before conducting the 
programme, the boundary [of affected properties] should be set up. We’ve already 
built [the houses before the programme], so [the houses] must be counted [within 
the boundary as affected properties], right? The rice has already been cooked. 
Once the boundary of the programme was set up and published before [the 
initiative of] the programme, then if you build more new houses [after the 
initiative], they shouldn’t be compensated any more. In terms of the NMP, they [the 
developer and the local government] haven’t practice it at all! The local 
governments don’t listen to [the central government]! 
Based on the descriptions, the so-called “New Regulation” could be Regulation on 
the Expropriation of Buildings on State-owned Land and Compensation18 (REBSLC). 
It was issued by the State Council in January 2011 to replace the old Regulation on 
                                                        
16 新条例 
17 就近市场价 
18 《国有土地上房屋征收与补偿条例》 
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the Dismantlement of Urban Houses19, which was issued by the State Council in June 
2001. Both the old and new regulations were only applicable to the requisition and 
compensation of properties on state-owned land. However, villagers confused it as 
a regulation meant also for rural collective-owned land. It was likely that villagers 
saw REBSLC and its content on media, in newspapers or on television, rather than 
having read the full-text document line by line by themselves. How and why they 
misinterpreted it could be traced by examining the original text of REBSLC, and 
comparing it with villagers’ descriptions. For example, the NMP could be a 
misinterpretation of Article 19 in REBSLC:  
The compensation for the value of the building expropriated shall not be less than 
the market price of real estate similar to the building expropriated on the date of 
announcement of the building expropriation decision.  
(State Council, 2011) 
'Similar real estate’ referred to commercial housing that was of similar quality, 
layout, condition, environment and location etc. in comparison to the one being 
requisitioned and demolished. ‘Similar location’ indicated that the counterpart 
would be situated nearby. The term NMP invented by villagers seemed to derive 
from that.  
The description about setting up a boundary for the programme could be linked to 
Article 15 and Article 16:  
Article 15: The building expropriation department shall organise surveys and 
registration of the ownership, location, use, construction area, etc. of buildings 
within the scope of expropriation, and the owners shall provide cooperation. 
(State Council, 2011) 
Article 16: After the scope of expropriation is determined, acts which lead to an 
improper increase of compensation fees, such as new construction, expansion or 
reconstruction of a building or a change of the use of a building within the scope of 
expropriation, shall be prohibited. For such acts in violation of the relevant 
provisions, no compensation shall be made. 
                                                        
19 《城市房屋拆迁管理条例》 
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(State Council, 2011) 
These articles and others in the regulation did not specifically involve the 
arrangement for illegal built properties. Somehow villagers interpreted this as 
meaning that, as long as the illegal built houses were constructed before the 
announcement of the programme, they were eligible for compensation at NMP, 
regardless of their legal status.  
Mr VT: “Then the Department of Land Resource, published a [report], twice, on the 
newspaper, that rural collective land mustn’t be used to build commercial housing, 
and the second time, a word was added that rural collective land DEFINITELY 
mustn’t be used to build commercial housing. They must be demolished even if 
they have already been built up! The local [governments] just don’t listen [to the 
central government]; how could you do (he said it angrily)! It was CCTV-4 that 
[reported] it, so he [the local governments] knew it as well. Could they really do it 
when they knew it? … They attempt to requisition and demolish VA Village. Well, 
the central government doesn’t forbid it, but they have set a boundary, that it’s 
only for public interests! You can’t pretend to do it for public interests, [but 
actually for others], especially for commercial housing, which was forbidden […] 
now their purpose is to build commercial housing! I’ve got a newspaper, which 
published the picture of their planning for the redevelopment of VA Village. [Their 
purpose] is exactly to build commercial housing! So you don’t know [that]. You 
know less even than me regarding these laws”  
The report published by the Department of Land Resource was, in reality, about 
another topic – the construction and sale of Housing with Limited Property Right 
(HLPR). According to the housing system, the housing can be sold as a commodity 
only when it is built on state-owned land. The high cost of state-owned land leads 
to the high price of commercial housing. As a result, some developers or villagers 
illegally construct housing on rural collective-owned land and sell it to the public 
as commercial housing. The cost of acquiring the rural land is usually much 
cheaper, which makes such housing more affordable. However, such properties do 
not have title deeds and are not protected by the law. Therefore, the state strictly 
forbids the construction and sale of HLPR and, as such, there are many relevant 
reports about this in the media. The aim of the programme in VA Village was to 
requisition the rural land, transferring its ownership from the villager collective to 
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the state. Once it is transferred, the land is eligible for the construction of 
commercial housing. In short, it is illegal to construct commercial housing on rural 
land directly, but it is legal as long as the rural land is requisitioned and 
transferred. Villagers were confused by the difference, and misinterpreted the 
reports.  
Another misinterpretation of “rural land can only be requisitioned for public 
interests” was derived from Article 8 in REBSLC:  
Where, for public interests such as safeguarding the national security and 
promoting the national economic and social development, it is necessary 
to expropriate a building under any of the following circumstances, the 
people’s government at the city or county level shall make a decision to 
expropriate the building  
(State Council, 2011) 
Article 8 is specifically for urban land requisition only. For rural land requisition, 
Land Administration Law of PRC (2004) only prescribes that “the State may, in the 
interest of the public, lawfully expropriate or requisition land and give 
compensation accordingly”, without further explanation of how to identify a 
specific circumstance as being in the public interest or not. In the subsequent laws 
and regulations for rural land requisition made by Fujian, Xiamen or Huli 
authorities, there is no prescription regarding this topic. Therefore, villagers’ 
argument about the requirement of public interests in rural land requisition was 
reasonable, but it seemed that their legal ground was derived from the wrong 
source. Villager Mr VT said:  
There is another item in the New Regulation that developers can’t 
participate in the requisition and demolition job. You know, now it’s CB 
Company, which is exactly the commercial developer, who is in charge of 
the programme … the programme was stuck, and after three or four 
years, now they raise the compensation standard a bit, but compared to 
the state’s New Regulation, there is still a huge gap in the NMP. 
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The argument that “developers can’t participate in the requisition and demolition 
job” was supposed to be linked to Article 5: 
The building expropriation department may designate a building expropriation 
implementing entity to undertake the specific work on building expropriation and 
compensation. A building expropriation implementing entity shall not operate for 
profits 
(State Council, 2011) 
The article does not forbid commercial developers’ involvement, as long as the 
purpose is not for profits. Such prescriptions do not exist in rural land requisition 
policies. The reason could be that the policies have already established specific 
compensation standards for rural land requisition programmes, so that 
programme implementers officially can do nothing but follow policies.  
The New Regulation had a profound influence on villagers. The standard of NMP 
became the villagers’ objective and was something that they thought they deserved. 
With much higher expectations, they did not appreciate the improvement in the 
new scheme, which they had referred to it as “a bit”. In interviews with another 
elder leader Mr VF, he also frequently cited the New Regulation in order to justify 
his arguments.  
Question: “So far, have you got a full understanding of the compensation scheme 
and policies?” 
Mr VF: “Is it possible that I don’t understand it? I’ve been very clear! [The 
compensation] is based on the NMP, but will they compensate you for that?” 
Villagers believed that the New Regulation with the prescription of NMP was a 
policy that exactly applied to their situation. Under this misunderstanding, they 
stuck to demanding the NMP:  
Question: “In 2008, villagers just claimed 1,000 [Yuan/m2, same for the followings]. 
However, even though now the scheme has the highest standard in Xiamen, why do 
many villagers still refuse to accept the offer?” 
Mr VF: “You don’t know the reason. Of course we villagers know. The government 
has already prescribed a [new] price for compensation, which is the Nearby 
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Market Price. For example, these [he pointed to the nearby commercial housing] 
are sold at the price of 18,000, so that the NMP should be 12,000 to 15,000 at least. 
It can’t be 6,000 only [as provided by the developer]. Many villagers have been 
aware of it. It’s impossible that nobody knows it.” 
[…] 
Mr VF: “At the beginning, if the developer [was willing, he] offered 2,000, rather 
than 6,000, the whole village could have been demolished already. And villagers 
wouldn’t have sued them, would they? Now it’s different. Even if you gave villagers 
10,000, they may not accept it … because we should get 12,000. You know, the 
NMP is 20,000. According to the state’s [new] policy now, the price for 
compensation should be the NMP. It’s not that the price should be exactly the same 
as the NMP, but it should be close to the NMP. For example, the NMP of VA Village 
is 20,000, and then [the compensation price] should be at least 15,000, right? Or 
12,000. In my understanding, now all villagers believe this […]” 
The New Regulation dominated and bounded the majority of villagers’ 
understanding of the policies. Nevertheless, villagers’ understanding of the NMP 
proved to be limited and problematic. The range price of 12,000 to 15,000 Yuan 
was calculated by villagers by estimating the average price of the village’s 
surrounding commercial housing. However, to know a house’s NMP, not only 
location, but also other variables e.g. house quality, condition, environment, layout, 
design etc. should be considered comprehensively in choosing a comparable 
objective. Houses in VA Village were of a poor quality, with substandard living 
conditions and inferior design and layout. The nearby commercial housing was a 
high-grade commodity, much better than villagers’ houses. They were 
incomparable. It seemed that villagers eventually became aware that it was 
unreasonable to ask for the same price. Thus they claimed a lower price. As Mr VF 
mentioned, the average price of nearby commercial housing was 18,000, so they 
claimed 12,000-15,000. Furthermore, Article 19 in the regulation also prescribed 
that “the value of the building expropriated shall be assessed by an eligible real 
estate price assessment institution according to the assessment measures for 
building expropriation”. However, the NMP they claimed were all estimated by 
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villagers. Therefore, villagers seriously misinterpreted the so-called “New 
Regulation” and used it to justify their claims inappropriately.  
6.5 VA Village Committee 
This section introduces the context of the leadership of the privileged group – VA 
Village Committee. Officially, a villager committee is an autonomous organisation. 
Its members are elected and empowered by the majority of villagers, as their 
representatives, to take charge of collective affairs on their behalf, especially the 
management of collective assets. VA Village also has a grass-roots branch of the 
Communist Party of China (CPC). It consists of members of the VA Village 
committee who are also party members of CPC. The leadership of the CPC village 
committee is appointed by the upper level CPC committee, as political leaders, to 
take charge of political issues. The CPC village committee could be seen as an 
interior political organisation of the village committee. In practice, membership of 
the two committees overlapped considerably and they function like an integrated 
one. According to the research aim and objectives, it is not necessary and might be 
time-consuming to separate their functions and distinguish their differences. For 
simplicity, this thesis treats the two committees as an integrated one as VA Village 
Committee. 
6.5.1 Elections of VA Village Committee  
According to the regulation of the Organic Law of the Villagers Committee of the 
People’s Republic of China (2010), village committee members (5-9 members) must 
be elected from a valid election once every three years. However, in VA Village, the 
elections were problematic. The legitimacy and empowerment of the village 
committee mainly derives from the support and influence of upper-level authority, 
social networks and financial resources, rather than a democratic election. This 
was argued by elder Mr VN:  
The election in our village is not like what you may think... there are many factions. 
For example, your family’s relatives are part of your faction. If you have more 
relatives than any other candidate, then in the election definitely you’ll win the 
jackpot… What’s more, you can even ask non-relatives to vote for you, and then 
you promise you’ll do some favours for them in return. It’s prevailing in all 
villages…some [candidates] will host banquets for several days in a row if they’re 
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elected, and villagers who contribute their votes are able to attend and enjoy it. 
Some even did the thing in the past, that if you took a photo of the moment you put 
the vote with my name in the box, then afterwards you could get paid from me 
with the photo.  
For a very long time, elections were conducted in such way. It appeared that many 
voters were focused mainly on personal material gain. It was more a competition 
of candidates’ wealth and the factions they represented by a somewhat unjust 
canvassing approach. Villagers were used to the phenomenon and accepted it as a 
social norm. The upper-level authority had a duty and obligation to organise and 
supervise a valid election, but tended to turn a blind eye to the actual process. It 
could be seen as acquiescence, since both the local authority and villagers followed 
and supported the norm. Therefore, the village committee was empowered 
through this social norm rather than the law.  
The head of the village committee was Mr VCH. He took office in the 2006 election. 
Villagers could not recall many details since no extraordinary issues had happened 
during the election. Mr VCH had been a celebrity within the whole VA 
Administrative Village for a long time. He was known as a rich and capable 
businessman, having a good relationship with the authority. In early 2000, he was 
appointed as a member of the district’s People’s Congress, and he also received 
many honour titles from the authority, e.g. Model Worker and Model Citizen. With 
such a remarkable background, Mr VCH’s victory in the 2006 election did not 
surprise villagers.  
In March 2008, within Mr VCH’s tenure, local cadres and the developer announced 
the launch of the programme. The ground-breaking news did not change the 
election norm much, except that the support from the upper-level authority was 
clearer, stronger and more direct. Many conflicts took place during 2008 to 2009. 
In 2009, a new election was due to be held, but it was cancelled without reasons 
being given. Elders believed the authority was concerned that a new election 
would replace Mr VCH with a new Head who would hinder the programme. Given 
the context in 2009, villagers would probably reach an agreement to elect a new 
Head who could truly confront the developer and the authority for villagers’ 
interests. Therefore, the cancellation was a direct intervention which indicated the 
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authority’s support for Mr VCH’s committee. The following election was due in 
2012. With the deployment of Strategy Two in 2012, the programme gained 
popularity. The once tense conflict was eased. It was within this context that the 
election was resumed in 2012. However, it was alleged that it was manipulated by 
the authority because there was only one candidate for the Head and it was Mr 
VCH. Elder leaders Mr VT and Mr VF reflected that:  
Mr VT: “In the (2012) election, there was only one candidate. No second one. It was 
100% that he (Mr VCH) would win. No second candidate! You could only vote him! 
It was definitely that he won…”  
Mr VF: “Everyone who had voted for him (Mr VCH) could get 40 RMB. I’ve got the 
money. That’s enough. Actually, I didn’t care who was elected…”  
It seemed that the local authority preferred to keep the same members in the 
village committee to prevent any unexpected opposition. Therefore, a non-
competitive election was held to justify, as much as was possible, the village 
committee’s legitimacy and, simultaneously, to maintain the district authority’s 
reputation.  
6.5.2 Effectiveness of VA Village Committee 
Ordinary households in VA Village had complicated feelings towards the Village 
committee. On one hand, they were discontented about the governance of Mr VCH 
and his committee. Many conflicts took place, not only during the programme, but 
also in the past. An important reason for their distrust was that Mr VCH was not a 
native of VA Village. Mr VCH came from VL village, another big natural village in VA 
Administrative Village. VL village was also an urban village with prosperous rental 
businesses. Natives of VA Village seriously doubted that a Head of committee who 
was not born and raised in their village would truly exercise his power on their 
behalf. As a result, the committee’s contribution to VA Village was questioned, 
since Mr VCH “neither made us richer, nor unified us to make a big move [to earn 
money]”, as elder leader Mr VT said. Furthermore, villagers in VA Village even 
suspected that it was Mr VCH who voluntarily invited the developer to requisition 
their properties, as a tactic to benefit him as well as his home village.  
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On the other hand, they complied with the governance of Mr VCH and his 
committee. As discussed previously, elders alleged that the elections of Mr VCH 
were severely manipulated, either being cancelled or being non-competitive to 
renew his term. If they were discontented about the governance, they were able to 
overthrow it legally by challenging his legitimacy, e.g. exposing the illegal elements 
of the election process to relevant authorities. There were successful examples in 
rural China where a village committee was dismissed under such claims and 
actions, as illustrated by the example in a poor Hebei village:  
A group of farmers lodged a series of complaint requesting the dismissal of several 
village cadres […] One day, one of the villagers happened upon a copy of the 
Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees lying on a desk in a township office. He read 
it, immediately realised its import, and showed it to his fellow complainants. After 
they studied the law, they decided to “lodge complaints against the township for 
violating the Organic Law by not holding democratic elections.”[…] Facing an 
angry crowd demanding implementation of a law that had been casually ignored 
throughout the region, the township caved in and agreed to hold elections. In the 
subsequent balloting, the man who had originally discovered the Organic Law was 
elected director of his villagers’ committee.  
(O’Brien and Li, 2006: 55-56) 
This strategy seemed to be more reasonable, rightful, just and more likely to 
succeed than the other actions villagers took during 2008-2009. In that period, 
they had conducted many similar actions to protest against the land requisition, e.g. 
appealing to upper-level authorities in the municipality and the provincial capital 
authority, hiring lawyers to sue the municipality etc. The details of these actions 
are examined in Chapter Seven. The question arises why villagers chose to comply 
with, rather than to challenge, Mr VCH and his committee. The answer was 
important and helpful to provide some insights of the governance and the power 
relationships in the village and the programme.  
There were many reasons. An important one was that, in the villagers’ perception, 
such a phenomenon was prevailing in China’s political environment. They believed 
that irregular practices occurred in a chain, and Mr VCH was just a link of the chain. 
Challenging Mr VCH was constructed in their minds as a challenge to the whole 
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chain. This idea was widely accepted by villagers and was reflected upon in an 
interview with elder leader Mr VF:    
Just think about it, there were thousands of high-rank officials [in China]. Many of 
them were reported for embezzling millions Yuan. How did they embezzle such a 
big amount of money? It’s a top-down and bottom-up corruption chain! [For 
example,] if I embezzle a million Yuan, I will share 100 thousand Yuan to bribe 
other [officials] … or how could an official embezzle at least ten million Yuan in 
most cases when he was exposed? It’s not like that he embezzled it in a single day 
or in a single time, and then he was exposed immediately. It’s more that he had 
done it for a long time, to a very serious extent, that others could not tolerate, so 
he was exposed by others. That’s how it functioned. [The corruption] involved a 
series of [officials], not just one person.  
In this case, not only Mr VCH and his committee were responsible for the 
manipulated elections, but also the local authority. They would not support 
villagers’ accusations, or even deny them. Elders’ rich social experience led them to 
believe that that the higher-level authority would be unlikely to investigate their 
concerns, since the higher-level authority would side with the local authority.  
Second, the likelihood of the effort involved in challenging the authority would not 
only be in vain, but may also consequently bring fearful revenge to a family. 
Compared to the higher-level authorities or giant commercial corporations, the 
grass-roots authority had closer and more direct relations with villagers on a daily 
basis, which made them fear the consequences of certain actions. It was indicated 
by elder leaders Mr VF and Mr VT:  
Mr VF: “He [Mr VCH] knows what villagers think about him, but he allows villagers 
to discuss whatever they like, because who dares to report it? He doesn’t care what 
villagers discuss. He knows that villagers are not in solidarity. Villagers talk about 
it (alleged irregular practice) as much as they like, but nobody will report it. If you 
do dare to report it, your name will be listed, and get revenged afterwards. The 
revenge is villagers’ greatest fear.”  
Mr VT: “Only a few people [will report it]. Nobody likes to be the ‘bad guy’, and it 
doesn’t work anyway, right? The grass-roots society is very dark.”  
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The village was a traditional rural kinship-based community. Born and raised in 
the village, indigenous villagers had resided there for their entire lives. Neighbours 
and relatives shared dense social networks. People knew each other well and 
almost nothing could be hidden as a secret. Furthermore, for elders, they had no 
other place to live. They had properties, relatives, friends and a sense of belonging 
there. Even if they managed to escape from the village, it was hard to cut their 
connections with the village completely. Therefore, the threat of revenge was an 
effective means to deter the resistance of villagers. Even in the programme, the 
solidarity power formed by some elders and others just challenged the 
municipality and the developer, rather than the committee. In such a context, 
villagers learned to tolerate the committee and admit its effectiveness, even while 
being discontented about it. There were also many villagers, such as illiterate elder 
Mr VS, who did not actually think too much about the legitimacy question:  
Question: “Do you believe that contracts signed by the village committee and the 
developer are legitimate?”  
Mr VS: “Yes. It’s our boss who signed it with the developer. Of course, it’s legal. But, 
the problem was, he didn’t sign on the behalf of us villagers. This’s why we don’t 
buy it. It’s legal. He’s the boss of the village. It must be protected by law. How could 
it be not?”  
As a result, although villagers often doubted, and sometimes strongly objected to, 
decisions made by the committee, they were either indifferent to the legitimacy 
issue, or afraid of suffering reprisals by challenging it. Developers as outsiders 
followed the same norm, especially when they had support and good cooperation 
from the committee. Actually, what they really looked upon was the seal of the 
village committee, which provided the legitimacy for the paperwork, rather than 
the person who controlled the seal.  
6.5.3 Role of VA Village Committee 
The question raised by the legitimacy issue concerned what kind of role the 
committee had played if it was not empowered by its villagers. As an autonomous 
organisation, officially its role was to manage collective affairs and assets on behalf 
of the majority, including times when this required challenging the district and 
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urban authorities. In practice, since the appointment of the committee was alleged 
to be controlled by the local authority, the committee appeared to function more 
like the local authority’s agency. It was under the leadership and supervision of the 
local street office, which was a branch of the district government. The street office 
even kept the position of “the connector” in the office’s administrative structure, 
and its function was to coordinate the committee’s work. Two examples from 
interviews illustrate the committee role.  
The first one took place before the launch of the programme. Two ordinary 
villagers Mr VH and Mrs VW had been disappointed and angry at the village 
committee for a long time. They claimed that the village committee had not 
fulfilled its responsibility for serving villagers, even in the past before the launch of 
the programme. For example, it was really hard for them to have a document seal 
in the committee. A couple of years ago, once they needed the head (Mr VCB) to 
seal a document for their child’s school registration. They visited Mr VCB’s office 
for several times, but they could not get the document seal. Sometimes, Mr VCB 
was absent, and when he was in, they alleged that he would find all kinds of 
excuses and refuse to provide the seal. Finally it took them nearly 20 days to have 
the form sealed. The couple believed that in fact Mr VCB was implying that they 
should make a payment for the seal as a bribe and suggested that this was a 
common occurrence in the village. It was evident that, even without the 
controversy of the development and demolition programme, there were times 
when a divide existed between the village committee and ordinary households. 
Elders complained that those who took these positions considered themselves as 
the privileged group. As a result, their connection and communication with the 
ordinary villagers were weak and rare.  
The second example took place during the land requisition programme. Since the 
programme was commissioned to the developer by the government, the developer 
enjoyed strong support from the government. To facilitate the developer’s work, 
the village committee was asked to cooperate with the developer positively and 
became the developer’s close partner. All the paperwork needed for the developer 
to authorise the actions and purchases was completed without any challenge or 
resistance from the village committee.  
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Such intimate cooperation further enlarged the gap between the privileged group 
and the ordinary group. Villagers were angry that some of their collective 
properties were purchased by the developer with an unreasonable low offer, 
without villagers’ participation or consent. It was widely believed that the village 
committee was eager to cooperate with the developer and sold the public 
properties simply because they wanted to embezzle the money. For example, the 
purchases of the Elder Recreation Centre and the A6 land were handled in such a 
way in 2008 and 2009 respectively. What made it worse was that the committee 
never published the details of these purchases, even when there were widespread 
rumours among villagers, which provoked many unnecessary misunderstandings 
and anger. The following is an excerpt that reveals some ordinary villagers’ 
understanding of the purchase of the A6 land.  
Mr VH: “We don’t know why the authority would conspire with the developer to 
sell our property, for money, for their personal interests… Look at the A6 Land, 
upon which a real estate project is being constructed. Why was the A6 land sold 
for 930 million RMB but [we got nothing]?”  
Question: “Did they inform villagers before the sale of the land?” 
Mrs VW: “No! They embezzled all the money!” 
Question: “Did the former land user of the A6 land get anything from it?”  
Mrs VW: “No! We’ve got nothing, because the committee and the head had 
embezzled it!”  
Question: “Has anybody ever asked the head where the money is?”  
Mrs VW: “It would be a waste of time! The last head of the committee, he has 
embezzled an incredible large amount of money, and nothing was left.”  
Mr VH: “Let me tell you how much they took. They sold our land, which belongs to 
our descendants and us, for massive money and embezzled it. That’s it.”  
Nevertheless, there was no any evidence to substantiate or prove these allegations. 
In fact, in my analysis, the embezzlement claim could be a misunderstanding. 
Company representatives confirmed that they requisitioned the A6 land at the 
price of 137,000 Yuan/Mu in 2009, which was prescribed by relevant policies. 
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Measured from the Google satellite image, the size of the A6 land was roughly 
23,320m2 (220m*106m), equivalent to nearly 35 Mu. Thus the total amount of 
purchase fee the village committee had received was around 4.8 million Yuan. 
After the requisition, the government soon leased the land use right of the A6 land 
to the public through a land use right auction. The exact amount of the land lease 
fee was found easily on the government’s website from the Internet.  
The final bid turned out to be 930 million Yuan, and all of it went into the fiscal 
income. The requisition of the A6 land was an internal purchase, between the 
village committee and the developer, on the behalf of the government. Since none 
of them released the details of the purchase, villagers knew nothing about it. They 
only heard from the public media that the bid for the A6 land was 930 million Yuan, 
and thought the village committee had the fund. However, in fact, the committee 
had only gained 4.8 million Yuan rather than 930 million Yuan. By May 2013, 
almost four years had passed, but the rumour of the embezzlement was still 
prevailing around the village. Given the fact that the rumour had caused a serious 
problem and the negative image of the committee had become deeply rooted in the 
mind of ordinary households, it may have been appropriate to make public the 
details of the purchase. The reason why the village committee had not done this 
was unknown. Perhaps they thought the clarification was difficult, or just 
unnecessary, as long as the government knew the truth. Whatever the reason was, 
this example showed how the relationship between the village committee and 
ordinary households was problematic. The divide between them was large, 
communication was weak and mutual trust was not present. Therefore, the 
committee’s role was perceived not to be as an autonomous organisation of 
ordinary villagers but rather as an agency of the government.  
To conclude, according to law, the alleged malpractices, including the cancellation 
of the 2009 election and the non-competitive election of 2012 meant technically 
the committee had no legal grounding. But in this village, the legitimacy and 
authority did not derive from national law and valid elections, but instead from 
individuals’ wealth, social status, social networks, influence, capacity etc., villagers’ 
fear of revenge, the prevailing social norms, and particularly, the support from the 
local authority. By all means, the governance of the committee had been widely 
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admitted and accepted by the majority, although its role was perceived to be as a 
partner of the government. Even when villagers were extremely angry at what the 
committee had done, or what they thought the committee had done, to harm the 
majority’s interest, they only challenged the municipality and the developer, rather 
than attempting to overthrow the village governance by questioning its legitimacy.  
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the main characteristics of both the ordinary group and 
the privileged group of villagers in VA Village. The former comprised mainly elder 
men, with the leadership of some senior elders. Due to the mixture of an urban-
rural identity, elders held a different view of value towards their properties. Such 
value might not be understood by outsiders but was important in their decision-
making. Second, the rich bonding social capital enabled elders to take advantage of 
their network for information sharing and mutual help. Third, elders’ information 
interpretation was problematic. Elders seemed to believe that their rich social 
experience was able to compensate for their lack of education experience. They 
had been confident and satisfied with their performance with the developer, but it 
turned out that prejudice and false knowledge had compromised their 
interpretation. The privileged group was represented by VA Village Committee. 
The committee was alleged to have legitimacy problems. Elections of the villager 
committee had not followed the regulations exactly and it was perceived that the 
villager committee had not fulfilled its duty properly by supporting the majority of 
ordinary villagers’ claims. Nevertheless, elders admitted the effectiveness of the 
committee as their governor and, as such, did not challenge its authority. In the 
programme, the committee had closer cooperation with the developer party, 
rather than the ordinary group of villagers, which further enhanced elders’ distrust 
of them. Based on the context provided by Chapter Five and Six, the next chapter 
will explore how collective actions were formed and taken within different groups, 
and how such cooperation ultimately declined. 
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Chapter Seven - Forming and Declining of Collective Actions 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on specific actions that took place during the development 
programme. The previous two chapters have described how there were four main 
stakeholder groups in the programme:  the local authority, the developer, the 
privileged group of villagers and the ordinary group of villagers. The first three 
groups had close cooperation and are referred to as “the developer party”. Section 
7.2 analyses how the developer party and the ordinary group formed their own 
collective actions to pursue their interests and the conflicts arising. Section 7.3 
discusses how these forms of collective action eventually declined. Section 7.4 
theorises the findings with the social capital framework.  
7.2 Forming Cooperation and Collective Actions 
The close cooperation of the developer party inheres in their governmental 
background. For the ordinary group of villagers, the foundation of cooperation was 
relatively weak. It relied mainly on kinship, mutual culture, mutual interests and 
bonding social capital. The catalyst of cooperation was supposed to be the 
undesirable compensation scheme, the lack of public participation via formal 
approaches and the developer party’s aggressive actions. This section examines 
the cooperation, collective actions and conflicts that took place from 2008 to 2011.  
7.2.1 Cooperation within the Developer Party 
Among the developer party, every group had its own competitive advantages. The 
authority, mainly the district government and its branch SO Street Office, had 
powerful governmental forces. The developer, CB Company and its owner CA 
Company, provided strong financial resources. The developer also commissioned 
CC Company as the developer’s partner. CC Company was specialised in dealing 
with affected households in rural land requisition programmes. Their advantages 
were complementary and the match between them made them even more 
powerful. However, they did not gain entirely what they anticipated from the many 
significant actions they took and, to an extent, their flawed strategy wasted the 
strong foundation and background they had.  
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Cooperation with the Local Authority 
 Due to their close relationship, it was not difficult for the developer to ask for help 
from the government. These forms of assistance were various. There was a clear 
division of work inside the government, based on departments and levels. First, as 
grass-roots’ government representatives, actors from SO Street Office were 
appointed to deliver the publicity of the programme and policies. They contacted 
and communicated with households and monitored households’ opinions and 
emotions, and consequently reported them to the Headquarters. The approaches 
they took for their work included holding conferences, visiting households door  to 
door and circulating publicity materials, e.g. leaflets, DVDs, brochures and banners. 
It was indicated in an interview with Mr SOC, an actor from SO Street Office that:  
We’re mainly in charge of publicity and monitoring the trend of public opinions. 
After all, we’re not specialists in land requisition. They’re more experienced 
because they’ve got professional trainings. What we do is to exercise the 
government’s duty. It’s such that we establish a stage for discussions. For example, 
the company representatives visit a household and villagers may misunderstand 
that they are just some kind of salesmen and [shut them out]. So we accompany 
them and explain to villagers the significant meaning of the programme, tell them 
how the village will be redeveloped after the demolition, how their lives will be 
improved, how their properties will be appreciated, and that there’ll be 
educational and medical services in the future. That’s it. We tell them how we’ll 
help them improve their lives, based on policies and the needs of publicity… We’ve 
held many conferences. [We divide villagers into] Groups like villager teams, 
representatives, elders, women etc. Then we invited villagers, group by group to 
conferences to activate them, to circulate the whole policies, the scheme, the 
processes of the programme, tell them how problems will be solved, and the 
[bright] prospect, the planning of the village… after conferences, we visited 
households door to door, and also circulate some publicity materials, like the 
brochures of the introduction of the scheme and DVDs […] 
Various departmental forces from the district government also participated in the 
programme. VA Village had remained as an unregulated area for a long time and 
had developed without much administrative regulation and intervention. This 
situation changed dramatically soon after the launch of the programme. During 
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2008 to 2009, many administrative forces from different departments deployed 
actions in the village strategically. Villagers claimed that security policemen, 
stationed at an office within the Headquarters, received an extra salary from the 
developer. In return, they came to the village to inspect tenants’ temporary 
residential permits, and expelled from the village anyone who did not have one. 
Furthermore, city management inspectors (cheng-guan20) came and banned 
illegally built houses and drove away street-stalls. The once prosperous night fair 
enjoyed by both villagers and tenants in the village was abolished. Law 
enforcement forces from various departments e.g. the industrial and commercial 
bureau, the sanitation bureau, the environment bureau, the taxation bureau and 
the fire bureau; showed up to inspect shops’ licenses, sanitation standards, sewage 
discharge permissions, tax paying, fire protection standards etc. The actions were 
intensive and universal. Due to the lack of administrative regulations and 
enforcements in the past, the majority of shops and rental houses did not have the 
required licenses, and neither did they reach the required regulatory standards. 
These actions had a major detrimental impact on the village. Within a short period, 
shops and rental houses were forced to cease, and the village lost its popularity 
and prosperity. The actions were perceived by villagers as a move designed 
specifically to force them to accept the purchase contracts. The major reason was 
the timing of these actions, and a comparison that the same actions did not take 
place in other adjacent urban villages. Villagers were significantly affected by the 
actions. It was indicated by elders Mr VF, Mr VT and Mr VN in a group interview:  
Mr VF: “Security police officers came every day. They drove away (teachers and 
children) in the kindergarten, shut down shops, and dispelled everything. ‘Move 
out of the village immediately or you’ll be in a serious trouble,’ they said. It’s 
always been like that… Before long, they sent some people to post notices 
everywhere, saying that, you tenants, move out of the village. We’ll knock down the 
houses soon. Second, they shut down kindergartens. What should we do? Once 
there are no places for kids, our rental houses became unattractive for tenants. 
[They] posted notices on shops, telling us to run, get out of here before the deadline, 
or once the demolition begins, you’ll lose everything. Let me tell you, they did not 
                                                        
20 城管 
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follow the processes prescribed in relevant policies. What they did was to 
marginalise you, keep tenants away from renting our houses and shops. Then 
perhaps villagers would even demolish houses by themselves. In my understanding, 
that’s their strategy […]”  
Mr VT: “Anyway, what they did was use any potential means to press villagers. 
Right? All kinds of forces, police force, city inspectors, law enforcement from 
industrial and commercial bureau, and taxation bureau […]” 
Mr VN: “When police stations participated in such actions in 2008, security police 
officers even [stationed their office to] worked in the requisition and demolition 
office [in the Headquarters], and got a second salary [from the Headquarters]… 
but now they don’t do that anymore.”  
Affected households who had members who worked for the public sector, e.g. 
teachers in local schools, employees of the village committee or the local authority 
and employees of state-owned companies, were required to sign purchase 
contracts. This was described by villager Mr VD:  
It’s like that, if you work for the government or their work units, you live on public 
finance. Then they’ll require you to accept the requisition and demolition of your 
house promptly, or you’ll be fired in the second day. If you’re a teacher, and you 
don’t sign the contract, the education bureau will dismiss you, to stay home and 
reflect on your problem.  
The party leader of CPC village committee was also from an affected household, 
and her household signed the contract early on. Some villagers claimed that they 
signed contracts quickly because they were the privileged group and were able to 
enjoy extra benefits. In addition to these actions, the developer party also 
conducted forced demolitions over several rounds, which will be discussed 
specifically in Section 7.2.3.  
Cooperation with VA Village Committee 
The VA Village committee and its role in the first stage of the programme have 
been discussed previously in Section 6.5. The developer and the village committee 
closely cooperated, with a mutually beneficial relationship. Members of the village 
committees were able to gain extra benefits. In return, when the developer 
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required authorisation to smooth the way for purchases or actions, the village 
committee would cooperate actively, whether other villagers agreed or not. 
Theoretically, according to national law, when making an important decision 
regarding the disposition of collective assets, the decision should be made by 
voting in the assembly, by villagers or representatives from households. However, 
in the context of this programme, it was difficult to gain consent from the majority 
to accept the purchase offer at the suggested price. Therefore, such cooperation 
was necessary and crucial for the developer. Although it did not exactly follow the 
law’s prescription, what the developer appeared to be really concerned with was 
the legitimacy of paperwork, rather than the legitimacy of procedures. The village 
committee’s signatures and seals for the contracts were perceived as enough to 
endorse the purchase to avoid many time-consuming efforts, e.g. explaining and 
negotiating with villagers to persuade them and gain their consent. Therefore, the 
cooperation significantly improved the efficiency and saved considerable trouble 
and cost for the developer.  
It was believed by villagers that this was the main reason why VA Village was 
chosen rather than HP village, which was another potential target of the developer, 
however work had not been initiated there yet because HP village committee did 
not offer as much cooperation as VA Village Committee, as argued by villager Mr 
VS:  
The contract [of initiating the programme in VA Village] was signed by simply the 
head [Mr VCH] and several other cadres. There was no public hearing or 
something like that. When they had signed the contract, and everything was 
prepared, they then finally announced the decision to villagers.  
7.2.2 Cooperation within the Ordinary Group  
Villagers’ discontent with the compensation standard was largely generated from a 
comparison with others. At 2008, there was another programme conducted in MC 
village. Its location is in Siming District. Villagers heard that the compensation for 
houses in MV village was up to nearly 1,000 Yuan/m2. It was higher than theirs: 
the 280 Yuan/m2 namely upgrading reward for the 50m2 quota and the 560 
Yuan/m2 compensation for the 80 m2 quota. Affected by the comparison, villagers 
claimed they were willing to cooperate with the developer’s requisition, but 
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requested the same compensation standard as MC village, and suggested that the 
developer stop the implementation until a new compensation scheme was drafted 
and agreed by the majority of villagers, otherwise they would not allow anyone to 
demolish any houses.  
At first, relatively mild actions were taken. A petition was made to the developer 
party directly to ask for a face-to-face negotiation. A joint-signatures letter was 
submitted as well. It was drafted by some villagers with a large collection of 
signatures and fingerprints from others. However, these efforts failed. Upset and 
angry, villagers decided to take more aggressive actions. United by a mutual goal, 
households gradually banded together and formed a loose but more powerful and 
large-scale cooperation with a leadership of elders to protest against the developer 
party. Following this, they adopted both legal and illegal collective actions.  
Appealing to Upper-level Authorities 
Appealing to upper-level authorities was one of the most frequently used 
approaches when villagers tried to solve conflicts with the local authority. It 
became the first action they took after a failure of more moderate and localised 
means. At first, they sent some representatives to appeal to the Department of 
Letters and Visits (DLV) of Xiamen municipality, and then to the DLV of the 
provincial government at Fuzhou city. Elder Mr VF, a key leader of the leadership 
in plotting these actions, described in an interview.  
The housing price in our area was around 10,000 Yuan/m2. The compensation of 
280 Yuan/m2 was not enough at all. Did they want us to become beggars on the 
street? This was the first request. So we villagers simultaneously realised that, we 
shouldn’t accept it, we should go to Fuzhou (the capital city) to appeal. Anyway, 
we argued, we would like to cooperate the requisition, but we wished a reasonable 
compensation standard. Second, the developer should stop their implementation 
and suspend the programme right now, until we reached an agreement on the 
compensation. We were not anti-requisition; we liked it honestly. We just doubted 
the compensation. At that time, we went to the DLV of the provincial government 
at Fuzhou to appeal for, probably, four or five times… Fuzhou was far away from 
here. So we hired a driver and a car, and sent seven, or nine people, not too many.  
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Appealing to upper-level authorities had long been a controversial approach. It 
always irritates the local authority because the frequency of making appeals by its 
citizens is a criterion for the administrative assessment of local cadres. As a result, 
cadres established special teams to monitor and prevent potential actors from 
appealing, and to punish anyone who did so. Equally, the outcome from appealing 
is usually limited. As a department of the government, the DLV did not function 
independently. Letters and visits regarding politically sensitive issues such as land 
requisition often ended up without positive outcomes, and sometimes even worse, 
being revenged by local cadres.  
Question: “What did the DLV of provincial government reply to your visits?”  
Mr VF: “Well, they just shunned their responsibility. They said, ‘you visited us on 
25th June 2008, but the event happened more than three months ago, and then the 
appealing was expired. You shall go to the DLV at your city.’ They were shunning 
their responsibility!” 
Question: “Did you go to the DLV of Xiamen municipality?”  
Mr VF: “Yes. We firstly went to the DLV of Xiamen municipality, but they did not 
receive our visits at all. That’s why we then went to the DLV in the capital city. And 
they claimed it’s expired [...]”  
Villagers’ visits were not welcome and they gained nothing from the action. What 
the DLV actually meant might be that the programme was launched more than 
three months before, so it was too late to change anything. The programme was 
officially initiated and announced in newspapers on 27 October 2007. No villagers 
saw this until March 2008, when the developer with local cadres came to the 
village and announced it to them. They visited the provincial DLV in late June 2008, 
so the DLV claimed the period for their appeal had expired. However, in relevant 
regulations, there was not any item that prescribed that an appeal would not be 
accepted if the issue took place more than three months before21. Therefore, this 
seemed to be an excuse to avoid any tough and sensitive issues. Villagers claimed 
that since the programme was an administrative activity and an important fiscal 
                                                        
21 See National Regulations on http://www.gjxfj.gov.cn/xffg/2009-11/24/c_1395090.htm. The province’s and 
the city’s regulation are similar.  
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source, officials tended to shield and cover each other tacitly. It was the reason 
why, immediately after their visit to the DLV in the capital city, they were 
summoned to the local police station for interrogation:  
Mr VF: “When we returned from the capital city, the local police station released 
the message that they’re going to arrest us. [And they did it.] ‘What the hell you 
went to appeal in Fuzhou (The villager imitates the police officer’s angry tone)?’ 
They gave us a long speech, which seemed to suggest that appealing to an upper-
level authority was an anti-revolution crime. The DLV is established exactly for 
ordinary people’s visits and appeals. Why did police officers arrest us?”  
Question: “Did they finally arrest any of you?”  
Mr VF: “No, they couldn’t do that. They did arrest us and take us to the police 
station to interrogate and intimidate us, but they didn’t take us into custody.”  
The actions of the Police officers appeared to go beyond their duty. The event’s 
occurrence reflected the cooperation between the developer and the local 
authority. The issue effectively alarmed villagers and made them careful and 
cautious about their activities and speeches. In my interviews, when I told them 
that I wished to interview those who had been summoned by police officers, and 
hoped they could introduce me to them, they firmly refused my requests and did 
not release any details of these individuals, no matter how much I explained that 
the interview was confidential and for research purpose only.  
The issue also showed that elders played an important role in the leadership 
among ordinary households. Although the appealing actions failed, it had a 
significant meaning. It boosted their cooperation, creating a path leading to further 
actions. After that, elder leaders plotted more actions on a larger scale, and 
arguably protected their village more successfully.  
Hiring Lawyers to Sue the Municipality 
Raising funds from affected households and hiring lawyers to sue the municipality 
was the next subsequent collective action. The idea was generated by elders’ 
discussions about finding a more effective strategy. The purpose was to gain the 
attention of the developer party, and force them to revise the compensation 
standard to the same level as the one in MC village.  
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Mr VF: “After the failure of the appealing, we had no ideas what to do next…So [we 
gathered up and discussed] and then some elders suggested, quoted, ‘we cannot 
confront them by force. We shall hire lawyers. Let lawyers speak for us. How much 
is the property, and how to evaluate it. Lawyers know how to do it.’ This is a wise 
choice. Isn’t it?”  
They soon raised a fund from the villagers, found two lawyers and hired them. The 
lawyers were from Beijing CL Law Firm, which had a good reputation in the field of 
property requisition. After a month of preparation, on 25th August 2008, they sent 
five representatives to officially file the lawsuit to sue the municipality’s Bureau of 
Land Resource and Real Estate Management (BLRREM, as defendant), Huli District 
Government (as third party) and CB Company (as third party) at the People’s Court 
of Siming District. Their arguments in the first lawsuit were based on two points, 
quoted from the judgment paper of the second lawsuit: 
The first is that “the Requisition and Demolition Permission authorized by 
BLRREM to the developer had no fact basis because there was a lack of approval 
document on land requisition…it [also] does not have legal basis because 
according to Law of Administrative Permission, only law or administrative 
regulation can authorise administrative permissions.”  
The second is that “the permission breached the law severely because when 
BLRREM authorised the permission to the developer, BLRREM did not inform 
villagers or hold a hearing which was a compulsory requirement by law.”  
The first argument was rejected by the court based on two reasons. The first one 
was that:  
According to the municipality’s regulations, ‘land requisition’ and ‘houses 
requisition and demolition (R&D)’ are two different administrative actions, 
distinct in terms of compensation standard, compensation approaches and 
procedures. The argument in this case specifically focuses on whether the 
authorisation of the administrative permission of houses R&D by BLRREM has any 
fact basis. […] In current law system, there is no specific law regarding the action 
of houses R&D on rural land. BLRREM, as the department in charge of R&D, 
administrates the action of R&D on rural land based on the state council’s and 
Xiamen municipality’s regulations on urban land R&D, which is reasonable. 
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According to these [urban land R&D] regulations, the developer company has got 
all the required documents […] It is true that there is no specific law or 
administrative regulations formulated that the action of houses R&D on rural land 
could be authorised through administrative permission. However, BLRREM 
authorises the R&D action to the developer through the way of administrative 
permission, in which the one who suffers from the unfavourable burden is the 
developer, not the property owners. And the district government and the developer 
company do not have any complaints about that  
The second argument was rejected as well. The reason was: 
According to current law system, there is no any specific law or regulations 
regarding the official procedures of houses R&D on rural land. BLRREM has 
neither informed property owners nor held a hearing for property owners. It is a 
flaw in its procedures, but it is not illegal.  
The judgment result was not released until late 2009, a long time after the trial. On 
that day, villagers were informed that they had lost the lawsuit. They claimed that 
they did not receive the document of the judgement result, and the judge even 
came to them and persuaded them to reach an agreement with the developer by 
negotiation rather than lawsuit. The result and the persuasion did not stop them 
from raising funds again and commissioning the lawyers to apply for 
reconsideration at the Intermediate People’s Court of Xiamen City. Villagers’ 
arguments in the second lawsuit were “some facts adopted by the first trial were 
wrong” and “in the first lawsuit, the law, which the judgment was based on, was 
improper”. The lawyers argued that the first judgement was controversial and 
unconvincing, so they requested to “abrogate the judgment in the first lawsuit and 
also abrogate the Administrative Permission of the R&D action”. The second 
lawsuit was on 22th December 2009 and the result of the judgment was released 
on 17th October 2010, which rejected their appeal and sustained the original 
judgment. This was also the final step in the procedure, so villagers could no longer 
make an appeal to the courts on this issue.  
The court’s logic in the first judgement appears problematic. The Law of 
Administrative Permission states that the government can only authorise 
administrative permissions to specific actions based on the relevant law of 
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regulations. However, there are no relevant laws or regulations prescribing that 
the R&D action can be authorised and issued with an administrative permission. 
BLRREM issued an administrative permission to the developer for its houses R&D 
action in VA Village. The court admitted that there was a lack of specific laws or 
regulations that supported such issuing and, as such, had no legal basis. 
Nevertheless, the court judged that it did not matter even if it was controversial, 
since the burden of processing all the troublesome paperwork for the application 
of the administrative permission was placed on the government and the developer 
rather than property owners. Although there was no law or regulation prescribing 
the procedures in which to apply for an administrative permission of houses R&D 
action on rural land, the government and the developer did this by referring to the 
application of houses R&D action on urban land. Therefore, the court thought it 
was reasonable. This judgement was not based on law or regulation, but the 
judge’s view. The third point in the first judgement is true in so far that (by May 
2013) the developer’s requisition only involved houses rather than the rural land. 
Only when all constructions had been requisitioned and demolished could the 
developer move on to the next phase to requisition the rural land.  
The second judgement was problematic as well. The court judged that since there 
was no law or regulation prescribing the specific procedures in the application of 
administrative permissions for houses R&D on rural land, the lack of 
acknowledgement or hearing was a flaw, but not in itself illegal. The judgement 
was based on the assumption that even without any support of law or regulation, 
the action was legal. In relation to the houses R&D on urban land at that time, the 
acknowledgement and hearing were not necessary (that was the court’s logic in 
the first judgement thought the court did not mention it there). Basically, all these 
problems derived from the fact that there were no laws or regulations supporting 
the management of administrative permissions for houses R&D on rural land, and 
the court, under the administration of the authority, made a judgement in favour of 
the government.  
Although villagers finally lost the lawsuits, the meaning of the actions were 
significant for the profound influence they had. The event showed that villagers 
managed to take a more organised and powerful collective action against the 
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developer party. It was accomplished by making the best use of the strong bonding 
social capital they had. As discussed previously, VA Village used to be a 
marginalised kinship-based rural community. Even when it became an urban 
village, indigenous villagers, especially these elders, retained rural lifestyles. Face-
to-face communications and interactions took place intensively on a daily basis, 
and this enabled them to have strong internal social networks and the possibility 
for cooperation. In their interactions, several factors, mainly the clear-cut 
classification of interest groups and roles – the developer, the authority, the 
privileged group and the ordinary group – and sharing a mutual goal, interest and 
“enemy”, gradually created in them a strong sense of belonging and, as such, they 
were able to band together. The norm of reciprocity was evident as well. Villagers 
considered themselves as a homogenous group, with a closed relationship based 
on a mixture of kinship, friendship and neighbourliness. Thus, they were willing to 
offer assistance to each other. It was especially significant during the programme, 
as company representative Mr CRD mentioned “when it came to the topic of 
houses requisition, every villager would be your relative.” Mutual help played an 
important role in villagers’ information acquisition. The trustworthiness of others 
was not regarded as such a problem in VA Village, since the cost of cheating or 
lying in such a close community was viewed as being too high to risk.  
Compared to the previous collective actions, this legal route was more 
sophisticated. Hiring lawyers to sue the government required a lot more effort and 
their rich bonding social capital helped to facilitate this and as a result, made it 
happen. The fund for lawsuits was gathered through collective fundraising.  
Although it was a considerable sum there were no difficulties encountered in 
raising such a large amount. Those involved described how “the action was really 
supported by villagers”. “The rich contribute money while the strong contribute 
labour.” “More or less, nearly every villager contributed money for it.” This is the 
reciprocity and collective use of resources. Representatives were sent to Beijing, 
found a law firm, hired two lawyers and initiated the lawsuits. Even though the 
organisers of the action were summoned to the police station for interrogation and 
intimidation, they were less afraid of this given their previous experience.  
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The event had three main influences. First, villagers appeared to have maintained a 
high morale generated from the lawsuit. This partly explained why they managed 
to remain relatively united, through which they successfully defended the two 
large-scale forced demolitions conducted by the developer party. The first lawsuit 
was initiated in late 2008 and the negative result was released in late 2009. 
Meanwhile, lawyers’ “excellent and inspiring debates” in the trial, as quoted from 
villagers, had significantly encouraged them, upholding the conviction that they 
would definitely win the case and this expectation helped maintain the solidarity 
between ordinary households. Although the negative result shocked villagers, it 
also made them feel angry and combative rather than defeated. The second lawsuit 
was soon initiated and, this time, villagers had even more zeal to participate in it. 
Many villagers emerged as volunteers to offer their signatures for the lawsuit 
application as plaintiffs, in an approach to show their support. Around 200 
villagers signed their names, although finally only 80 names were adopted because 
of the quota limit (5 plaintiffs from the last lawsuit and 75 new plaintiffs). From 
late 2009 to late 2010, the expected positive outcome of the second lawsuit 
continued to uphold villagers’ high morale and strong belief.  
Second, on the other hand, villagers’ beliefs and hopes were devastated by the 
negative result of the second lawsuit released on 17th October 2010. Making 
appeals to an upper level authority and filing lawsuits in a court are the two most 
frequently used approaches ordinary people could think of for solving conflicts 
with the developer and authority in such issues. The failure not only meant that 
they had no chance to make a change via an approach as apparently promising as a 
lawsuit but also enhanced their perception that the developer enjoyed an all-
around powerful support from the authority. The result soon terminated their 
long-term efforts in trying to shape the outcomes in their interests through legal 
mechanisms. After this, they could take no more actions as attackers, but only as 
defenders. Without the possibility of taking further legal action, they could not take 
advantage of their rich bonding social capital and the importance of the organised 
cooperation and the role of the elder leadership declined as well. This was an 
important factor that made their cooperation decline later.  
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Third, the relations and mutual trust between ordinary households and the 
developer party deteriorated further as a result of the outcomes of the lawsuits. 
For a long time, villagers believed that they would definitely win, because of their 
rightful requirements and their lawyers’ excellent statement in the court. The 
more reasonable explanation for the failure they perceived was that the judgement 
of lawsuits was manipulated somehow by the developer and the authority, as 
indicated by elders Mr VS, Mr VO and Mr VT:  
Mr VS: “In fact, we won the lawsuit, but the government somehow manipulated it 
covertly …” 
Mr VO: “Everybody said that the court was irresponsible. Judges’ salaries are paid 
by the government. Therefore, they judged that, the government was 51% right 
and we were 49% wrong (actually Mr VO means ‘51% wrong’ here). In such social 
context, unless some [judges] dare to stand out and do something good for 
ordinary people, or we don’t expect [justice]…”  
Mr VT: “It was a very famous lawyer from Beijing. In the trial, he argued so 
excellent and exciting that we enjoyed it very much. Everybody believed that, we 
absolutely would win since we were rightful and reasonable. However, the court 
was not fair. What could we do? … After all, the court is in the charge of the 
government. Therefore, the case was deliberately delayed in the whole process […]”  
Although many years had passed from this outcome by the time I interviewed 
them, villagers still had a vivid memory of the event, and remained angry and 
regretful about losing the lawsuits. They still believed that the developer party was 
responsible for their failure of the lawsuits.  
7.2.3 Collective Conflicts 
Two major conflicts took place between the developer party and the ordinary 
group and these marked the climax of the series of actions between 2008 and 2011. 
The first major conflict concerned the demolition of the elders’ centre. The second 
one was the demolition of Mr VG’s iron-board house.  
Forced Demolition and Protection of the Elder Centre 
The elders centre, officially named “VA Village Activity Centre for Elders”, is the 
collective asset of households in VA Village. As the following image (7.1) shows, it 
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consists of a four-floor building (A), two three-floor buildings (B and C), a two-
floor building (D) and an open yard in the middle surrounded by these buildings.  
 
Image 7. 1 The elder centre 
These buildings have a long history. Decades before, the office building of the two 
committees used to be an old, small house. In the 1970s, when Mr VCA took office, 
as the head of the villager committee, he built two new buildings (A and B) in this 
location as new offices. In the 1980s, another new building in another location was 
built to be utilised as the new office building. The households of VA Village then 
raised a fund, nearly a hundred Yuan per capita on average, to purchase the two 
buildings (A and B) from the villager committee, as their collective property. They 
were used as an elders’ centre, and managed by the VA Villages’ elder association. 
In the 1990s, the households again raised funds to build another two buildings (C 
and D) as their new collective properties. Then the elder centre moved to building 
C where it was based from thereon in. The centre was a popular place for elders, 
used as their permanent venue for recreation, e.g. gathering, watching television, 
chatting, playing board games and gambling. Buildings A and B were used as rental 
housing for low-income migrants. The rent was collected and managed by the VA 
Village’s elder association and used as a special fund to improve elders’ welfare. 
Building D was used to run a kindergarten.  
The incidents of the forced demolition of the elder centre took place between late 
2008 and early 2009. Initially, the developer signed a purchase contract with the 
village committee privately to requisition all these buildings without any consent 
from households. Following this some company representatives came to the elder 
centre without advance notice, accompanied by local cadres, demolition workers 
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and security men armed with riot shields. Elder Mr VZ recalled that “[…] the 
developer even sent these policemen, who worked in the company (in VA 
Headquarters), with riot shields, to provoke troubles with us villagers.” When they 
arrived, they forced tenants out of the rental buildings. As soon as the buildings 
were empty, they were ready to demolish them. Villagers witnessing this on site 
immediately ran for help from others. Before long, masses of villagers rallied at the 
site, all provoked by the developer party’s action. The two sides then confronted 
each other and the situation lasted for several hours. It was described by villager 
Mr VD:  
At that time, they were all sieged. Even the girls, the women staff, were not able to 
find a way out to pee. You could image (how crazy it was)! It lasted for several 
hours. So they couldn’t conduct the demolishing work.  
Villagers’ radical and unexpected reaction reflected the importance of the elder 
centre. This was indicated from interviews with elders:  
Mr VF: “[…] the elder centre was a collective property of VA and VB Village, not the 
whole VA Administrative Village. Did the village committee have the right to sell it? 
On whose behalf did the village committee sign (the requisition contract)? … And 
how much money did the committee sell it for? A thousand or ten thousand (Yuan)? 
Didn’t they have to make it public? How large are the buildings? Shouldn’t they 
invite ordinary villagers to measure them and to supervise it [the measurement]? 
Obviously, the committee and the developer are cooperating in the same party. 
Can we trust them? Am I right? Everybody is aware of their cooperation, so who 
would trust them?”  
Mr VZ: “[…] first the developer was not going to build something on the land right 
now. Second, we’ve got elders to take care of. Elders had no jobs. So we lease these 
buildings out [to make money]. Then each elder could get about a hundred Yuan 
[per month]. Though a hundred Yuan is not a big amount, the developer didn’t 
need the land urgently… The kindergarten was the most important one. We, VA 
Village, had run the kindergarten for a long time. If you demolish it and you don’t 
build a new one, where could we send our kids to? … The tuition fee in the 
kindergarten was only three hundred Yuan each term. However, it was one to two 
thousand Yuan each term in state-run kindergartens. How could we afford it?”  
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Mr VD: “First, if you demolish them, where could the elders go (for recreation)? 
They usually go here in the afternoon for recreation. Second, when you demolish 
the village, on which piece of land are you going to build the new elder centre? You 
can’t just say it. You need to write it down on paper. Am I right? Another one is the 
compensation problem. How much is the compensation? Is it a special fund for this 
area [VA and VB village]? [The elder centre] had some rental buildings, so the 
elders had some incomes, which subsidised them. For example, on Elders’ Day, on 
Chinese New Year and on some festivals, the rent would be used to subsidise elders. 
For example, if an elder who had financial difficulties was ill and was in hospital, 
then the elders’ association would visit him and take some money from the fund, 
like five hundred Yuan or eight hundred Yuan, to subsidise the elder.”  
There were a number of concerns and demands that the elders had. First, the elder 
centre should be kept intact until the village was almost demolished and there was 
an alternative elder centre. Second, as it was households in VA and VB village that 
owned the centre, they demanded a participation in the decision-making. Third, 
the process of measurement and evaluation must be supervised by them. Fourth, 
the compensation should be used exclusively for households in VA and VB village, 
rather than the whole VA Administrative Village.  
During the siege, a villager lost his control and slapped the programme manager of 
CB Company in her face. Finally, the Vice Head of the district government was 
informed and arrived at the site. The Vice Head calmed villagers down and asked 
both parties to stop the siege. He then held a conference in VA Headquarters and 
invited some elder villagers. Many other villagers also attended as observers. 
Meanwhile, elders stated villagers’ concerns and demands. Under the Vice Head’s 
facilitation, the negotiation between elders and the developer went smoothly and 
an agreement was reached. The Vice Head and the developer gave them an oral 
promise that the elder centre would be kept intact until the majority of houses in 
VA Village had been demolished and the new elder centre had been built 
completely. Villagers felt satisfied and, since a mass of villagers witnessed the 
whole process, they did not insist that the Vice Head or the developer write the 
oral promise down on paper.  
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The developer party failed in their attempted demolition action for they misjudged 
the situation. Initially, they appeared to be looking for an opportunity to teach 
villagers a lesson and establish their authority to facilitate the rest of the 
programme. Accordingly, the action adopted was to demolish something important 
by coercion in order to demonstrate their strength. The elder centre was chosen 
specifically because it was treated as a symbol, a landmark of the village in the 
mind of villagers, especially the elders. The developer party were confident, 
appearing not to know villagers’ concerns, or at least, not taking them seriously. It 
turned out to be a bad strategy. This was reflected by company representative Mr 
CRD: 
CA Company had never conducted any requisition programme before they took 
this one. The programme manager they appointed to the company had no 
experience in requisition either. She just anticipated that demolishing the village’s 
landmarks would greatly facilitate the consequent process. 
The event was the first large-scale conflict caused by both parties’ collective 
actions, ending up with a villagers’ victory. No riot or fierce physical conflict took 
place, except that the programme manager was humiliated by being slapped on the 
face by someone, and the developer party was besieged for hours without even 
having access to toilets. Elders, as the leadership of ordinary households, played an 
important role in coordinating villagers and negotiating with the developer party 
on the behalf of the collective. In contrast, the developer party was unsatisfied with 
the outcome. From their aspect, they had processed all the necessary paperwork 
with the villager committee in order to conduct the demolition but, despite this, it 
ended in failure, a situation further exacerbated with their boss being humiliated 
in public. Many believed that this failure was the trigger for the next conflict – the 
attempted forced demolition of Mr VG’s house.  
Forced Demolition and Protection of Mr VG’s Iron-board House 
This event took place on 22nd August 2009. It was the climax of a series of conflicts 
in the first stage of the programme. The event generated a profound influence that 
significantly affected the development of the programme.  
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It was another uninformed attempted forced demolition conducted by the 
developer party on a larger scale. It failed again because of the strong collective 
resistance by villagers and the mediation of the municipality. The developer’s 
motivation appeared to be to reverse the humiliation of the failed demolition of the 
elder centre and to once again attempt to establish their authoritarian image to 
facilitate the rest of the programme. Villagers were aware of this, calling it “an 
action of killing a chicken to frighten monkeys” (a Chinese idiom), quoted by 
villager Mr VS. It meant that the developer wanted to establish a precedent to 
frighten and pressure villagers into accepting the purchase of their houses.  
The developer adopted a strategy that was similar to the action with the elders 
centre but with some quite significant differences. There was, for example, much 
better preparation. First, the developer mobilised all his resources to rally a much 
larger and more powerful team to support the action. Second, more equipment 
was mobilised, including riot shields, police batons, cameras and bulldozers. Third, 
the target, which was Mr VG and his iron-board house, seemed to have been 
selected deliberately. Mr VG was not a particularly prominent resident of the 
village, but he was well known as an anti-requisition activist. His iron-board house 
was a 98 m2 informal property made mainly of iron boards and located in a 
marginalised location of the village, just to the south side of the city highway. It 
was a privately-owned property, unlike the elder centre, which was a collectively-
owned one. Thus, the action did not appear to directly involve the public wider 
interest. Particularly, although the iron-board house was built on a piece of land 
for which Mr VG possessed the land use rights, the iron-board house was an illegal 
construction since it did not have any approval permission or certificate. Officially, 
such constructions could legitimately be demolished without the owner’s consent, 
so the action had legal grounds.  
On the day, up to an estimated two hundred people walked ahead to Mr VG’s iron-
board house. They included company representatives, local cadres, police officers 
in uniform, and dozens of unidentified men in colourful-flowered casual suits. 
Some were armed with riot shields and police batons.  Although there was a lack of 
evidence to prove it, villagers believed that the unidentified men were actually city 
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management inspectors (cheng-guan) in casual clothes. It was described by elders 
Mr VT and Mr VL thus:  
Mr VT: “Though they were city management inspectors and came here on duty, at 
least they should wear uniforms. But they didn’t. They even wore the kind of 
flowered clothes, the clothes with short sleeves and short pants. What kind of 
governmental officers was that? It’s mobster-style! So many things happened… 
there were also policemen in uniform, but only several …”  
Mr VL: “… there were policemen, there were city management inspector. Every 
kind of forces was there, with some sorts of electric batons, with some sort of 
shields. Even quite a few of policemen came there [...]”  
The group asked Mr VG to leave his house, because they were going to demolish it 
soon. Mr VG refused and continued to stay in his house. He then closed doors and 
windows. After a while, a bulldozer came and drove towards the house directly, 
ramming down a part of it. “He didn’t come out yet, and then the house collapsed 
and overwhelmed him. He crawled out of the ruins. He was enraged so he punched 
them. Once he punched them, they fought him back,” described elder Mr VF. 
Villagers saw it and immediately ran for help.  
The call successfully gained considerable help from others and led to a collective 
resistance. Villagers’ motivation could be generated by two factors. First, the 
contrast between Mr VG’s helplessness and the group’s ruthlessness aroused 
people’s sense of sympathy and justice. Second, the aim of the action enraged 
villagers. It appeared to be obvious that the real aim of the action was to punish Mr 
VG as an anti-requisition activist, rather than as an illegal construction builder. 
There were a great number of illegal constructions all around the village, from 
large-scale steel-concrete structure buildings owned by the better-off villagers to 
many other iron-board houses scattered along both sides of the city highway that 
were owned by the worse-off villagers. Mr VG’s iron-board house was just one of 
many. The only feature that singled out Mr VG from other villagers lived in iron-
board houses seemed to be his anti-requisition activities. Therefore, even though 
Mr VG was a vulnerable person and the iron-board house was an illegal 
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construction, he gained much support from others. This was analysed by elders in 
interviews thus:  
Mr VS: [Mr VG’s previous house] had been built for a long time, around ten years.  
Mr VZ: “Yes. His [previous] house was there long before the construction of the HL 
Avenue [the city highway]. His [previous] house was partially requisitioned and 
demolished for the construction of the HL Avenue. Then he built this [iron-board] 
house. You know, a part of his [previous] house was on the highway construction 
site, so it was demolished. His remaining [previous] house was salvaged, to build 
the current [iron-board] house on his remaining land. The [iron-board] house was 
also used as a shop to sell some stuff.” 
Mr VS: “In short, it was a [iron-board] house with simple structure, salvaging from 
the remaining of the [previous] house that had been requisitioned.”  
Mr VZ: “We also have many, go and see it if you don’t believe it, many [iron-board] 
houses like that along the [two sides of] HL Avenue, from here to there, selling 
windows, gates or whatever stuff… Anyway, it was some troublemakers who 
gossiped behind his back… Otherwise, actually, it was not a big deal at all, right? 
He had the land use right of that piece of land and he had a [iron-board] house 
there. The [previous] house was requisitioned and demolished when the highway 
was being constructed. However, he still got a small piece of land there so he built 
a simple [iron-board] house.”  
Mr VT: “If you insist to talk about the property right, yes, it was a property without 
any legal certificate. However, it was made of just some thin iron boards. Why they 
did not demolish those cadres’ thousands of square meters of illegal buildings? 
They conducted [such a big action] just to demolish his iron-board house. That’s 
because Mr VG was protesting the unjust requisition programme. Well, their 
purpose was to punish him since he stuck his neck out!”  
Before long, hundreds of villagers rallied at the site, and protected the house 
against the developer party. At the beginning, the confrontation was without 
physical conflict, but rather a war of words, as elder leader Mr VF described:  
[Mr VCH, the head of the village committee] didn’t treat us ordinary villagers as 
citizens. You know what he said? ‘It was us [CPC] won the civil war with Kuo Min 
Tang’s eight million troops. You really think we will lose this battle with you, 
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merely two thousand villagers?’ He, a head of the village committee, he really said 
every single word of it [Mr VF said that angrily and slapped the table heavily]! He 
dared to treat ordinary villagers as enemy! 
After a while, one individual from the developer party stood out, taunted and 
provoked villagers, and then began punching villagers, as elder leader Mr VF 
described:  
He punched us, and then of course we fought back, right? Well, the camera, the 
journalist, whatever, let me tell you what they did. If I punched you with one hit, 
perhaps you would tolerate it. With one more hit, you would fight back, wouldn’t 
you? So, they didn’t film the moments when I punched you. Instead, they filmed 
moments when you punched me. Then [the fact] you were punched by them was 
reversed to that you punched them! … It was an entrapment! How could we 
ordinary villagers own a camera? They just stood there and filmed it… The fact 
was that police officers punched civilians, not the reverse… because we had ten 
injured villagers and the hospital had got the proof of it… Villagers were punched 
to bleed. 
When the crowds started fighting with each other, the situation became 
uncontrolled and chaotic. Some villagers ran away to ask for assistance, but they 
had no idea who should they contact and how. Eventually, these villagers went 
onto the nearby city highway, using their bodies to form a barrier to obstruct 
vehicles and cause a highway blockage. Villager Mr VS described the situation thus:  
They caused a traffic blockage, so that the municipality, the high authority would 
send people to handle it. Then we could tell them [about the fight] and then solve 
the demolition incident. That’s it. We ordinary people really could not think better 
ideas. We didn’t know which department of the municipality we were able to ask 
help for. So we could only take such simple and awkward approach… Yes, actually, 
we went too far that we might have violated law. It’s true. But, which department 
shall we contact, what’s the telephone number, we didn’t know, it’s impossible we 
were able to know it […]  
The traffic blockage was soon reported to the municipality. Some officers were 
sent out promptly to the site to investigate the situation. When they arrived, 
villagers told them about the events that had occurred. Officers then came to the 
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iron-board house, mediated with both parties to cease the conflict to reach 
reconciliation through negotiation. Then several elders negotiated with the 
developer party, and finally they reached an agreement. This was printed out on a 
paper, called a “reply letter” (the following Image 7.2 and Figure 7.1).  
 
Image 7. 2 The reply letter 
Source: Taken by the author 
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Figure 7. 1 Translation of the reply letter 
In the letter, the sentence in the last item that “but those whose actions truly broke 
the law are not included” was strongly disagreed with by elders, so it was deleted 
with a strikethrough. When the reconciliation was completed, the crowd was 
dismissed and the conflict was apparently over. The next day, the event was 
reported in a local newspaper, but the angle was in favour of the developer’s party, 
as elders Mr VS and Mr VF said:  
Mr VS: “The newspaper reported it. But what it said was so exaggerated. It only 
reported the negative side of what villagers had done. It was true that it was we 
villagers who caused the traffic blockage. But they didn’t mention what the 
developer had done at all. In the report, there was nothing about the developers 
punching us.”  
Mr VF: “The newspaper reported that we villagers harassed and sabotaged their 
mission […]”  
Reply Letter 
In respond to requests asked by some villager 
representatives in the conflict of demolishing Mr VG’s 
iron-board house (98 m2) in one meter the north of No. 
xxx VA Village on 22nd August 2009:  
1. The street office agrees to console villagers who are 
accidently injured in the issue.  
2. The compensation for the demolition of VG’s iron-
board house should be negotiated by the street 
office and Mr VG privately.  
3. Villagers mentioned that there were some people 
provoking and punching in the issue. The street 
office would investigate it thoroughly and reply 
villagers in a week.  
4. The legal liability of villagers who have had radical 
actions in the issue will not be pursued,(.) but those 
whose actions truly broke the law are not included.  
  The municipality officer                 2009-08-23  
                    Mr VCH             Seal of SO Street Office 
         The elder       Mr VG 
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The incident generated a huge influence that significantly affected the 
development of the programme. After that, although tensions were still extreme, 
both sides managed to show some restraint and caution to try to avoid further 
escalation. The situation was described by villager Mr VS:  
After that incident, they rarely came here or took any other (further) action. 
Otherwise, people would die (in any further conflict)! 
When the interactions between the sides were terminated and the progress was 
halted, this impasse lasted for a long time. Shops, kindergartens, street stalls and 
the night fair were resumed gradually. The rental business returned to its previous 
prosperity.  
However, after almost a year, when the incident seemed to have already passed 
and had been forgotten, several police officers visited the village to conduct an 
investigation into the incident. They summoned relevant villagers to write records. 
Elder Mr VF, as one of leaders, was found by policemen, describing:  
I was also summoned to the police station. I just wouldn’t cooperate with their 
interrogation. Ha-ha! I wasn’t afraid of it. I had got good and reasonable points. 
They just couldn’t do anything to me. 
As a result of the investigation, four villagers were accused, as the main offenders, 
of causing the highway blockage, and were taken into custody for three months as 
punishment. When they were released, elders suggested to them that they make an 
appeal to the court, since they had had an agreement with the government 
agencies that any legal liability would not be pursued. Nevertheless, the four 
rejected this, apparently afraid of potential revenge. They did nothing but tolerated 
the punishment silently, as described by mentioned by elder Mr VF:  
They [the four] just tolerated it. They didn’t dare to show their dissatisfaction 
[about the accusation and punishment]. We suggested them make an appeal in the 
court. But they said, ‘If we make appealing, could you promise my personal 
security in the future? If they sent thugs to chase and punch me, police officers 
won’t even help me!’ Well, the situation at that time was that, the policemen, thugs 
and the media were on the side of the developer party. 
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The custody of the four offenders shocked villagers. They felt angry, disappointed 
and betrayed that the promise in the agreement had been broken. Villager Mr VS 
reflected that:  
Anyway, they accused that villagers violated the law by blocking the highway… 
After that, nobody would pay attention to them. To put it simple, no matter what 
they said, nobody would believe it. To be honest, in the incident, the developer, and 
villagers, both took some radical actions. It’s true that we blocked the road, but it’s 
also true that they punched us firstly. [But] they lied to us, saying that they won’t 
pursue the legal liability in the future. Then after one year, they took the four 
[offenders] into custody. We’re so angry. Anyway, no matter what they said… 
nobody would believe it!  
The reconciliation agreement was actually in favour of the developer party. To 
some extent, the developer party appeared to have abused the resources of 
governmental forces, as policemen should not routinely participate in demolition 
issues. Although city management inspectors (if what villagers said was true) were 
in charge of such issues, they should wear uniforms and show their identity clearly. 
Villagers could have made the issue public or appealed against it in the courts to 
try to achieve justice. To some extent, the agreement alleviated the developer 
party’s legal liability and diminished villagers’ willingness and inclination to 
pursue the issue further. In relation to the road blockage, the developer party did 
not participate in it directly. Theoretically, the agreement upon the blockage 
should have been made between the offenders and the public (but, obviously, the 
public was an abstract concept), rather than with the developer. Villagers also 
complained that the municipality officer had also signed the agreement, so it 
would be valid and the four villagers should not suffer. However, the officer had no 
right to exempt their legal liability since the action of blocking roads violated 
criminal law. It is prescribed in Criminal Law of the PRC22:  
Where an assembled crowd disturbs order at stations…or other public places, or 
an assembled crowd blocks traffic or undermines traffic order or […] if the 
circumstances are serious, the ringleaders shall be sentenced to fixed-term 
                                                        
22 See the full text on the website of the Ministry of Public Security of the PRC on 
http://www.mps.gov.cn/n16/n1282/n3493/n3763/n493954/494322.html 
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imprisonment of not more than five years, criminal detention or public 
surveillance.  
(The Ministry of Public Security, 1997: Article 291) 
Therefore, no matter what the government representatives had promised, it was 
the procurator’s duty to charge them, by law, on behalf of the public.  
From the incident, it could be seen that villagers’ collective resistance had 
limitations. The elder leadership had not been capable of undertaking some 
preparations, for example, equipping themselves with cameras, recorders, or 
knowing how and who to ask for assistance in such an emergency.  
Generally speaking, the issue benefited villagers more than the developer, even 
though villagers’ strategy and actions were flawed in the process. Because of the 
incident, no further actions were taken and the programme was halted until the 
end of 2011, when the programme had a new manager, who brought a new 
strategy and a new compensation scheme, benefiting the majority of households. 
In contrast, the MC village, whose compensation standard used to be the goal and 
the motivation of VA villagers’ cooperation and collective resistance, was then 
demolished quickly and VA villagers enjoyed a comparatively much better scheme.  
7.3 Declining Cooperation and Collective Actions 
This section continues to explore the decline of cooperation after 2012. When 
collective resistance from the ordinary group resulted in the failure of the 
developer party’s practice of Strategy One, the programme was stalled. The 
appointment of Mr PM as the new programme manager with the practice of 
Strategy Two became a watershed. The new practice gained popularity as soon as 
it was initiated at 2012. The long lasting tension was gradually reduced and the 
cooperation within each group, once formed to pursue confrontation with the 
other group, also declined.   
7.3.1 Declining Cooperation within the Developer Party 
Many factors led to the decline of cooperation within the developer party. A 
contextual factor was that the state strictly forbade the security police force from 
being involved in land requisition programmes. An interior factor was that the new 
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programme manager adopted a new strategy of programme implementation. 
Under the new strategy, the developer deliberately kept a balance in his 
relationship with the village committee and the authority, neither being too close 
nor too far.  
Declining Cooperation with the VA Village Committee 
The new strategy treated every household equally. The developer reclaimed all 
extra benefits previously distributed to the privileged group, which included local 
cadres of the village committee. The purpose was to loosen the close ties between 
the developer and the village committee and to restore their images and 
reputations. Only when local cadres had no extra benefits in the programme would 
their stance appear to be more neutral and objective. Then villagers would respect 
their governance and consider their suggestions which were in favour of the 
developer. The new project manager Mr PM explained his idea in an interview: 
Mr PM: “VA Resident Committee [VARC] is a grass-root agency of the government. 
However, to some extent, the identity of VA Village Committee [VAVC] or so-called 
“VA Resident Committee” is ambiguous. Officially, it’s VARC, but in fact it’s more 
like a VAVC. So that it should represent the interest of villagers. If it stands in the 
side with the government, then it would have no authority among villagers. Its role 
is contradicted. Well, we hope that it represents villagers, so it has a good 
reputation among villagers. Then when villagers claim an unreasonable high offer, 
it could stand out and said, ‘Enough. The offer is nice.’ Then the villager will calm 
down. If villagers do not trust the committee, no matter what cadres say, it won’t 
help. The committee used to stand on the wrong side, with the developer, so its 
reputation was very low in the village. Since 2011, when I came, I kept telling their 
leaders about it. Gradually and slowly, they change it and now it’s better, but it 
doesn’t completely change yet.”  
Question: “What’s the difference between the two roles?”  
Mr PM:  “It depends whether the head of the committee is selfish or not. If he is 
selfish, he of course he will support the developer, and then he was able to get 
extra benefits when his houses are requisitioned.”  
Question: “But isn’t that the standard is the same for everyone?”  
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Mr PM: “[Yes,] but the committee would claim more benefits because they had 
done much work for us. Therefore, before I came and took the position, that’s what 
they did, giving cadres privileges, giving leaders more benefits, you know. Once 
they did it, no villagers would listen to them. [Villagers would think,] you said that 
for your own interests. So when I came, we used new standards. No matter how 
many extra benefits you’ve got for whatever reason, we will claim it back based on 
the new standards… This action makes cadres speechless, and villagers cheerful. 
Then we win reputations and villagers’ trust, which will facilitate the programme.”  
Under Mr PM’s efforts, the relationship between the developer and the village 
committee cooled. Accordingly, their cooperation declined. The committee would 
still authorise and justify the developer’s requisition of collective properties, since 
it was a political task assigned by the local authority, however the committee no 
longer participated in collective actions conducted by the developer, if any, or used 
coercion or threats to force the ordinary group to obey.  
Declining Cooperation with the Authority 
Many factors revised the once closed relationship between the developer and the 
authority. First, the new scheme caused trouble to the authority. Households from 
other programmes, which were delivered through the government - led paradigm, 
requested a higher compensation standard, as applied in the VA Scheme. This 
imposed a further burden on governmental finances and irritated officials and 
other developers. The new programme manager Mr PM expressed the dilemma in 
an interview:  
Since we follow the market principles to conduct the programme, which allows 
our enterprise to compromise with villagers on the profits and interests. However, 
now most of requisition programmes in the District are government - led. The 
government won’t make compromise on it. Once the standard increases, the 
governmental financial expenditure would be huge. So they claimed that we 
should take the responsibility for establishing an extraordinary high standard. We 
became their attack target. In the last year (2012), initially the government 
supported [our scheme], but later they did not, and they demanded us to promptly 
terminate some rewards for villagers, like the purchase of extra resettling flats 
and the favoured price. Once we did it, the programme would die […] 
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The pressure from the government eventually forced Mr PM to slightly improve 
the favoured price of resettlement flats, from around 5,000 Yuan to around 6,000 
Yuan. He also abolished the qualification to compensation for babies and children 
whose birth violated the one-child policy. The adjustments displeased many 
villagers. They soon made a petition to the developer by submitting a joint-
signature letter asking to restore the original scheme. Finally, the programme 
practiced a covert rule that, if households delivered their properties for demolition 
right after signing the contracts, they could still enjoy the terms of the original 
scheme.  
Second, a policy was published in early 2011 by the state to forbid the security 
force’s intervention and participation in property requisition23. The policy was 
strongly implemented in the city. It was reflected by elders, Mr VN and Mr VL:  
Mr VN: “It was like in the 2010 or later [that the security force stopped the 
participation in the programme].” 
Mr VL: “Since the central authority issued a policy, our lives have been easier. 
Otherwise, they used coercion to demolish houses, posted notices commanding 
tenants to move out in a week. It used to be like that, but now they don’t do it 
anymore.” 
Mr VN: “Now it’s relatively more civilized. We can accept it.” 
Therefore, even before Mr PM’s arrival, the developer stopped the use of the 
security forces in the programme. When Strategy Two was initiated, the 
programme abolished the use of coercion and violence. The developer then 
stopped sending other kinds of administrative enforcements to the village.  
Being Closer with the Ordinary Group 
In the second stage of the programme, the developer tried to restore its 
relationship with the ordinary group. Many actions were taken. An important one 
was the first point of Strategy Two, as discussed in Section 5.3.5. The 
implementation was more fair and transparent, every household was treated 
                                                        
23 See http://www.mps.gov.cn/n16/n1953586/n1955790/2951089.html (Comments about the Work of 
Building a Fine Party Culture, Keeping its Organizations Clean and Anti-corruption in the year of 2011 published 
by Ministry of Public Security) (2011年公安机关党风廉政建设和反腐败工作意见) 
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equally and coercion and violence were no longer used. Villagers were able to 
decide whether or not to take the requisition deal as they wished. In addition, the 
ordinary group were more involved in the decision-making processes through the 
participation of villager representatives.  
In the policy-making process, a series of sessions were held in VA Headquarters to 
formulate details of the VA Scheme. Different groups of stakeholders were invited, 
including actors who held positions in the headquarters, as well as those who did 
not, such as cadres from the village committee, household team leaders, and 
especially villager representatives. Therefore, the attendance of villager 
representatives was supposed to represent the majority of villagers and their 
voices. It could be seen as a sign that the developer respected and valued the 
ordinary group’s participation and opinions, and tried to include them in the 
decision-making process. Company representative Mr CRD described how:  
Usually, [ordinary] villagers were not invited, because you can’t invite every single 
villager. However, they have representatives and usually representatives will 
deliver villagers’ opinions to us in the policy-making sessions, such as, what 
villagers want. For example, in the scheme, Item 6 that ‘give a household reward 
for ground floor [area the house occupied] at the price of 1,300 Yuan/m2’ was 
proposed and made by representatives based on villagers’ will… these 
representatives were elected meant that they had some capacities and connections 
to others. And, they would really consider [the scheme] on behalf of ordinary 
villagers, because they would be facing the same situation as others in practice. 
What they want is also what others want. 
In contrast, villagers claimed that this process was a mere formality for two main 
reasons. First, although the representatives were elected by ordinary households, 
their representativeness was doubted. The election took place before the launch of 
the programme. After it, elections were cancelled. In the programme, it was 
reported that the representatives continued to enjoy many ‘treats’ from the 
developer. Thus it appeared that they developed a closer relation with the 
developer than with their electors. Villagers claimed that they had not been 
consulted and their voices had not been delivered to decision-makers. Second, the 
representatives’ contribution was considered to be limited. Although 
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representatives’ interest was bundled up with the majority in terms of the 
property requisition, representatives could not fight for the mutual interest 
without restraints, since these representatives were not empowered to have an 
equal position with the developer in policy-making. The power was still 
centralised and situated firmly in the hands of the developer. The result was that 
representatives contributed only Item 6. Elders Mr VF, Mr VT and Mr VS criticised 
this, saying:  
Mr VF: “The developer sent the so-called ‘villager representatives’ to Hong Kong, to 
Thailand, to Yunnan to have a vacation, and paid for their expenses, according to 
the positions they hold, how important they were. Anyway, I mean, the developer 
paid to make these people become their lackeys…It’s true that these villager 
representatives were elected by villagers, but it’s also true that what they did were 
without villagers’ consent…they were elected before the programme was initiated.” 
Mr VT: “No. This is the first time I heard about it, that villager representatives 
were invited (to the decision-making).” 
Mr VS: “This is absolute not true. It’s made up. It couldn’t be true.” 
 However, contrary to what the villagers believed, it seemed that villager 
representatives did make a contribution, as much as was possible, to the ordinary 
group interests. The proposal and adoption of Item 6 was meaningful, not just a 
token. In the programme, the requisition of rural land was initiated when the 
requisition of all properties was complete. Since the land is collectively-owned, in 
practice, only the village committee and the developer were involved in the 
negotiation of land requisition. The fund then goes to the village’s collective 
finances, rather than individual households. Thus, villager representatives 
complained that they could not enjoy the fund directly but that they deserved it. As 
a result, Item 6 was innovated and adopted by the VA Scheme. According to Item 6, 
the ground floor of the house (the land area the house occupied) could be 
compensated for 1,300 Yuan/m2, and all of it belonged to individual households. It 
was desirable, compared to the one-off price for rural land prescribed by the 
government policies in Xiamen, which was 137,000 Yuan/mu (equivalent to 205.5 
Yuan/m2). Since most households in VA Village had more or less 100 m2 of ground 
floor in their houses, the benefit provided by Item 6 was around 130,000 Yuan, a 
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considerable amount. For the developer, item 6 was another financial burden. 
Nevertheless, the developer adopted it perhaps because the symbolic value in 
adopting it outweighed the financial costs. It fostered the establishment of a more 
democratic image for the policy-making process. 
The programme’s institutional system and power distribution meant that 
participants, especially villager representatives, were not equally empowered in 
the decision-making process, and therefore could not achieve much. The most 
rational action for villager representatives was to maximise villagers’ interests 
while complying with the rules, rather than to propose an unrealistic requirement 
as the majority of villagers expected. As previously mentioned, the maximum 
investment the developer could offer was 55% of the land lease fee. Any proposal 
beyond this principle would not be adopted by the developer. Item 6 provided a 
balance to this issue. On one hand it benefited the majority by rewarding them 
with a considerable amount of extra compensation; on the other hand, the 
developer could not possibly offer more than that since the developer had already 
anticipated a loss in the programme. From this aspect, villager representatives’ 
participation was positive and meaningful, and the adoption was a sign of the 
developer’s goodwill to the ordinary group. In such a context, the developer had no 
intention of provoking further conflicts with villagers. 
7.3.2 Declining Collective Resistance within the Ordinary Group 
Two main developments led to the decline of cooperative resistance and the 
increase of acceptance for signing contracts. The first one was the release of the 
result of the second lawsuit and the second was the launch of the new programme 
compensation scheme. As a result of these developments, an increasing number of 
households cooperated with the developer and abandoned the motivation for 
resistance. An indication of this phenomenon was that the developer eventually 
successfully demolished the elder centre, without any effective resistance.  
Increasing Acceptance of Requisition 
The result of the lawsuit by the intermediate court was released on 17 October 
2010. It officially terminated villagers’ long-term lawsuit with the government. It 
also devastated their morale and motivation for further cooperation. Its influence 
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and meaning should not be overlooked. Company representative Mr CRD 
commented it that:  
Before it (the release of the result), if someone wanted to sign the contract, for 
example, some villagers didn’t like living in the village and preferred to moving to 
a better community, and the contract was signed, he would be blamed by many 
other villagers, saying, “is your family in debts? Or why would you sign the 
contract so eagerly? What the hell have you done?” Because of this issue, villagers 
became more democratic, which meant, if you wanted to sign it, it was your own 
business. 
Previously, villagers had been highly confident about the chance of winning the 
lawsuit, as they believed that their lawyers’ statement in trial was too excellent to 
fail. Even by 2013, many villagers still could not understand why they had 
eventually lost the case. The lawsuit had given them hope and the prospect that 
sooner or later the developer would abolish the programme and leave the village, 
as long as the result was released. The collective belief generated a bond that 
fostered villagers’ cooperation. The failure of the lawsuit removed villagers’ last 
chance to challenge the programme, so they turned towards accepting the facts 
more passively. As a result, individual households could then sign contracts more 
easily, free from the worry of being condemned and judged by others.  
The second issue was the significant improvement of the compensation standard 
in the VA Scheme launched in 2012. To some extent, the new standard was a 
reward for villagers’ long-term collective resistance. The improvement was so 
extraordinary that many households dramatically turned their hostility into 
eagerness and signed contracts, even including some individuals who used to 
protest against the developer vehemently. This was reflected upon by company 
representative Mr CRD: 
Nearly all of these people [the 75 villagers who were recognised as plaintiffs in the 
appendix of the application for reconsideration] had already signed the contracts. 
Some even became our promoters voluntarily… These people were eager to sue us 
but they were also eager to sign it. Some of them were included in these who 
signed the first 20 contracts [for the new scheme].  
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These people used to be recognised as the backbone of the collective resistance. 
However, they reversed their attitude and advocated the new scheme, even 
promoting it to the rest of the villagers, which illustrated its popularity.  As a result, 
the previous ordinary group became divided into two groups, one who advocated 
the requisition versus the others who still protested against it Villagers who 
remained in the latter group found it increasingly difficult to sustain an effective 
campaign of resistance.  
Another issue generated from the increasing acceptance of contracts was the 
deterioration of the local environment and public security. When a household 
signed contracts and moved out of the village, the house would be delivered to the 
developer. To prevent the household or others moving back and occupying the 
house, the developer would demolish the house. However, the house would not be 
knocked down completely. Experience from other programmes indicated that, if 
the whole house was demolished completely into ash, the measurement of the 
house size had the risk of being manipulated or fabricated to an exaggerated size 
to secure extra compensation benefits. As a result, the frame of the house was 
retained as evidence in order to double check its size at the end of the programme.  
In this programme, a house was usually demolished as in the following image (7.3):  
 
Image 7. 3 Demolished houses at May 2013 
Source: Taken by the author 
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The deterioration of the environment brought many hazards.  As usual, some 
residents would dispose of daily garbage in the ruins. It is a situation that was not 
managed. The accumulating solid waste resulted in potential health hazards, e.g. 
air population, pests and diseases. As a result, some households, who could not 
tolerate these changes, soon compromised and accepted the requisition, as villager 
Mr VD said:  
[The developer] messes up the environment… Households who live nearby then 
suffer. Soon there’re more and more mice, flies and mosquitos. Some villagers then 
compromise and think, well, so be it and just take my house as you wish… Some 
demolished houses have safety hazard when it rains… Once it rains and typhoon 
comes, it’s even hazardous for pedestrians.  
The deterioration of public security even endangered personal safety. When many 
houses were demolished, the population of residents decreased, resulting in some 
areas in the village becoming scarcely populated. It was believed at that point that 
thieves, robbers and even murderers then came to the village, hid in the ruins and 
committing crimes occasionally. This was described by tenants Mr TH and Mrs TW 
who had lived in the village for nearly ten years:  
Mrs TW: “Before the demolition and relocation, VA Village was peaceful, without 
thieves. Then the demolition of houses began, and everywhere was in ruins. Then 
murders happened here, fights happened there, and especially there were a lot of 
thieves… Thieves are so savage that, last year, they even visited [our neighbour’s] 
home and stole things like fridge and wash machine […]”  
Mrs TW: “[Thieves] even robbed my mum’s [earrings]…Like this kind of house (she 
points to a semi-demolished house nearby), my mum went pass by a house like it, 
and [the thief] pulled and grabbed her earrings from behind. It’s five o’clock when 
it’s not dark yet! Three [robberies] took place in that place!” 
Mr TH: “The place is over there, closed to the village’s old primary school.” 
Mrs TW: “We’re very scared when go pass that place.” 
When more households compromised to the requisition, the environment 
deteriorated further and increased the acceptance of contracts. Eventually, only 
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people who valued the properties and community more than the compensation 
offered and the suffering of living in the dilapidated environment would stay.  
Compromising on the Demolition of the Elder Centre 
The elder centre had already been requisitioned and was supposed to be 
demolished in 2008. Villagers’ previous collective resistance had prevented this 
and the Vice Head from the district government promised that it would be kept as 
one of the last buildings to be demolished. In early 2013, it was announced again 
that the elder centre was to be demolished. Although there were still some 
villagers who disagreed with this, no collective actions were organised, except 
some individual efforts. For example, some elder leaders found it impossible to 
form another collective resistance, and turned to me to look for help during an 
interview on 23rd January 2013. An example is illustrated by the interview with 
villager Mr VZ:  
The elder centre is a collective property purchased by our collective fund, but now, 
some rich and powerful developers from CB Company attempt to expel out, by 
giving us some money. We didn’t know it, until they [suddenly] asked us to 
evacuate the elder centre because they were going to demolish it on 28th this 
month (February 2013)… Only a couple of days left now. There are still many kids 
studying in the kindergarten. What shall we do then? Well, since you are here 
today, we want to ask, if it’s possible that you write something for us to report to 
the municipality that, from the elder to the young of our society, elders is one of 
the main groups that we should take care of, right? The demolition of the entire 
village hasn’t been accomplished yet, and somehow they want to demolish the 
elder centre. This is a problem. So is it possible that we tell you it, and you report it 
to the municipality? 
Restricted by research ethics codes, I could not accept their request. There were 
still a group of villagers who disagreed with the demolition and tried to do 
something to stop it. However, they could not find an effective way to do so. In the 
previous demolition attempt, they had managed to organize a collective resistance 
as soon as the developer group had appeared suddenly. In contrast, this time, they 
were informed about the demolition at least one week in advance. It was plenty of 
time for preparation of any resistance action. However, they had few effective 
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actions to take, including asking assistance from me to help them report it to the 
municipality. Nevertheless, they knew that even if I did what they wished, the 
chance of success would be very limited anyway, since they believed that the 
municipality sided with the developer.  
On 25 February, tenants were informed that they must leave the elder centre’s 
rental buildings within three days. By 28 February, most tenants had evacuated. 
On 4 March, the electricity and water supply to the elder centre was completely cut 
off. Meanwhile, valuable facilities e.g. air-conditioners and furniture were 
gradually transferred away. On 8 March, the two rental buildings were demolished. 
On 13 March, the kindergarten was demolished. On 23 March, the rest of the elder 
centre was demolished.  
Two factors contributed to the successful demolition. First, by March 2013, almost 
half of the village had been demolished and was in ruins. Both the physical and 
social environment of the village was deteriorating to a dilapidated situation, as 
discussed previously. Many households had abandoned the community, and the 
population kept decreasing. The remaining villagers were aware of the trend. They 
did not have enough support and did not have the same motivation for resistance 
as before. Second, the price offered was more reasonable. According to the new 
scheme, the elder centre was purchased in the price of 1,300 Yuan/m2. The 
estimated area was 2,000 to 3,000 m2, so the lump-sum cash payment was 
2,600,000 Yuan to 3,900,000 Yuan. It was reasonable, given the inferior condition 
of the buildings. “We’ve negotiated the compensation with different groups of 
villagers many times, and they were all satisfied with it,” is a quote from a 
company representative Mr CRD. No protests took place during the demolition 
process, although there were still some important details unknown to the public, 
e.g. whether the fund would be used for the property owners – households in VA 
Village exclusively or not, and what was the planning of the new elder centre.  
7.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored how forms of cooperation formed and then declined 
between the developer party and the ordinary group. In the practice of Strategy 
One, the developer party conducted some aggressive demolition actions by 
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coercion, aiming to facilitate the process of the programme in a command-and-
control way. However, such actions provoked villagers who then undertook forms 
of collective resistance and effectively foiled the developer’s attempts. In late 2011, 
the developer replaced Strategy One with Strategy Two, generated by the new 
programme manager Mr PM. The new strategy gained popularity and the 
programme enjoyed significant progress. As a result, the collective actions 
declined. The following chapter is the conclusion of the thesis, in which the 
findings of empirical chapters will be examined by the framework of Social Capital 
Theory.  
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Chapter Eight - Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes the thesis. Section 8.2 provides a summary of empirical 
findings by answering the research questions raised in Chapter One. Section 8.3 
continues to reflect on the findings, from the aspect of theory, methodology, policy 
and implementation. Finally, Section 8.4 briefly discusses the future research 
agenda.  
8.2 Key Empirical Findings 
The research aimed to investigate the role and interactions of policies and 
stakeholders in the redevelopment of urban villages. The literature, the field 
research in the case of VA Village and the qualitative analysis of the data have 
produced outcomes to achieve this aim. In this section, the key empirical findings 
of the study will be presented within the framework of questions raised at the very 
beginning of the thesis.  
a) What is the contemporary situation of the development of urban villages, in 
terms of the requisition and demolition process of rural properties? How are 
policies made? What are the aim, rationale, and the practice of policies and results 
of them?  
b) Why is public participation included or excluded in policies and decision-
making process, and how is it manifested (or not) either in formal or informal 
ways?  
The answers to these questions were generated through the Literature Review 
(Chapter Two) and the research fieldwork and analysis presented in Empirical 
Chapters Five, Six and Seven. The key issue surrounding policies regarding the 
requisition and demolition of rural properties was the programme mechanisms 
and compensation standards. The institutional design for the policy-making 
process was characterised as a top-down approach. First, general policies at the 
national level were formulated. They established the framework and principles. 
Then, based on these upper-level policies, the lower-level authorities made 
increasingly specific policies by filling in the framework with contextual details at 
the locality. Subsequently, policies at the district level were very specific with 
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practicable details. They were also one-size-fits-all, which meant that all 
programmes conducted within the same district area were mandatorily required 
to follow the same set of policies.  
The aim of these policies was to ensure the state’s control over, and benefit from, 
rural property redevelopment. The design of dual land ownership system granted 
local governments the legal status as the exclusive entity to conduct the property 
requisition. The principle of compensating property possessors at the standard of 
properties’ original usage, value of annual outputs and costs of constructions, 
instead of the potential market value, ensured that the budgets of programmes 
were within the affordability of public finance. In addition, the state and local 
governments were able to enjoy a huge proportion of the property appreciation 
value from the redevelopment.  
In contemporary practice, three basic paradigms of implementation were 
identified. The first one was the state-led paradigm. In such programmes, the local 
government covers the pre-investment from the public finance, and plays a 
dominant role in implementation, either by its direct engagement or by 
establishing state-owned enterprises specifically to manage programmes. The 
second one was the developer-led paradigm. The local government usually cannot 
afford the huge investment. It then forms a partnership with an independent 
developer, and grants them the power to manage the programme, the duty to pay 
all costs, the right to recoup these costs at the end and to share a certain amount of 
profits. The nature of these previous two paradigms was a conventional top-down 
approach. The third one is a new mode, known as the villager-led paradigm. It is a 
bottom-up approach within a neoliberal ideology. It is rarely seen and only exists 
in Guangdong Province, because so far only Guangdong Province has been granted 
the experimental policy status by the state to explore the new approach. In such a 
paradigm, the aforementioned policy system is inapplicable. Powers are 
decentralised to indigenous villagers. As property owners, they are authorized to 
be the main decision makers, while the government retains a minimum 
involvement both in programme management and interest and profit distribution.  
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Evidence from the literature review and empirical data from the field research 
show that, in the contemporary situation, the practice of the former two paradigms 
have encountered many resistances from property owners and have caused many 
conflicts (e.g. Li and Li, 2011). The central issue is that the government and the 
developer compete with the interests of villagers, which makes the latter group 
unwilling to cooperate with the implementation (Zhou, 2014). As to the third 
paradigm, the empirical experience is limited. Only a few programmes in 
Guangdong have practiced it, e.g. the cases of Liede Village in Guangzhou (Li et al, 
2014a; Zhou, 2014), Xiasha Village in Shenzhen (Chung, 2009). Nevertheless, both 
theoretical analysis (Lin and De Meulder, 2012) and empirical evidence show that 
it is a sustainable and promising approach. Despite its success, the paradigm is not 
widely replicated to other programmes by the government since it reduces the 
fiscal income (Ding, 2007).  
In the previous two paradigms, public participation via formal mechanisms of 
decision-making is usually excluded. Examined from the institutional design, it is 
noted that once the national policies have established the basic framework, it is 
both impossible for the subsequent local decision makers to change the 
subsequent policies fundamentally and unnecessary to include localised public 
participation within the process to benefit from stakeholders’ local knowledge. In 
practice, indigenous villagers tend to participate in decision-making by exerting 
their influences towards decision makers through mechanisms beyond the 
processes within the redevelopment programme itself. For example, in the case of 
VA Village, villagers wrote petition letters, made appeals to upper-level authorities 
and hired lawyers to sue the government, for the primary purpose of increasing 
the scheme’s compensation standards to their expected levels. These interventions 
did not make a significant difference. Subsequently, and as a result of the failure of 
the above actions, villagers, conducted collective forms of resistance to confront 
the developer’s aggressive demolition actions, and finally to force the developer to 
increase the compensation standard. In another case, a community in Drum Tower 
Muslim District in Xi’an (Zhai and Ng, 2013), residents formed a strong 
cooperation for resistance, which then forced the government to have a 
negotiation and eventually to abolish the regeneration programme. Although it is a 
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regeneration programme of an old town community, not an urban village, and the 
claim was to terminate the programme instead of to improve the compensation 
standard, to some extent it triangulates the idea that public participation through 
informal ways could affect an administrative decision. For the third paradigm, it 
could be seen as an approach with the maximum engagement of public 
participation in a formal way. The government plays the supportive role only, as 
‘babysitter’, to facilitate the process and supervise the planning of the 
redevelopment. The public is authorized to take charge of all the other decision-
making. Although the meaning of ‘public’ here only includes property owners - 
indigenous villagers, and excludes others, e.g. the tenants, nearby urban residents 
and voluntary specialists with expertise or NGOs, the success generated by this 
paradigm suggests the importance of public participation.  
c) How do different groups of stakeholders interpret the policies? What are their 
interests? How does the developer employ strategies, if any, in dealing with the 
policies?  
Stakeholders have different interpretations of policies based on the stances they 
take. The authority and the developer tend to perceive the compensation standard 
formulated by policies as reasonable. The view is more from the institutional 
aspect and properties’ de facto usage and value. Most properties in urban villages 
are illegal constructions with substandard conditions. With the lack of title deeds, 
the properties suffer from a risk of being demolished by administrative 
enforcement. The rural land is forbidden for commercial development and 
therefore has little de facto value. In comparison, the compensation offered by 
policies seems to be equivalent to the value of the property. On the other hand, 
indigenous villagers prefer to interpret it from a market aspect. Since urban 
villages usually have a good location, near prosperous urban built-up areas, and 
the redevelopment of the rural land is usually associated with commercial projects, 
villagers believe that their properties have a promising potential value and 
therefore deserve a high compensation. The analysis via a simplified calculation 
illustrates that the gap between the two versions of compensation is extremely 
large. Competing the revenue from the land development becomes the nature of 
the stakeholders’ conflict. All want to maximize their interest in the programme.  
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In the case of VA Village, the developer did not strictly stick to policies. Their own 
ideas of managing the programme were reflected in two strategies they made. 
Strategy One was deployed in the first stage of the programme (2008-2011). 
Households in VA Village were differentiated into the privileged group and the 
ordinary group. Strategy One aimed to favour the privileged group and gain their 
support, and then combine their power with other available forces to facilitate the 
process. The compensation level was claimed to be the exact standard prescribed 
by the policies, and to be the same for all households, but in practice “extra 
benefits” were secretly distributed to the privileged group in order to gain their 
support to facilitate the process. As a result, major decisions about the collective 
properties were made without the consent of the majority of villagers. Forced 
demolitions towards rural properties were conducted by the collaboration of the 
developer, village cadres and administrative forces. Strategy Two had been 
adopted since 2012 to replace the previous one. The idea of the new strategy was 
characterised by two key aims, (1) to manage the programme in a transparent, fair 
and equal way, avoiding the use of violence and threats, and (2) to break the price 
ceilings imposed by the policies and return all the profits that the developer was 
able to gain from the 55% of land lease fee to affected households via 
compensation. The function of the new strategy faced many challenges, both from 
the authority and other programmes, and many actions were taken to assure its 
implementation. Generally, Strategy Two gained popularity among the villagers 
and enabled progress to be made within the programme.  
d) How are decisions made within different groups of stakeholders? What and how 
actions are taken by them to interact with others? How do participants take 
advantage of their power and resources to achieve their goals? How do all of these 
affect the policy-making process and shape the development of the programme?  
There is a lack of empirical data to reveal the government’s and the village 
committee’s decision-making process. The study only examined the process within 
the developer and the ordinary group of villagers. For the developer, their 
decision-making could be illustrated in the drafting of the two strategies. The 
analysis found that both the wider context (experience of other programmes) and 
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the specific context (the situation of VA Village) played an important role for their 
decision-making, which could be characterised as “replication and revision”.  
In making Strategy One, since the developer had no experience in the field of rural 
property requisition, they paid much attention to experiences from other 
programmes. The nearby successful programme in Lingxia Village became an 
important point of reference. The Lingxia Scheme strictly followed the 
government’s policies, which inspired the developer to believe that the scheme 
and policies were feasible. As a result, the Lingxia Scheme was replicated in VA 
Village. Perceived from the context of VA Village, the developer judged that the 
local government and the village committee were powerful, while ordinary 
villagers were vulnerable and marginalised. To facilitate the process, the developer 
made the decision to take advantage of the former two groups’ resources. At that 
time, forced requisition and demolition were still frequently practiced. Then the 
developer added the idea of distributing extra benefits to the privileged group to 
gain their support. The drafting of Strategy Two was led by Mr PM, the new 
programme manager, and it also followed “replication and revision”, but attached 
more importance to the specific context of VA Village. Mr PM paid much attention 
to Linbian Village, a nearby urban village that undertook another redevelopment 
programme, and the process there was perceived to be operating effectively. The 
basic framework was replicated from the Linbian Scheme. The programme 
manager realised that VA Village had a better location and more prosperous rental 
business than Linbian Village. He also noticed that using violence and threats did 
not suit the context of VA Village. With his revisions and further amendments by 
from fellow colleagues, Strategy Two was developed and implemented.  
The decision-making of the ordinary group of villagers was different. Elder men 
from households consisted of the majority of decision-makers. A lot of them 
suffered from the lack of basic education, and their decision-making relied 
significantly on personal social experience, information and knowledge shared 
from social networks and direct help from close friends, relatives or neighbours. 
Empirical evidence shows that there were three values they held affecting their 
decision-making – concerning permanent property use right, preferring 
sustainable revenue from rental houses rather than lump-sum compensations, and 
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emotional attachments to the village. Furthermore, many problematic 
interpretations were generated and influenced their decision-making. For example, 
their hostile attitude towards the programme was enhanced due to the 
misunderstanding of an earthquake donation event. They claimed what could be 
argued to be an unreasonable compensation level based on false knowledge. As a 
result, villagers still distrusted the developer and remained estranged.  
Many actions were taken during the redevelopment programme. In the first stage, 
the developer formed a close collaboration with the local government and the 
village committee to conduct joint actions, e.g. the frequent administrative 
inspections to VA Village to depress villagers’ rental business, and forced 
demolitions of some properties to intimidate villagers. The ordinary group of 
villagers also cooperated with each other and conducted many collective actions. 
They appealed to upper-level authorities, hired lawyers from Beijing to sue the 
municipality, and undertook collective forms of resistance to counteract the forced 
demolitions. In the second stage, all the existing forms of cooperation with each 
stakeholder group declined. The new scheme gained popularity and reduced the 
tension between actors. Actions within the ordinary group become more 
individual rather than collective. Previously, individuals’ actions were restrained 
by collective norms for the group’s mutual goal, e.g. any households taking the 
purchased contract with the developer would be condemned as traitors. Now such 
norms disappeared and villagers were able to act more freely. Some households 
chose to accept contracts while the others remained as resisters, but took no 
further actions. For the developer, they also stopped conducting aggressive actions. 
Furthermore, more efforts were spent to repair their relationship with villagers, 
enacted by the extraordinary offers of the new scheme.  
To achieve their goals, both groups made the best use of their relative power and 
resources. The developer came from a giant state-controlled corporation. This 
background gave them strong financial support and rich linking social capital. In 
the first stage, the developer took advantage of these resources by involving 
governmental forces to press villagers to take contracts. It was also claimed that 
the developer gave extra benefits to privileged households to gain their support for 
the programme implementation. In the second stage, the strong financial power 
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enabled the developer to adopt the extraordinary scheme by reducing their own 
profits and even suffering from a loss in the programme. Furthermore, the special 
background empowered the developer to counteract the local government’s 
opposition towards the scheme. Since both of them cannot play a dominant role in 
the power relationship, the developer managed to find a balanced point on which a 
consensus could be reached. For the ordinary group of villagers, they were a 
marginalized community, but with rich bonding social capital. This resource 
allowed them to share information and mutual help via social networks. In 
addition, it facilitated the group’s cooperation to conduct a series of collective 
actions to defend their mutual interest in the first stage of the programme, which 
then forced the developer to offer a much better scheme. To some extent, the 
ordinary group gained a success from the investment.  
e) Why do tensions and conflicts exist or not exist among different groups of 
stakeholders? How are these conflicts and tensions generated in the process?  
The empirical chapters of the thesis reveal how the whole programme was 
characterised by tensions. At the beginning, the tension was generated by 
stakeholders’ different interpretations of the scheme. Viewed from the developer’s 
stance, the scheme was made based on the guidance of policies from the 
government and it had legal grounds, legitimacy and authority. In contrast, 
villagers tended to compare it with the scheme from another programme in the 
nearby district. Their opinions could not be expressed through any formal ways, so 
that the aforementioned actions were taken to make their voice heard. When 
villagers realised that they were not able to make much difference, the tension was 
created. Meanwhile, despite the resistance, the developer insisted on 
implementing the scheme by force, with the assistance of the local government and 
the village committee. In addition, the scheme was neither equal nor transparent 
as the privileged households were able to receive extra benefits secretly. All these 
enhanced the existing tensions, which reached a new climax when the two fierce 
confrontations relating to demolitions of properties took place. These tensions 
significantly influenced the development of the programme. Since both groups did 
not intend to escalate the tension to avoid any further conflicts, no actions were 
taken for a long time. In the second stage of the programme, the new strategy and 
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the more attractive revised compensation scheme changed the pattern of tensions. 
Between the developer and the ordinary group, the tension and conflict were 
reduced to a relatively low level. The widespread prejudice and misinterpretation 
of information seemed to account for the tension and conflict. Between the 
developer and the local government, a new tension was generated since the new 
scheme impaired the latter’s interests. These tensions put the programme in a 
complicated situation.  
8.3 Social Capital in the Programme 
This section applies the framework of social capital theory, specifically the eight 
domains developed by Forrest and Kearns (2001: 2140), to theorise the empirical 
findings. The first part focuses on the elements of social capital within 
stakeholders’ groups. Then the second part examines social capital in the collective 
actions.  
8.3.1 Social Capital in Stakeholders 
In the following section the theoretical framework of eight domains of social 
capital theory is applied to conceptualise the empirical findings regarding 
stakeholders’ groups, e.g. their social networks, norms, mutual help, trust.  
Empowerment 
The elections and the role of VA Village Committee proved that the ordinary group 
did not have empowerment in village governance. Officially, villagers were 
empowered by the national law not only to elect the autonomous leadership but 
also to vote to make key decisions that affected the majority’s interests, especially 
when the decisions involved the disposition of collective assets. However, the law 
had not been practised properly at grass-roots level. The local government, who 
proved to be more authoritarian than the national law at its locality, tended to 
manipulate the election process to facilitate its administration in the village. This 
phenomenon is reflected in many academic works. It is summarised that:  
One way that the central government has tried to rein in arbitrary and self-serving 
grass-roots leaders has been by rolling out an ambitious program of village 
elections. […] But opposition to free and fair elections has, at times, been fierce. 
Many midlevel leaders argue that empowering villagers in any way will jeopardize 
public order and make it more difficult for cadres to complete the many tasks (e.g. 
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birth control, revenue collection, land allocation, grain procurement) they are 
assigned. Some of these officials have acted on their misgivings by blocking or 
rigging elections, either openly or through subterfuge. Among other tactics, 
opponents of village self-governance have refused to convene elections, 
monopolised nominations, help snap elections, required that Party members vote 
for favoured candidates, banned unapproved candidates from making campaign 
speeches, insisted that voting be conducted by a show of hands, annulled results 
when the “wrong” candidates won, forced elected committee members from office, 
and rejected villagers’ demands for recalls. 
(O’Brien and Li, 2006: 54-55) 
In the programme, elections were either cancelled or organised in such a way as to 
ensure that the village committee in power was in favour of the developer party. 
This was likely to be a tactic of the government designed to facilitate the 
requisition issues. Thus, the only formal route for the ordinary group of villagers to 
exert influence on the decision-making process that affected them was, in effect, 
blocked. Although many elders from the ordinary group were aware that the 
practice of elections was illegitimate, it did not alter the effectiveness of the village 
committee. Even during the fierce confrontation, when villagers took a series of 
collective actions to challenge the developer and the local government, they did 
not intend to shift their tactical focus to the village committee, e.g. illegalise the 
committee’s cooperation with the developer by doubting the cadres’ legitimacy. 
Empirical evidence revealed that the effectiveness of the committee was highly 
recognised by villagers. The empowerment was derived from villagers’ perception 
that any challenge emerging from their suspicion of the cadres would not only end 
up in vain but also bring potential serious reprisals in revenge. As a result, the 
developer and the village committee dominated the process while the majority of 
villagers were marginalised from it.  
Participation 
The ordinary group had a very high level of participation in community activities. 
The phenomenon was fostered by some features of the community. The first one 
was the availability of spare time. A large proportion of indigenous villagers were 
elder empty-nesters. They were limited by their age and their education level and 
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also by their skills in finding livelihoods other than those in agricultural activities. 
At the same time, the booming rental business compensated for these limitations, 
enabling them to gain considerable incomes. . Thus, they were freed from 
labouring and enjoyed plenty of spare time. The second feature was the well-
connected social networks. The village was characterised as a kinship-based rural 
enclave within the city. Indigenous villagers from the ordinary group were a 
marginalised, closed and stable group. Households were interlinked based on the 
kinship, the mutual culture, geographical relationship etc. Their social networks 
were inward-looking, exclusive and tended to be self-reinforced. Although a large 
number of tenants resided in the village, villagers had very limited interactions 
with tenants. The third feature was the availability of social occasions. Four 
ancient temples existed in the village. Abundant recreational places were available, 
e.g. elder activity centres, outdoor drama stages, teahouses and board rooms. 
Street corners were an ideal location for cursory social activities as well. Since the 
streets and lanes were pedestrian friendly and elders mainly commuted on foot, 
they were able to have an interaction conveniently on the street when they met. As 
a result, religious events and social activities were well attended by elders. Special 
events e.g. donations for the earthquake, also had a wide engagement.  
Associational Activity and Common Purpose 
The elders formed an effective cooperation, through the elders’ association to 
further their interests. The elder association controlled several elder activity 
centres as venues. It was a loosely- organised association with the primary 
function of providing welfare and recreational services for elders. The elder 
centres were popular daily hang-out points for elders. In the programme, since the 
village committee did not have a close cooperation with the ordinary group, it 
could not truly represent them and defend their interests, even when it required 
challenging the developer and the local authority. Thus, there was a vacuum of 
leadership within the ordinary group. As a result, a new leadership was formed in 
the elder association to facilitate the ordinary group’s cooperation.  
The elder association had good potential to form the leadership. First, members of 
the elder association covered the majority of decision-makers in households. They 
were the group who were more concerned about the issue compared to others. 
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They had a mutual goal in the programme, which was to request a higher 
compensation standard, but the goal was hard to achieve individually due to their 
limited education level and skills. Second, the association provided permanent 
occasions for elders’ daily interactions. The elder centres gathered elders and 
enabled them to exchange information, express opinions and plot collective actions. 
As a result, cooperation was formed, and the knowledgeable and respected seniors 
became the new leadership of the ordinary group. It was an informal and 
temporary cooperation. Nevertheless, it played an important role in making the 
best use of their rich bonding social capital and conducting a series of collective 
actions to further their interests.  
Supporting Networks and Reciprocity 
Mutual help was commonly practised within households. The limitation of 
education levels and skills restrained elders’ capacity in dealing with the 
requisition issues independently. Elders were not confident enough to handle the 
issue alone, and tended to appreciate intellectual assistance from peers. As a result, 
mutual help emerged as a mechanism to deal with the requisition issues and 
featured two aspects. First, mutual help was relatively generalised in terms of the 
content. It was based on the circulation of the most recent information, the 
exchange of opinions and the discussion of relative issues. It was promoted by 
daily face-to-face interactions in the community’s various social locations. Second, 
it was particularised when households were about to negotiate with company 
representatives on the details of the transaction. The households would invite 
others who had previously completed the transaction, or people who were viewed 
as being wise and experienced, to accompany them in the negotiation. Such help 
even became a routine in negotiation, and in return, households would provide 
help to others in the future. This was a mutual gain. In the process, supporting 
networks were built and the norm of reciprocity was established and enhanced.  
Collective Values and Belonging 
Indigenous villagers shared many common values. Being a rural enclave meant 
that the village had many distinguishing features compared to its surrounding 
urban communities. As discussed, three important common values that affected 
the decision-making process were identified. First of all, elders had a strong sense 
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of responsibility to take care of their descendants’ lives. They wished to leave as 
positive a legacy as possible. For elders, rural houses with permanent land usage 
rights were more promising compared to resettlement flats with only 70 years of 
title deeds. Elders shared the view that the land was more versatile since 
descendants were able to adjust the construction of the house according to the 
financial resources they had. Second, elders preferred a higher monthly rent 
income than a higher overall value of their housing assets. The properties had only 
two uses for elders – self-residence and leasing. Few people would really capitalise 
their properties for monetary gain. Although the value of their overall assets would 
appreciate through the requisition deal, they feared that the monthly income they 
were able to gain from leasing would be reduced. Third, elders had a strong sense 
of belonging to the village and its people. Born and raised in the village, they had 
built an emotional attachment to its properties, its culture and its social networks. 
The bonding was so strong that the dramatic change from the current rural 
community to an urbanised community was hard for them to accept emotionally.  
Trust 
The ordinary group in VA Village trusted their peers, but were more estranged 
from the VA Village Committee. As discussed, ordinary villagers shared a similar 
social background and status. They had a high level of social interactions with each 
other, provided by the frequent special events and intensive daily activities. Thus, 
a strong social familiarity was accumulated during the interactions, and mutual 
trust was established within the group. In contrast, a gap of social status and 
interactions existed between the ordinary group and the privileged group. The 
latter group consisted of households who had close connections to the VA Village 
Committee. They were usually the elites of the indigenous villagers, with superior 
social background and status. They were richer, better educated and more 
powerful. Some even lived out of the village and commuted by cars. Particularly, 
village cadres were more occupied by work rather than community activities or 
events. Thus, the privileged group had fewer social interactions and accumulated 
less social familiarity with the ordinary group. They developed their own distinct 
social networks, which seldom had overlaps with the networks of the ordinary 
group. Furthermore, some village cadres were from other natural villages, e.g. Mr 
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VCH, the head of the village committee, came from VL Village. Some villagers in VA 
Village believed that he would therefore prioritise VL Village rather than VA Village 
in collective affairs. What made this situation worse was that the village committee 
rarely published information concerning collective affairs and therefore the 
ordinary group tended to misunderstand the committee and perceive them as 
corrupted cadres, as illustrated in the example of the requisition of the A6 land. As 
a result, estrangement and distrust existed between the ordinary group and the 
village committee. This situation resonated with many other cases, such as:  
A low-trust country like Brazil which is characterised by high levels of corruption, 
inequality and non-cooperative behaviour between isolated groups of poor and 
rich, who seldom interact would find it rational to trust in-group members and 
distrust outsiders. 
(Patulny and Svendsen, 2007: 35) 
The ordinary group also developed a perception that the central government was 
good and trustworthy, while the local government and the developer were 
responsible for all wrong doings. This may be summarised as “trusting the centre 
and blaming lower levels”, which was also found in other forms of resistance to 
urban redevelopment in China (O’Brien and Li, 2006: 42). In these cases, villagers 
tend to obtain and interpret “highly selective information”, which “reveals 
misconduct, points to potential allies and creates a strong sense of injustice”, and 
then “deem the Centre trustworthy, blame local officials for their plight, and see 
officials at higher levels as possible champions” (O’Brien and Li, 2006: 38-39).  
However, the basis of villagers’ trust of the central government was not as solid as 
they perceived. Chapter Five discussed how the policy-making process of the rural 
requisition policies followed a top-down approach. The state policies formulate 
principles and establish a general framework, and consequently the lower-level 
authorities fill the framework with contextual details. The low compensation 
standard is derived from the state’s policies. For example, it is prescribed that the 
compensation paid for farmland is based on the land’s annual agricultural output 
rather than its market value. Nevertheless, elders in VA Village did not know this. 
They paid more attention to beneficial information within their information 
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obtaining and circulation. Particularly, they focused on the central government’s 
beneficial commitments and policies, whether they were included in the rural 
requisition policies or not. Then they misinterpreted such highly selective 
beneficial information and developed a problematic perception. The “New 
Regulation” they learned about from television and newspapers illustrated this. 
Although it was a policy for urban requisition exclusively, they believed it was 
applicable in their case as well. They appreciated and spoke highly of the central 
government’s effort in improving the compensation for them, and at the same time, 
were irritated and felt a sense of grievance towards the perceived malpractice of 
the local government and the developer. Influenced by such perceptions, prejudice 
was generated. Even in completely unrelated issues, elders tended to ascribe the 
responsibility of undesirable results to the developer and the local government. In 
the example of the donations following the Sichuan earthquake, the official media 
actually praised villagers’ actions of donation, but villagers did not know or 
understand the whole story. They found that there was only a two-second scene in 
the news broadcast on the television, and then blamed the local government for 
blocking the report of their full event.  
In the theoretical debate, there are two models to explain the generation of trust 
(Patulny and Svendsen, 2007). The rational-choice model advocated by economists 
argues that lack of information about others undermines trust, as illustrated in the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965). In contrast, some sociologists 
(Patulny and Svendsen, 2007: 34) believe that people trust when they lack 
information and have no alternatives. It is argued that the primary function of trust 
is to “cope with the increasing social complexity and uncertainty characteristic of 
the post-industrial/modern society”. Based on the empirical evidence in this case, 
it seemed that the ordinary group’s low level of trust of the privileged group, the 
developer and the local governments could be explained by the rational-choice 
model. Since villagers suffered from a lack of sufficient information about others, 
they chose not to trust them and may have misinterpreted their actions. However, 
the ordinary group chose to trust the central government, even though they had a 
limited understanding about it and its policies. From this aspect, the sociological 
model provides a stronger explanation.  
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Safety 
Before the launch of the programme, the village was a relatively safe place. 
Residents of the village consisted largely of tenants and a small proportion of 
indigenous villagers. The majority of tenants were rural migrants, who worked in 
the nearby factories or informal economic sectors, as street vendors or low-end 
service workers. Although such a configuration of population seemed to be highly 
mobile and heterogeneous, interviewees from indigenous villagers and tenant 
groups reported that the neighbourhood was peaceful with an acceptable level of 
safety.  
This examination of eight domains of social capital shows that the ordinary group 
was strong in seven domains, and weak in the specific domain of empowerment. 
These strong domains are featured as the domains of bonding social capital. Their 
strong “participation”, “associational activity”, “supporting networks” and “trust” 
belonged to the “particularised” type, and the “collective norms and values” 
belonged to the “micro” type, because these were all inward-looking, taking place 
within the ordinary group. Therefore, the high level of social capital that the group 
possessed was a bonding one. The counter parts of “generalised” and “macro” 
types, which were outward-looking and involved heterogeneous groups, were 
weak or were not present between the ordinary group and the other groups. 
Particularly, the domain of empowerment was weak and there was a lack of trust 
between the ordinary group and the developer party. All these indicated that 
villagers had a very weak level of bridging and linking social capital. In contrast, 
the developer enjoyed a high level of linking social capital due to its company 
background. In the first stage, the developer did not intend to build a close tie with 
the ordinary group. Instead, they tried to take advantage of their linking social 
capital to facilitate the implementation. In the second stage, the new programme 
manager Mr PM came up with a new idea in the partnership. He balanced the 
company’s connections within the two groups of villagers. The company tried to 
build a stronger bridging social capital with the ordinary group than before, while 
keeping a suitable distance from the village committee. The new strategy also 
weakened the company’s linking ties with the local governments.  
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8.3.2 Social Capital in the Collective Actions 
In this section, the social capital framework will be used again to conceptualise the 
empirical findings regarding stakeholders’ collective actions.  
Empowerment, Collective Actions, Trust and Leadership 
Chapter Six indicated that the ordinary group was not empowered to directly 
participate in the decision-making process. Following this, the elders conducted a 
series of collective actions to make their voices heard. The actions could be seen as 
an initiative to achieve empowerment via various tactics. The literature review in 
Chapter Two introduced three tactics identified as achieving more effective 
resistance by Chinese citizens – linking the discontent to other wrongdoings that 
the opponent was also responsible for , seeking support from the upper-level 
authority and conducting disruptive collective actions (Cai, 2010). In the case of VA 
Village, elders could have adopted tactic one by doubting the legitimacy of the 
village committee, accusing the local authority’s manipulation in elections, or the 
corruption that villagers claimed existed between the developer and the village 
committee but they did not do so. Instead they used the other two types of tactics.  
The second tactic was to gain empowerment via a top-down approach, and the 
third tactic was to achieve it via a bottom-up approach. At the very beginning, 
elders made a petition to the developer party by delivering a joint-signature letter 
to request a higher compensation standard. It was a bottom-up approach, but a 
much milder one compared to disruptive collective actions. The petition proved to 
be too ineffective to initiate a difference. The consequential actions taken were an 
appeal to the municipality and to the provincial government, as well as hiring 
lawyers to sue the municipality at the court. Both these approaches could be 
characterised as the top-down approach. Villagers attempted to gain support from 
the higher authorities to empower their claims in the programme. These were all 
unsuccessful. Unlike the previous actions, the collective resistance to the forced 
demolition of the elder centre and Mr VG’s iron-board house showed a 
combination of two tactics. On one hand, the resistances were started by villagers 
from the grass-roots level. A mass of villagers gathered to confront the developer 
party. Both cases involved the use of violence. The situations were chaotic and 
disruptive. The considerable pressure generated from the scenes prevented the 
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developer party from conducting the forced demolitions. On the other hand, the 
engagements from the higher authorities marked the climax and the end of the 
resistance. In the first case, the Vice Head of the district government showed up to 
resolve the argument. In the second case, representatives from the municipality 
were called to the site to solve the road blockage and the demolition conflict. The 
resistances effectively suspended the programme. Eventually, the developer was 
forced to compromise their interests to those of the villagers. The new programme 
manager Mr PM was appointed and Strategy Two was adopted. Although villagers 
did not participate in this specific decision-making directly, it was an achievement 
of the series of actions. To some extent, elders were empowered indirectly to 
initiate the changes they expected.  
In this new stage of events, Mr PM also made an effort to include the ordinary 
group in the decision-making process. Villager representatives were invited to 
attend conferences for drafting the new compensation scheme. The ordinary group 
perceived this as a token participation. Nevertheless, the outcome proved that it 
was more than that. Within the developer-dominated power structure, the villager 
representatives were not equally empowered. They could not actually request a 
compensation standard to the level the ordinary group expected. From this aspect, 
they fulfilled their duty and made a contribution for the ordinary group.  
The collective actions also featured the pattern of “trusting the centre and blaming 
lower levels”. When the petition for direct negotiation with the developer failed, 
the ordinary group soon made appeals to the higher-level authorities. After that, 
they hired lawyers to sue the land department of the municipality. Although they 
lost both two lawsuits, many of them ascribed the responsibility of the failure to 
the developer’s covert manipulation. The confrontation of the two forced 
demolitions was solved with the involvement of higher-level authorities. In stage 
two, the developer, along with villager representatives, created a new scheme with 
higher compensation standards, but people in the ordinary group did not 
appreciate it as much as the developer expected, since villagers believed that they 
deserved a much higher compensation standard, prescribed by the central 
government in the New Regulation.  
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Additionally, the order of all actions seemed to have been tactical, whether 
consciously or not. It was “tactical escalation”, which characterised the 
radicalisation of actions, “from humble petitioning to the politics of disruption”, in 
order to revitalise “the repertoire of contention” (O’Brien and Li, 2006: 67). The 
order of villagers’ collective actions happened to match the tactic, from mild 
petitions to disruptive collective resistances. Furthermore, the order of the 
developer party’s actions fitted the tactic as well. At the beginning, they tried to 
convince villagers through publicity (or propaganda). When this failed, 
administrative enforcements were deployed to depress the prosperous rental 
business. Finally, disruptive forced demolitions were conducted twice. The 
function and importance of the tactic was analysed as being:  
Forms of contention generally have a limited life-span. Even the most creative 
tactics tend, over time, to lose their power to surprise opponents and stir followers. 
Tactical escalation offers a means to regain momentum when established 
techniques of protest no longer create the sense of crises and excitement they once 
did. As the effectiveness of familiar methods wanes, enterprising activists 
sometimes turn to even more disruptive acts to demonstrate their commitment, 
leave their opponents rattled, and mobilize supporters, they can also help draw 
newcomers to a cause while offering leverage to actors who have few other 
resources. 
(O’Brien and Li, 2006: 67) 
The function of the tactic partially explained why collective actions from both sides 
declined eventually, which made the programme stall and as such, moved it into a 
new stage. Cai summarised the local authority’s commonly used approach in 
dealing with collective actions:  
Given the risk of violent suppression, a more commonly used mode is to impose 
punishment on selective participants, the activists or the leaders in most cases 
Local governments have adopted two approaches in dealing with activists or 
leaders in collective action. One is that some grassroots officials resort to the 
illegal method of hiring thugs to harass or attack the activists or leaders in 
collective resistance 
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More commonly, local governments use legal punishment to deal with organisers 
or activists of collective action 
(Cai, 2010: 50-51) 
For the developer party, their actions in stage one reflected these ideas. The snap 
checks conducted by administrative enforcements from different governmental 
departments to crack down on the rental business in the village were actually a 
legal punishment to villagers. The attempted forced demolition of the elder centre 
could be interpreted as a punishment to elders, who were the leadership of the 
ordinary group. The attempted forced demolition of Mr VG’s iron-board house, 
with the use of thugs and armed city management inspectors, was actually 
harassment of selective activists, since Mr VG was a well-known anti-requisition 
activist. Therefore, when all these actions were prevented by villagers’ collective 
resistances, the developers’ repertoire of actions was drained. The only approach 
left, to escalate their actions, seemed to be violent suppression, which might 
involve the use of potentially lethal force. The approach was too risky to use. As a 
result, the developer took no further coercive actions and the cooperation between 
the developer and the local government declined.  
For the villagers, when the negative result of the second lawsuit was announced, 
they stepped into the same bottleneck situation. As shown in the following table 
(8.1), apart from “approaching the media”, they had tried almost every mode of 
action available therefore it was hard to escalate their actions any further. As a 
result, a peaceful balance emerged and the programme was suspended.  
Modes of action Total (%) Urban (%) Rural (%) 
Law 27.1 32.9 21.5 
Approaching upper-level leaders 26.8 29.3 24.0 
No action 26.0 14.3 39.5 
Approaching leaders of the agency 
concerned 
18.3 22.1 16.5 
Collective petition 13.4 16.4 9.9 
Approaching the media 4.6 5.7 3.3 
Miscellaneous 3.8 4.3 3.3 
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Total number of cases 261 140 121 
Table 8. 1 Modes of resolving state-citizen disputes 
Source: Cai (2010: 25) 
The previous chapter discussed how the elite elders from the elder association 
became the leadership of the ordinary group. This chapter shows that they 
successfully led the others to conduct collective actions. The crucial role of 
leadership in collective actions was summarised that:  
Research on collective resistance in China has pointed to the preeminent role of 
leaders in initiating collective resistance and making it successful. Specifically, 
leaders play several roles in Chinese citizens’ collective action: (1) They mobilize 
participants; (2) they disseminate information; (3) they inspire confidence in 
participants; (4) they take the greatest risk and reduce that for average 
participants; and (5) they negotiate with the government or other social actors on 
behalf of participants. It is a common finding that leaders of collective action in 
China are often those people who know about relevant government policies and 
enjoy a certain degree of respect and prestige in their communities. In rural areas, 
leaders of peasant resistance include village cadres, rural teachers, demobilized 
soldiers, or other better-educated members of the community and respected 
villagers not in office.  
(Cai, 2010: 34-35) 
The leadership in this particular programme covered all the points mentioned. The 
senior elders were better-educated and respected villagers in the elder association. 
They gathered information and disseminated it to followers, e.g. the circulation of 
the New Regulation. They inspired and mobilised villagers to conduct a series of 
collective actions. At the same time, they suffered great risk. Some were even 
summoned to the police station for interrogation each time they appealed to the 
upper-level authorities or hired lawyers for lawsuits. In the collective conflicts, 
they represented the others to negotiate with the developer party.  
Collective Norms, Safety and Belonging 
A collective norm was identified as playing an important role in minimising the 
external costs associated with households’ transactions. Whether or not to take the 
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requisition deal with the developer seemed to be a household’s domestic decision. 
A household usually made this decision based on the private benefit and private 
cost of the household, without the consideration of social benefit and social cost to 
others. However, when a household made the transaction, the house would be 
demolished incompletely, left in ruins, with the debris of the house structure 
remaining. Consequently, its surrounding environment would deteriorate, both 
physically and socially. Other unrelated third parties then suffered from the 
household’s transaction but the household was not required to pay for the external 
cost. In the first stage when the conflict was fierce, among the ordinary group, a 
collective norm emerged that any household who decided to take the requisition 
deal would be judged by others as “traitors” or “unworthy descendants”. This is the 
dark side of strong bonding social capital – creating “strong in-group loyalty” and 
“strong out-group antagonism” (Putnam, 2000: 23). In this case, it took place in the 
form of “suffocating norms” (Kleinhans et al, 2007: 1074). Nevertheless, this dark 
side had a positive effect in this case. The norm corrected the negative externality 
by imposing moral punishment on these households who brought external cost to 
others. Therefore, fewer households would take the deal with the existence of the 
norm.  
Later, when the second lawsuit failed again and the compensation standard was 
improved, many villagers lost their motivation to protest further against the 
programme. They also changed their attitude toward the requisition issue. 
Households who decided to take the deal would no longer be condemned or 
judged by others and, as such, the collective norm then disappeared. Therefore, the 
negative externality associated with the transaction was not punished anymore. As 
a result, more households signed contracts with the developer than would be the 
case if the norm existed and they were likely to be punished. As a result, the 
environment deteriorated and households who remained in the village lived in a 
worse-off condition. The safety of the community even became a serious problem. 
It decreased residents’ willingness to live there, depressed the rental business, and 
forced many households to take the requisition deal. A negative feedback loop was 
formed and accelerated the process. When the once prosperous and vibrant 
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community was gradually transformed into a dilapidated and decaying community 
with general hopelessness, the sense of belonging declined with it.  
8.4 Reflections 
8.4.1 Theoretical Reflection 
In the last section, social capital theory is used to help understand the empirical 
findings, and the analysis also provided some insights to shed light on the theory.  
James Coleman’s Conceptualisation 
The empirical findings turn out to support many aspects of James Coleman’s 
conceptualisation. First, the research illustrated the importance of information 
networks in cooperation, which was in accordance with Coleman’s emphasis of 
information channels in social capital, as he described that:  
An important form of social capital is the potential for information that inheres in 
social relations. Information is important in providing a basis for action. But 
acquisition of information is costly. At a minimum, it requires attention, which is 
always in scarce supply. One means by which information can be acquired is by use 
of social relations that are maintained for other purposes.  
(Coleman, 1988: 104) 
Villagers within the ordinary group developed and maintained the social networks 
mainly for the purpose of daily recreation and interaction. When the requisition 
programme was initiated, these networks played a crucial role in circulating 
information within the collective. Restrained by education levels and skills, 
villagers had difficulties in acquiring information individually. They did not spend 
much time in collecting specific information. However, through the networks and 
the associated everyday interactions, they were able to accumulate up-to-date 
information. The means lowered the costs and provided broader coverage of 
information than would have been the case through collecting information 
individually. The information proved to be decisive in villagers’ decision-making, 
as well as their subsequent collective actions.  
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Second, Coleman’s framework argues that the closure of social networks was 
necessary in enabling norms and effective sanctions. This is supported by the 
finding of my thesis. Coleman described that:  
Effective norms can constitute a powerful form of social capital. This social capital, 
however […] not only facilitates certain actions; it constrains others 
One property of social relations on which effective norms depend is what I will call 
closure. In general, one can say that a necessary but not sufficient condition for the 
emergence of effective norms is action that imposes external effects on others. 
Norms arise as attempts to limit negative external effects or encourage positive 
ones. But, in many social structures where these conditions exist, norms do not 
come into existence. The reason is what can be described as lack of closure of the 
social structure 
(Coleman, 1988: 105) 
In this case, a household’s acceptance of the requisition deal brought external costs 
to unrelated households, since the environment deteriorated when the house was 
semi-demolished and left in debris. A norm was created that any household who 
planned to take the deal would be criticised by others as “traitors” and “unworthy 
descendants”. There was a lack of interview data about whether the norm was 
specifically developed to cope with the circumstances. Nevertheless, the norm 
effectively punished the action and corrected its negative externality. The 
emergence of the norm was underpinned by the closure of villagers’ social 
networks. As discussed, ordinary villagers were a marginalised, close and stable 
group of people. Their social networks were inward-looking, exclusive and close. 
Therefore, different members were able to combine their forces to impose 
collective sanctions on a specific member for the external costs he or she brought 
to others. However, Coleman did not provide an explanation that explored in what 
conditions the norms and sanctions would disappear. My field research showed 
that, in the second stage, the norm and collective sanction became very weak and 
households who decided to take the requisition deal were no longer punished for 
the external costs they brought to others. The reason could be the declining 
motivation to sanction the action coupled with the increasing acceptance to 
conduct the action.  
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Third, Coleman’s framework featured the importance of appropriable social 
organisation in social capital. He described that:  
[An] organization, once brought into existence for one set of purposes, can also aid 
others, thus constituting social capital available for use. 
(Coleman, 1988: 108) 
The role of the elder association in the case endorsed the point. Usually, the 
association’s primary function was to provide welfare services to elders. It was 
more like a casual club with loosely-organised members. When the programme 
was launched, it developed another function, that of leading the ordinary group to 
confront the developer. The leadership proved to be crucial in unifying villagers 
and making good use of their high level of bonding social capital.  
Fourth, empirical findings of the case advocated Coleman’s understanding of social 
capital as “a particular kind of resource available to an actor” (Coleman, 1988: 98). 
Bourdieu (1986) held the same view. He treated social capital as an elite group’s 
resource. Putnam (2000: 20) conceptualised social capital as “simultaneously a 
‘private good’ and a ‘public good’”. As shown in the case study, the bonding social 
capital owned by the ordinary group was very strong. It benefited them by 
facilitating their cooperation to confront the developer. From this aspect, it 
hindered the developer’s implementation of the programme. In contrast, the 
developer enjoyed a high level of linking social capital, and utilised it to conduct 
joint actions to force the ordinary group to obey. Therefore, the case reflected that 
social capital benefited the owner group specifically but not necessarily benefited 
other groups in the partnership.  
Different Elements of Bourdieu’s, Coleman’s and Putnam’s Conceptualisation 
It is discussed in Chapter Four that there are some different elements among 
Bourdieu’s, Coleman’s and Putnam’s conceptualisation of social capital. Bourdieu 
considers social capital as a limited private resource. In contrast, Coleman treats 
social capital as a limitless and self-reinforcing resource, and all individuals and 
groups can potentially benefit from it although Coleman recognises inherent 
dangers in how it may be used. In Putnam’s initial work, he has a similar view to 
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Coleman’s, but then he changes it and considers social capital as simultaneously a 
private and a public good.  
Empirical evidence from the first stage of the programme supports Bourdieu’s 
theory. It can be seen that the developer’s rich linking social capital was excluding 
to the ordinary group, and even impaired the latter group’s interest by conducting 
the joint actions. On the other hand, the developer had no access to the ordinary 
group’s high level of bonding social capital and suffered from the collective 
resistance generated from it. However, the findings indicate the self-reinforcing 
characteristic of social capital. The ordinary group’s collective actions showed a 
process of escalation. It may mean that their level of bonding social capital was 
increased every time when a collective action was conducted and consequently it 
facilitated their following collective actions and pushed them into larger scales. In 
the second stage, empirical evidence supports Coleman’s theory. The promising 
new scheme convinced some households to accept the offer. When contracts were 
signed, their interests became more bound to and aligned with the developer’s. 
They soon become “voluntary company representatives” and were eager to 
circulate the publicity to their fellow villagers, and try to convince them to take the 
offer via their social networks. From this aspect, the ordinary group’s bonding 
social capital starts to benefit the developer as well. In summary, it seems that 
Putnam’s theory is more close to the real situation in this specific case. Social 
capital is primarily a group’s private resource, but other groups are able to benefit 
from it as well, and then it has potential to become a public resource.  
Three Types of Social Capital and Eight Domains 
The differentiation of three types of social capital helps to distinguish social capital 
owned by the developer and the ordinary group. The empirical findings show that 
linking social capital played a more important role in the former one, while the 
bonding social capital was crucial for the latter one. The distinction indicates that 
the resource and power they owned and used are fundamentally different. 
Particularly, bridging social capital is not identified in both groups. I think it is not 
a flaw of the theory. It may be due to the special topic of the study. In the context of 
urban village development, indigenous villagers are usually a marginalised group 
in an urban area. They have limited interactions with other heterogeneous groups. 
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For the developer, they have a close relationship with the local governments. As a 
result, they spend more efforts on taking advantage of governmental assistance, 
and do not focus much attention on the help from other heterogeneous groups. 
Furthermore, the implementation of rural requisition and demolition is viewed as 
a politically sensitive topic. The participation or intervention from non-
stakeholders is usually forbidden.  
The eight domains identified by Forrest and Kearns (2001) provide a practical 
framework to examine a group’s social capital. Specifically, their original research 
is a quantitative one, and the domains are used as variables to quantify a group’s 
level of social capital. This research extends the use to the field of qualitative study. 
The domains, from another aspect, are applied as theoretical lenses to examine 
and explain actors’ cooperation and collective actions. They prove to fit the context 
of urban village redevelopment in China well and were useful in organising the 
content of the research.  
The Limitations 
The limitations of the use of social capital theory in the thesis should be noted. In 
the existing literature, social capital theory is more popular in quantitative 
research. The use of it in a qualitative study is innovative but also reveals some 
weaknesses. As discussed, it is hard to judge whether villagers’ bonding social 
capital showed the characteristic of being self-reinforcing within the escalation of 
their actions in different stages. The type of linking social capital is not seen in both 
the developer group and the ordinary group. Nevertheless, it is not robust to draw 
the conclusion that linking social capital is not important or claim that it did not 
exist in the two groups. The reason may be that the number of 29 interviewees is 
too few, compared to a quantitative one, to cover and represent thousands of 
participants. Some important information could be omitted in my interviews. More 
grounded evidence is needed to support the argument in the future research.  
8.4.2 Methodological Reflection 
Case Study and Generalisation 
The case study approach shows the strength of the in-depth scope. By focusing all 
my resources in the single case of VA Village, I managed to obtain the detailed data 
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from villagers and company representatives. The following qualitative analysis of 
these meaningful materials then provided an in-depth and better understanding of 
the events being examined. This shows the power of the qualitative analysis. It is 
doubted whether a quantitative one is able to reach such an in-depth view of the 
phenomenon.  
However, the weakness of being limited in generalisation is noted. As mentioned 
previously, most programmes in Xiamen were conducted in the government-led 
paradigm, while only this case was in the developer-led paradigm. Particularly, the 
case had the uniqueness that the developer finally shifted their strategy to the one 
that they contributed all their potential profits to affected households to facilitate 
the process of the programme. As a result, the findings in this thesis might not be 
widely applied to other contexts within or beyond China. Nevertheless, a single 
case research has the potential to generalise its findings to all the other cases. It is 
known as “falsification” (Popper, 1959). Flyvbjerg (2006: 228) considers it as “one 
of the most rigorous tests to which a scientific proposition can be subjected”, for 
the reason that “if just one observation does not fit with the proposition, it is 
considered not valid generally and must therefore be either revised or rejected”.  
Therefore, this case, as a “black swan”, is able to falsify the prejudice that is 
prevailing towards local governments and developers. In the early time, just as it 
was showed in the first stage of this case, the requisition and demolition process 
was controversial due to the use of violence. A stereotype was established that the 
greedy developers always collaborated with the authoritarian local governments 
to exploit indigenous villagers until the last drop of interest was squeezed out of 
them in the redevelopment of urban villages. This could be seen from my 
interviews with villagers. Nevertheless, times have changed and the case 
illustrates that the situation is improved. Firstly, it is important to clarify that the 
pattern of interest distribution is fundamentally designed by the central authority, 
rather than local governments. Secondly, the local government and the developer 
did not always cooperate closely to exploit villagers. The developer’s favourable 
scheme in the second stage not only showed its “selflessness”, but also alienated 
the developer’s relationship with the local government. Last but not least, besides 
the interest distribution, another important factor of the conflict and tension is 
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villagers’ misinterpretation of information and policies. These empirical findings 
could be generalised to others, as well. Perhaps this points the direction where the 
future of urban village redevelopment is heading.  
Qualitative Methods in Field Research 
Qualitative methods, mainly semi-structured interviews, participant observation 
and document analysis, were used in the field research to generate data. Overall, 
the field research was productive and the quality of material generated reached 
my expectation. I managed to talk to key actors from main stakeholder groups in 
Tier Three (See Table 3.9 in Section 3.3.2). Interviews with indigenous villagers 
worked well. Contacting them was easy. Being able to speak the South Fujian 
dialect helped to build mutual trust with indigenous villagers. Even though the 
topic had great sensitivity, they were willing to share their experiences frankly 
with me. They even told me about their opinions and experience that were 
unknown to company representatives, for example, the event of the earthquake 
donation (See Section 6.4.1). As for the developer group, the quality of interviews 
was satisfactory as well. Fortunately, the timings of the interviews were beneficial. 
Many conflicts were generated by Strategy One during 2008-2011. From 2012, the 
more popular Strategy Two replaced the old one, which largely alleviated the 
tensions and accelerated the progress. The staff had changed as well. As a result, to 
some extent, they felt proud of their work. They did not have many problems in 
discussing the programme. Thus, these interviews generated a large amount of 
primary data.  
The limitations of the field research also need to be noted. It was difficult to 
contact and interview actors of the authority group in Tier One and Two (See Table 
3.9 in Section 3.3.2). I was aware that understanding their experience on this issue 
was necessary and meaningful for my research. As previously mentioned, Tier Two 
agencies had an important influence on the programme, although their 
involvement appeared to be minor compared to Tier Three. The lack of their voices 
undermined the possibility of acquiring a more holistic view about the programme. 
Another weakness came from my lack of good interview skills. As an inexperienced 
interview practitioner, I found it challenging to overcome the disadvantage of 
being in a lower power position when interacting with officials. Similar situations 
252 
 
occurred when interviewing company representatives and villagers. They tended 
to treat me as an outsider and to downplay the importance of my questions and 
research. Although I did my best to eliminate this influence, this may have affected 
the interviews negatively.  
Overall, using qualitative methods to collect data in this urban village research was 
appropriate. My review of the existing literature in this field showed that 
quantitative methods, e.g. questionnaires and structured interviews, have been 
dominant in the field. Without doubt, a lot of excellent investigations have been 
done based on them. However, such methods seem to be weak in abstracting in-
depth data from the richness of their knowledge. Talking to actors face-to-face and 
letting them describe their experience in their own way proved to be both 
productive and generated very rich data. Through open-ended interviews, various 
stories were acquired. By analysing them, I managed to gain a comprehensive view 
of the programme, e.g. what exactly participants think, especially ordinary 
villagers, how they make decisions, what they have done and how conflicts are 
generated. This qualitative research approach makes a contribution by providing a 
deeper understanding of urban villages and development programmes in China, 
complementing the knowledge from quantitative studies. In the future, more 
investigations of this type, or mix-methods researches, should be encouraged.   
8.4.3 Reflection for Policy and Implementation 
The empirical findings enhance our understanding of urban villages and provide 
some insights for policy and implementation of urban village redevelopment, 
urban development programmes that require demolition and compensation in 
China, and even internationally. In this case, it was observed that the scheme based 
on the government’s policies had encountered many difficulties in the 
implementation. The compensation level was so low that few households would 
accept it. Even though the developer was willing to sacrifice its own interests to 
push forward the process, and the new scheme did achieve progress, the developer 
soon faced considerable pressure from the local government. Therefore, policies 
made via the top-down process prove to not fit the needs of practice, especially in a 
developer-led paradigm. These policies had no flexibility for front-line 
practitioners to adjust them into the specific contexts of local villages.  
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Compared with other empirical findings from the existing literature, it seems that 
bottom-up policy-making and participations from well-empowered stakeholders 
are a better approach to conduct such redevelopment programmes. The cases of 
Liede Village (Li et al, 2014a; Zhou, 2014) and Xiasha Village (Chung, 2009) show 
the merit of such a paradigm. These two villages have been demolished and 
redeveloped relatively successfully. The thesis confirms and supports this 
approach further. In the case of VA Village, the developer made a new scheme and 
returned all its potential profits to affected households. However, the according 
policies and scheme were still being made in an authoritarian way, since the 
majority of ordinary households did not have participation in the decision-making. 
Thus, even though the developer meant to be a “selfless” actor, and it was 
confirmed in their actions, there were still much mistrust and many 
misunderstandings held by the ordinary households towards the developer and 
their actions. Many factors could be responsible for this, e.g. villagers had not 
participated in the decision-making personally, villagers were influenced by false 
knowledge and experience from their previous interactions with the developer. 
Public participation and communication provide a good opportunity to solve these 
problems. In conclusion, in urban redevelopment programmes concerning 
requisition and demolition, a desirable way to conduct them is to include and 
empower all stakeholders’ participation in the decision-making process.  
8.5 Future Research Agenda 
The thesis tells a story of how different groups of stakeholders interact with each 
other in an urban village redevelopment programme. If we probe into the 
phenomena, we can see that it is not only a programme, but also a nutshell of 
China's urbanisation. In recent decades, the dramatic urban and rural land 
development is largely shaped by the three forces, the local governments, the 
developers and property owners. Along with the high-speed process is the sacrifice 
of property owners’ interest. As it was showed in the early stage of the case, the 
developer and the local government took advantage of their power and resource to 
facilitate the requisition and demolition of properties. With the progress of the 
society and property owners’ increasing awareness of legal rights safeguarding, 
the developers have gradually adapted their practice to the new socio-economic 
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context. However, restrained by the state’s institutional framework, the interest 
conflict will keep haunting the process. As a result, the cost in land development 
increases, in terms of time and financial expenses. Accordingly, the pace of China’s 
urbanisation is slowing down, and an institutional reform may take place in the 
future. This is what the case indicates. Could the same sign be found in other cases? 
Whether this research can be replicated in other places? What is the voice from 
local governments? These questions shall be answered in the future research 
agenda. 
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Appendix 1: The 2012 Compensation Scheme 
All the following data are collected in the field research from the developer, and 
translated by the author.  
Schemes Number Items Standard 
(Yuan/m2) 
Remarks 
Each 
household 
can choose 
one based 
on their 
situation 
The 
400,000 
Scheme 
1 Built site with title deeds 2,300   
2 Built site 
without 
title 
deeds 
Area authorized for 
Quota of 50 m2/head  
2,000   
3 Quota of 
130m2/head 
(excluding 
areas in item 1 
and 2) 
Built 
site 
2,100   
4 Un-
built 
site 
340  
5 Built site over Quota of 
130m2/head 
1,300   
6 Reward for ground floor 1,300   
7 Reward for moving out before the 
deadline agreed in the contract 
(The area for calculation is the 
total floor area excluding ground 
floor, based on house frame and 
brick/concrete structure not 
including house attachment in 
steel structure)  
500 The area 
multiplied 
by 500 
Yuan/m2 or 
400,000 
Yuan, 
whichever 
is the 
greater 
The 
2,500 
Scheme 
1 The area for calculation is the total 
floor area excluding ground floor, 
based on house frame and 
brick/concrete structure not 
including house attachment in 
steel structure 
2,500  Measure 
the built 
site 
Table 1 The part of the VA Scheme replicated from the Linbian Scheme 
Note: Not including Item 6 
 
Item Content 
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Extra quota of 
resettling flats 
Each qualified household member now is able to purchase 30 m2 
more resettling flats in a favoured price of 4,000 to 5,000 
Yuan/m2 (the market price is estimated around 10,000 to 12,000 
Yuan/m2) 
Extra quota of shops Each qualified household member now is able to purchase 10 m2 
more shops in the price of 4,000 Yuan/m2 (market price is 
estimated at least 6,000 Yuan/m2).  
Broadening 
qualification and 
extra quota for future 
household members 
Babies or children whose birth violated the one-child policy (e.g. a 
second or third baby or child in the household) now are qualified 
for full compensations; a newly-wed couple who does not have 
child yet now can enjoy one more conditional quota for 
compensation (for their future baby); a single person who reaches 
marriageable age in the household now can have one more 
conditional quota for compensation (for his/her future partner). 
The condition added is that when the programme is finished, if 
couples still have no babies, or single persons are still unmarried, 
or spouses they married are not qualified, then part of 
compensations should be reclaimed.  
Car parking slot A household now is able to buy a car park slot at the price of 
40,000 Yuan (market price is estimated at least 120,000 Yuan 
each slot).  
Table 2 The third component of the VA Scheme 
Either of the 
above two 
schemes 
should also 
plus this 
bonus 
1 Compensation for iron-sheet-made house: the land 
area (measured based on the house frame and 
brick concrete structure) multiply two multiply 
1100 YUAN/m2; the built-up iron-sheet-made 
house could be compensated for area multiply 200 
YUAN/m2 
The part above two 
storey and the part 
whose floor height is 
less than 2.2 metre 
would not be 
compensated 
2 Living fees for transition, 
moving fees and etc.  
 According to relevant 
policies 
3 Compensation for shops 20000 YUAN 
for each shop 
 
4 Compensation for adjunct 
construction of the house 
 According to the policy 
of XMGOV [1999] Z NO. 
62 
Table 3 The other part of the VA Scheme 
 
Extra bonus: It is 
for group-contract 
and it is not 
The whole area of 
group-contract 
2000 m2 
included 
and above 
3000 m2 
included 
and above 
4000 m2 
included 
and above 
Group-contract 
including 
signed contract 
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relevant to the 
compensation for 
the house.  
The bonus is 
calculated by each 
contract’s area 
(measured based 
on the house frame 
and brick concrete 
structure) 
multiplying the 
following standard 
60 
YUAN/m2 
80 
YUAN/m2 
100 
YUAN/m2 
+ newly signed 
contract or 
newly signed 
contract + 
newly signed 
contract 
Table 4 The other part of the VA Scheme 
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Appendix 2: Calculation Form 
Date:__/__/2012  
Contract number  The house owner  Members 
whose Hukou 
are registered 
at this house 
 
House address  Land area of the 
house  
 Built site that 
is measured 
 
Area with legal 
documents (m2) 
 Illegal built site 
included in the 
130m2/head 
 Built site not 
included in the 
130m2/head 
 
Authorized area as 
legal area (m2) 
 Illegal unfinished 
built site included 
in the 
130m2/head 
 Area of mental 
structure 
 
Theoretical 
resettling area 
(m2) 
 Extra area 
purchased due to 
the population or 
flat structure 
(m2) 
 Real resettling 
area (m2) 
 
Type Item Standard Amount 
(YUAN) 
Remarks 
Compensation 1 Area with legal 
documents 
X  2300 YUAN/m2   
2 Authorized 
resettling area 
X  2000 YUAN/m2   
3 Illegal built site 
included in the 
130m2/head 
X  2100 YUAN/m2   
4 Illegal unfinished 
built site included 
in the 
130m2/head 
X  340 YUAN/m2   
5 Built site over 
130m2/head 
X  1300 YUAN/m2   
Compensation 1 Compensation for 
land area 
Land area X 1300 
YUAN/m2 
  
2 Compensation for 
moving out before 
the deadline dealt 
in the contract 
Built site X 500 
YUAN/m2 
 The area 
multiplied by 
500 Yuan/m2 
or 400,000 
Yuan, 
whichever is 
the greater 
Sum   Choose a 
higher one If the average price is less than 2500 
YUAN/m2, then 2500 YUAN/m2 would 
be given 
Built site X 2500 
YUAN/m2 
 
Other bonus 1 Built site of steel 
structure 
X  1300 YUAN/m2   
2 Unfinished built 
site of steel 
structure 
X  1100 YUAN/m2   
3 Living fees for 
transition 
15 YUAN/m2 X 
months (including 5 
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YUAN living 
subsidy) 
4 Compensation for 
shops 
20,000 YUAN for 
each shop 
  
5 Compensation for 
adjunct 
construction of 
the house 
See the list   
6 Moving fees 10 YUAN/m2/times  
X 3 times 
  
7 Changing fees for 
land line, TV 
license and air-
conditioner etc.  
   
Sum    
(1)Sum of compensation (YUAN)   Include the 
Xiamen 
Contract and 
subsidy 
(2)Receivables for housing purchase 
(YUAN) 
X  4000 YUAN/m2   
Net compensation (YUAN) (1)– (2)   
Person who fills this form (sign)  
Table 1 The calculation form 
 
NO. Variables Note 
1 Number of 
qualified 
household 
members 
The number qualified household members for the house being 
requisitioned 
2 Built site with 
title deeds of the 
house 
It is considered as the legal part of the house 
3 Built site 
without title 
deeds of the 
house 
It is considered as the illegal part of the house 
4 Ground floor 
area 
The ground floor area of the house. It is the land area the house 
occupied.  
5 Number of 
shops 
The number of shops that the house has 
6 Land 
attachments 
Any valuable land attachments that are going to be requisitioned 
with the house, e.g. plants, ponds, walls, fences, shacks, wells, 
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animal house etc. The compensations are varied and the prices 
are listed in the file of XMGOV[1999]Comprehensive062.  
7 Interior 
attachments 
Any valuable interior attachments of the house that cannot be 
removed 
8 Whether the 
house is under 
construction 
Many houses in the village have a top floor which is still being 
constructed although may be suspended for a long time 
9 Moving out 
before deadline 
If all household members move out of the house before the 
deadline prescribed in contracts, the household is able to enjoy 
an extra reward.  
10 Sign contracts 
within a group 
If the household signs contracts under a group, there is an extra 
reward.  
Table 2 Ten variables in the calculation 
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Appendix 3: Calculation Process 
Item Unit: Yuan 
Compensation for land requisition (137,000 
Yuan/mu in 2011) 
(235,163.54 - 25,842.052) X 
(137,000/666.67) = 43,015,350.71 
Property compensation (the Quota of 50m2 
and 80m2 per qualified household member) 
1,906 X (50 X 280+80 X 560) = 
112,072,800 
Financial aid for moving (3 times) and 
temporary settlement (12 months) 
1,906 X 50 X 10 X 3 + 1,906 X 50 X 10 
X 12 = 14,295,000 
Expense for the village’s demolition (the fee 
for demolishing service is 95.34 Yuan/m2)24 
(44,400 + 455,600) X 95.34 = 
47,670,000  
Expense for the development and 
infrastructure construction of the land (at the 
fee of 300 Yuan/m2)25 
235,163.54 X 300= 70,549,062 
Expense for the construction of resettling flats 
(at the fee of 5,000 Yuan/m2 in 2012) 
97,807.67 X 5,000=489,038,350 
Expense for programme operation and 
management (4000 Yuan/mu as stated in both 
2005 and 2011 policies) 
235,163.54 X (4,000/666.67) = 
1,410,974.185 
Gross expense  
(include capital discount rate, which is 3.25%, 
the fixed term deposit rate in 2012) 
(43,015,350.71 + 112,072,800 + 
14,295,000.185 + 47,670,000 + 
70,549,062 + 489,038,350 + 
1,410,974) X (1 + 3.25%) = 
803,338,211.8 
Gross income (235,163.54 - 25,842.052) X 5,438.66 
= 1,138,428,404 (in 2005); 
(235,163.54 - 25,842.052) X 
35,492.41 = 7,429,324,074 (in 2010) 
Table 1 Gross expense and income 
                                                        
24 Refer from the contract between the developer and the demolishing company published by 
Xiamen Construction and Administration Bureau http://www.xmjs.gov.cn/gczj/degl/ 
25 The fee is estimated from a price list (2013) published by Xiamen Construction and 
Administration Bureau, http://www.xmjs.gov.cn/gczj/degl/. The price on the list is fluctuated and 
300 Yuan/m2 is a moderate one. So this item is not accurate.  
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Item Unit: Yuan 
Estimated how many household members 
are qualified to compensations (because the 
developer broaden the qualification, I 
assume that it is 1.1 times of all indigenous 
villagers) 
1,906 X (100% + 10%) = 2,096.6 ≈ 
2,097 
Expense for land requisition (137,000 
Yuan/mu from the 2011 policy) 
(235,163.54 - 25,842.052) X 
(137,000/666.67) = 43,015,350.71 
Compensation for built site of houses 
(assume that it is 2,150 Yuan/m2 for 
simplicity; assume that 80% village land is 
occupied by houses) 
2,097 X (50 X 2,150 + 80 X 2,100 + 
(450,000/2,097 – 50 -80) X 1,300) 
+ 235,163.54 X 80% X 1,300 + 663 
X 400,000 = 1,318,121,642 
Compensation for iron-board houses 235,163.54 X 80% X (1100 + 
1100+200) = 451,513,996.8 
Financial aid for home moving (3 times) 
and transitional settlement (12 months) 
2,097 X 50 X 10 X 3 + 2,097 X 50 X 
15 X 12 = 22,018,500 
Compensation for shops (assume that each 
household has one shop) 
663 X 20,000 = 13,260,000 
Reward for signing contracts within a 
group (assume that all households join in 
groups to maximize their interests) 
450,000 X 100 = 4,500,000 
Commission fees for Yihe Company (17 
Yuan/m2 according to their contract) 
450,000 X 17 = 7,650,000 
Expense for demolishing the village (the fee 
is estimated at 95.34 Yuan/m2)26 
(44,400 + 455,600) X 95.34 = 
47,670,000 
Compensation for the village’s land 
development and infrastructure facilities 
(300 Yuan/m2 in 2013)27 
235,163.54*300 = 70,549,062 
                                                        
26 It is estimated from Xiamen Construction and Administration Bureau 
http://www.xmjs.gov.cn/gczj/degl/ 
27 It is a moderate price estimated from a price list referenced by Xiamen Construction and 
Administration Bureau, http://www.xmjs.gov.cn/gczj/degl/.  
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Expense for the construction of the in-situ 
resettling flats (the quota of 50m2 per 
capita for houses. The price is estimated 
around 5000 Yuan/m2 in 2012) 
2,097 X 50 X 5,000 = 524,250,000 
Expense for extra resettling flats (including 
the quota of 30 m2 per capita for houses 
and the land. This part of flats is 
commercial flats built by the developer but 
sold to villagers as extra resettling flats. 
Assume that the plot ratio of the land is the 
same as the village’s resettling flats in 
planning) 
2,097 X 30 X 5,000+2,097 X 30 X 
(25,842.052/97,807.67) X 
35,492.41 = 904,491,920.7 
Programme operation expense (the fee 
4,000 Yuan/mu is prescribed by policies; it 
is one-time-off but I triple it for it is a long-
term one) 
235,163.54 X (4000/666.67) X 3 = 
4,232,922.555 
 
Total expense (include capital discount 
rate, which is 3.25%, the fixed term deposit 
rate in 2012. Assume that it is three years) 
(43,015,350.71 + 1,318,121,642 + 
451,513,996.8 + 22,018,500 + 
13,260,000 + 4,500,000 + 
7,650,000 + 47,670,000 + 
70,549,062 + 524,250,000 + 
904,491,920.7 + 4,232,922.555) X 
(1+3.25%)3 = 3,723,122,973 
Table 2 Calculating the cost 
 
Example 1 Calculation Processes 
Steps Calculations (Unit: Yuan) 
Step 1: Built site with title deeds 0 
Step 2: Compensation for the 
Quota of 50 m2  
100 X 2,000 = 200,000 (3 X 50 =150 > 100, so all the 
100 m2 built site without title deeds is authorized as 
built site with title deeds) 
Step 3: Compensation for the 
Quota of 80 m2 
3 X 80 X 340 = 81,600 
Step 4: Compensation for the 0 
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other built site of the house 
Step 5: Reward  
Reward for sign in a group 120 X 1,300 = 156,000 
Reward for moving before 
deadline 
400,000 (because 100 X 500 = 50,000 < 400,000)  
Step 6: Compared the total 
amount with the amount in the 
2,500-Scheme 
 
The total amount 200,000 + 81,600 + 156,000 + 400,000 = 837,600 
Compare it with the amount in 
the 2,500-Scheme, choose the 
greater one 
100 X 2500 = 250,000 < 837,600, so choose 837,600 
Step 7: Others  
Compensation for the top floor of 
the house and frames of the 
house 
120 X 1,100 X 2 = 264,000 
Financial aid for transitional 
settlement (one year) 
3 X 50 X 15 X 12 = 27,000 
Financial aid for home moving 
(three times) 
3 X 50 X 10 X 3 = 4,500 
Step 8: Total compensation 
received 
837,600 + 264,000 + 27,000 + 4,500 = 1,133,100 
Step 9: Optional offers  
Quota of 30m2 extra flats 3 X 30 X 5,000 = 450,000 
Quota of 10m2 shop 3 X 10 X 4,000 = 120,000 
Car park slot 1 X 40,000 = 40,000 
Total expense for the purchase 450,000 + 120,000 + 40,000 = 610,000 
Step 10: Summary  
Net compensation received 1,133,100 - 610,000 = 523,100 
Other properties received (50 + 30) X 3=240 m2 (resettling flat) 
10 X 3 = 30 m2 (shops) 
1 car park slot 
Equivalent value of the 
requisitioned house 
(523,100 + 240 X 12,000 + 30 X 6,000 + 1 X 
150,000)/100 = 37,331 Yuan/m2 
Example 2 Calculation Processes 
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Steps Calculation (Unit: Yuan) 
Step 1: Built site with title deeds 100 X 2,300 = 230,000 
Step 2: Compensation for the 
quota of 50m2 
0 
The following steps are the same as example 1  
Step 10: Summary  
Equivalent value of the 
requisitioned house 
37,631 Yuan/m2 
Table 3 Calculation processes of example 1 and 2 
 
Example 3 Processes 
Steps Calculation (Unit: Yuan) 
Step 1: Built site with title deeds 0 
Step 2: Compensation for the quota of 
50m2 
5 X 50 X 2000 = 500,000 
Step 3: Compensation for the quota of 
80m2 
5 X 80 X 2100 = 840,000 
Step 4: Compensation for the other 
house area 
(1000 – 5 X 50 – 5 X 80) X 1300 = 455,000 
Step 5: Rewards  
Rewards for sign in a group 200 X 1300 = 260,000 
Rewards for moving out before deadline 500,000 (because 1000 X 500 = 500,000 > 
400,000) 
Step 6: Compare the total amount with 
the amount in the 2,500-Scheme 
 
The total amount: 500,000 + 840,000 + 455,000 + 260,000 + 
500,000 = 2,555,000 
The 2,500-Scheme 1000 X 2500 = 2,500,000 < 2,555,000, so 
choose 2,555,000 
Step 7: Others  
Compensation for the top floor of the 
house and the house’s frames 
200 X 1100 X 2 = 440,000 
Financial aid for transitional settlement 
(one year) 
5 X 50 X 15 X 12 = 45,000 
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Financial aid for home moving (three 
times) 
5 X 50 X 10 X 3 = 7,500 
Step 8: Total compensation received 2,555,000 + 440,000 + 45,000 + 7,500 = 
3,047,500 
Step 9: Optional offers 750,000 + 200,000 + 40,000 = 990,000 
Quota of 30 m2 extra flat  
Quota of 10 m2 shop 5 X 10 X 4000 = 200,000 
Car park slot 1 X 40000 = 40,000 
Total expense for the purchase 5 X 30 X 5000 = 750,000 
Step 10: Summary  
Net compensation received 3,047,500 - 990,000 = 2,057,500 
Other properties received (50 + 30) X 5 = 400 m2 resettling flat 
10 X 5 = 50 m2 shops 
1 car park slot 
Equivalent value of the requisitioned 
house 
(2,057,500 + 400 X 12,000 + 50 X 6,000 + 1 
X 150,000)/1000 = 7,307.5 Yuan/m2 
Table 4 Calculation processes of example 3 
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Appendix 4: The City Contract 
Contract of Compensation and Resettlement for House Demolition and Relocation 
Implementer: XXXX Company                                                                             (Party A) 
House Owner:                                                                                                           (Party B) 
According to the policy of XMGOV [2005]L501, the policy of XMTFCT[2007]79 and 
the policy of XMTFCT[2008]80, party B’s house which is located at F village would 
be demolished for the F land redevelopment program. Party A and party B has 
negotiated based on the policy of ‘Regulation for the demolish of houses in urban 
area in Xiamen’, the policy of XMGOV[2005]176, the policy of XMGOV[2005]213, 
the policy of XMGOV[2006]147. Now they have reached an agreement upon the 
house demolish and relocation as the following contract:  
Item 1. The qualification of property ownership 
Party B’s affected house area is _____m2. According to the policy of 
XMGOV[2005]176, the area that is authorized as legal is _____m2, including:  
      1. The built-up area with legal documents is _____m2; 
      2. The number of residents whose Hukou are registered at party B’s house is 
_____. After the verification, the number of residents who are qualified to be 
resettled is _____. They are: ___________________________________(name/ID card number). 
So the built-up area that could be authorized as legal area for party B is _____m2.  
 
Item 2. The compensation and resettlement for the demolition and relocation 
      1. The area that is qualified for the ownership exchange between the house and 
the resettlement flat for party B is _____m2; the total area of the resettlement flat is 
_____m2; the total number of flats is _____, and the addresses is/are ____________. When 
apply the property ownership certificate, the tax for the part of the area that is 
qualified for the ownership exchange between the house and the resettlement flat 
should be paid by party A, and the remaining tax for the extra part of the 
resettlement flat should be paid by party B.  
      2. After the ownership exchange between the house and the resettlement flat, 
party B should pay _____YUAN for party A for the purchase of the extra part of the 
resettlement flat, including:  
        (1). Because of the structure of the resettlement flat, party B will purchase _____ 
extra area of the resettlement flat. According to the policy of XMGOV[2005]176, 
they are: the extra area purchased in F Resettlement Flat is _____m2, and its price is 
5705 YUAN/m2 according to the estimated market price of the resettlement flat; 
the extra area purchased in JGSJ Resettlement Flat is _____m2, and its price is 5620 
YUAN/m2 according to the estimated market price of the resettlement flat; the 
extra area purchased in YHHL Resettlement Flat is _____m2, and its price is 5523 
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YUAN/m2 according to the estimated market price of the resettlement flat; The 
sum of the money for the purchase of the extra area of the resettlement flat is _____ 
YUAN.  
        (2). Because the total built-up area of the house that will be demolished is less 
than 50m2 per head, after the ownership exchange (50 m2/head) between the 
house and the resettlement flat, the un-built-up area (the balance) is ____ m2, which 
should pay _____ YUAN, at the price of 600 YUAN/m2, the reset price of brick 
concrete structure house, according to relevant policies.  
      [Because the resettlement flat is forward delivery housing (future housing), the 
built-up area on the property ownership certificate applied after the flat is 
delivered shall be the standard. If it is different from the area in this contract, then 
the extra part should be paid and the less part should be return at the estimated 
market price of the resettlement flat.]  
      3. According to relevant policies, party B will get _____ YUAN for the 
compensation for the interior house upgrade and decoration, house adjunct 
constructions etc. including:  
        (1). The authorized legal area that is chosen to be compensated for money at 
the price of 5705 YUAN/m2, instead of resettlement flat, is ____m2;  
        (2). The compensation for the interior house upgrade and decoration for the 
authorized legal area of the house is _____YUAN, at the price of 280 YUAN/m2 (all in 
charges).  
        (3). Party A should compensate for party B’s house adjunct construction for 
_____ YUAN.  
        (4). In terms of the quota of the 130 m2/head deduct the authorized legal area, 
because party B agree to move out before the deadline, party B could get 
compensation for the built-up area ____m2 at the price of 560 YUAN/m2, and for 
the unfinished-built-up area _____m2 at the price of 340 YUAN/m2, and the total 
amount is _____ YUAN.  
        (5). Party A should pay party B moving fees _____YUAN at one time, at the price 
of 10 YUAN/m2 for the authorized legal area 100 m2 multiply three times’ moving; 
the compensation for the TV license is ____ YUAN, for the land line is ____ YUAN, for 
the moving of air-conditioners is ____YUAN, for water and electricity bills is 
____YUAN. The total amount is ____YUAN.  
 
Item 3. The deadline for moving out and the transition 
      1. Party B should move out before __/__/____(day, month, year), proceed 
relevant procedures and pay the water and electricity fees. If party B takes any 
unauthorized demolition upon the house or the house adjunct constructions 
during the moving or does not pay the water and electricity bills, then party A will 
deduct them from the compensation money or other funds. The amount of fees 
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appeared on the official invoice authorized by relevant departments shall be the 
standard.  
      2. Party A should pay party B transition fees for the transition from the day 
party B moves out the house to the date Party B gets the resettlement flat. Party A 
should pre-pay party B all-in-charges transition fees _____YUAN, including:  
        (1). Because F Resettlement Flat is forward delivery housing and party B 
chooses to transit in his/her own way, from the day party B finishes the moving 
out, party A should pre-pay 24 months’ transition fees at one time, at the price of 
10 YUAN/month for the _____m2 area of the resettlement flat, and the total amount 
is _____YUAN.;  
        (2). Because JGSJ and YHHL Resettlement Flat are completed flat, when party B 
finishes moving out and pass the qualification verification, party B can proceed the 
procedures of getting the flat. So, party A agrees to pay ___YUAN to party B at the 
price of 10 YUAN/month for the ____m2 area of the resettlement flat for three 
months, as the transition fees for the flat upgrade and decoration.  
 
Item 5. How to pay 
According the government’s relevant policies, when this contract passes the 
verification, the fund will be paid in seven days.  
 
Item 6. Bonus 
      1. If party B finishes moving out and give the house to party A for the 
demolition before __/__/____(day/month/year), then party A will give party B 
bonus ______YUAN at the price of 150 YUAN/m2 for the _____m2 authorized legal 
area of the resettlement flat.  
      2. The bonus will be paid in seven days when party B has moved out of the 
house. If party B does not move out before the deadline, party A has the right to 
cancel the bonus in item 6.  
 
Item 7. Supplementary items 
      1. Party B is responsible for the reality of the materials him/her provides. If any 
of the property ownership certificates or relevant documents prove to be fake, 
then party B should bear all the legal liability and should return all the illegal gains.  
      2. Party B and his/her relatives involved in this resettlement program as 
residents to be resettled will no longer enjoy the relevant 50m2/head, 80m2/head 
and 130m2/head bonus in any other demolition and relocation programs.  
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      3. If party B claims and applies to be the household without houses, then party 
B should be responsible for the reality him/her claims. Once it is proved to be fake 
and not qualified for it, party A reserves the rights to take the following actions:  
        (1). Claim party B’s illegal gains back and investigate party B’s legal 
responsibility.  
        (2). If the circumstance is serious and violate the criminal law, party B would 
be sent to judicial department and investigate the criminal responsibility.  
      4. Party B is responsible for that he/she has the right to sign this contract on the 
behalf of his/her family members. Party A does not have any legal responsibility 
for the division, heritage or dispute upon the house that is going to be demolished 
among family members.  
      5. Party B must clearly and completely provide all the relevant materials and 
information to party A, about the houses with legal documents owned by party B in 
or out of the area of the program, and houses without legal documents constructed 
before 1st December 2002 owned by party B.  
      6. The evidence of the cognizance of the house’s ownership is: based on the 
investigation.  
 
If any new bonus is added after this contract is signed, according to the second 
clause of the policy of FHeadquartersMinutes[2011]20, which is that if F village’s 
residential land was demolished more than 90% at the end of 2012, the ‘look back’ 
action will be taken, which is that if the compensation standard is better than this 
one, all the households who has already signed the contract can get the balance.  
      7. Relevant departments’ recognition upon party B’s house property ownership 
should be the standard.  
 
Item 8 This contract is valid when it is signed both by party A and party B and it 
passes the relevant verifications. If any arguments caused by this contract cannot 
be settled through the negotiation between party A and party B, party A and party 
B both can sue if to the People’s Court of Huli District.  
 
Item 9 This contract is centuplicate: party A keeps two copies, party B keeps one 
copy, the city’s relevant department in charge of the demolition and relocation 
issues keeps one copy, the demolition and relocation company keeps one copy.  
 
Party A: XXXX Company                                                       Party B:          
Representative (sign and seal):                              Representative (sign and seal):           
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The demolition and relocation company: YYYY Company 
Representative (sign and seal):  
                                                                                           __day/__month/20__year  
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Appendix 5: The District Contract 
Contract of Compensations for House Demolition and Relocation 
Implementer: XXXX Company                                                                             (Party A) 
House Owner:                                                                                                           (Party B) 
According to the policy of XMGOV [2005]L501, the policy of XMTFCT[2007]79 and 
the policy of XMTFCT[2008]80, party B’s house which is located at F village would 
be demolished for the F land redevelopment program. Party A and party B has 
negotiated based on the policy of ‘Regulation for the demolish of houses in urban 
area in Xiamen’, the policy of XMGOV[2005]176, the policy of XMGOV[2005]213, 
the policy of XMGOV[2006]147. Now they have reached an agreement upon the 
house demolish and relocation as the following contract:  
Item 1. The qualification of property ownership 
Party B’s affected house area is _____m2. According to the policy of 
XMGOV[2005]176, the area that is authorized as legal is _____m2, including:  
      1. The built-up area with legal documents is _____m2; 
      2. The number of residents whose Hukou are registered at party B’s house is 
_____. After the verification, the number of residents who are qualified to be 
resettled is _____. They are:  
Number Name Gender Relation with party B ID card number 
1     
2     
So the built-up area that could be authorized as legal area for party B is _____m2.  
 
Item 2. The compensation, subsidy and bonus for the demolition and relocation 
According to relevant policies, party B can get the following compensation, subsidy 
and bonus:  
      1. The built-up area with legal documents is ____m2, the compensation price is 
2300 YUAN/m2 and the total amount is ___YUAN.  
      2. The compensation price for the built-up area which is the authorized legal 
area deducting the area with legal documents is 2000 YUAN/m2, and the total 
amount is _____ YUAN.  
      3. The remaining 160m2 area which is the 130 m2/head built-up area deducting 
the authorized legal area, is compensated at the price of 2100 YUAN/m2(including 
the interior house upgrade and decoration); the part of unfinished-built-up area is 
____m2, is compensated at the price of 340 YUAN/m2, and the total amount of the 
above is ____YUAN.  
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      4. Party B has ___ m2 area not included in the 130 m2/head, and the compensate 
price for it is 1300 YUAN/m2, and the total amount is ____YUAN.  
      5. If party B participates in the program positively and actively, party A shall 
give party B bonus: the construction’s land area (brick and concrete structure 
house) ____m2 multiplies the price 1300 YUAN/m2, and the total amount is 
____YUAN.  
      6. If party has moved out the house and given it to demolish before the deadline 
set by the headquarters, party A shall give bonus at the price of 500 YUAN/m2 for 
the built-up area (is should be measured and not includes steal structure house 
and the land area). If the sum is less than 400 thousand YUAN, then 400 thousand 
YUAN would be given. The sum is _____YUAN.  
      7. The sum of the compensation, subsidy and bonus from item 1 to 6 is 
____YUAN. If the average price of the compensation, subsidy and bonus (calculated 
by the sum of the compensation, subsidy and bonus divided by the measured built-
up area) is less than 2500 YUAN/m2, then the price would be 2500 YUAN/m2. The 
total amount of the compensation, subsidy and bonus is _____YUAN.  
      8. Party A should give party B the other extra compensation, subsidy and bonus 
_____YUAN:  
        (1) Party A should pay party B moving fees _____YUAN at one time, at the price 
of 10 YUAN/m2 for the authorized legal area 100 m2 multiply three times’ moving; 
the compensation for the TV license is ____ YUAN, for the land line is ____ YUAN, for 
the moving of air-conditioners is ____YUAN, for water and electricity bills is 
____YUAN. The total amount is ____YUAN. 
        (2) Party A should pay party B transition fees for the transition from the day 
party B moves out the house to the date Party B gets the resettlement flat. The 
transition fees and bonus for the part of complete flat will be given for one year at 
one time and after that no further money would be given. Party A should give the 
transition fees ____YUAN for the part of complete flat at one time, and transition 
fees ____YUAN for the part of forward delivery housing, and the total amount is 
____YUAN.  
        (3) The compensation for legal shops is 20 thousand YUAN each one, and the 
total amount is _____YUAN.  
        (4) The compensation for the house adjunct constructions is ______YUAN.  
        (5) The area of steel structure houses is _____m2, and the total amount is 
______YUAN.  
        (6) Other bonus is ______YUAN.  
      9. The amount in the above clause 7 pluses that in clause 8 is the sum that party 
should pay to party B, and it is ______YUAN.  
Item 3. The above amount of compensation, subsidy and bonus includes all the 
compensation, subsidy and bonus dealt in Number __ Contract of Compensation 
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and Resettlement for House Demolition and Relocation. The amount in this 
contract’s Item 2 Clause 9 deducts the reduplicate amount of compensation, 
subsidy and bonus which is _____YUAN in the above Contract of Compensation and 
Resettlement for House Demolition and Relocation, and the difference _____ YUAN 
is the compensation, subsidy and bonus that party A should also pay to party B.  
 
Item 4. Deadline for moving out and the bonus 
If party B is able to sign the contract in the due time, move out and give the house 
to party A, party B could purchase the extra area (the real resettlement area 
deducts the authorized legal area) in all stocks of resettlement flats except the in-
situ F Resettlement Flat at the discount price of 4000 YUAN/m2. For the every one 
day party B delays in giving the house to party A, the price will increase 40 
YUAN/m2, but the top limit price should not exceed the estimated market price of 
the resettlement flat. Party B signs the contract and moves out the house in the due 
time, so he/she is able to have _____YUAN discount for the _____extra area of 
resettlement flat purchased, not including the in-situ F Resettlement Flat.  
 
Item 5. The total area of the resettlement flats that party B has chosen exceeds the 
limit set in relevant policies, and according to relevant policies, the exceeding part 
should be purchased at the price of up to 200% of the highest estimated market 
price of the resettlement flat. The exceeding area that party B purchased is _____m2, 
and party B should pay more _____YUAN for the purchase.  
 
Item 6. To conclude, the balance that the amount party B should get deducting the 
amount party B should pay is the money that party A should give to party B, and it 
is _____YUAN.  
 
Item 7. How to pay 
Party A should pay the fund to party B at one time in seven days once party B has 
moved out the house and finished the procedures before the deadline.   
 
Item 8. Party B is responsible for the leasehold relationship between he/she and 
his/her tenants or lessees, and is responsible for giving the house to party A in the 
due time. Party A does not have any legal responsibility for the argument between 
party B and his/her tenants or lessees.  
 
Item 9. If party B (including his/her tenants or lessees) does not move out in the 
due time, party A reserves the right to cancel the entire bonus in this contract.  
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Item 10. Supplementary Items 
      1. Party B is responsible for the reality of the materials him/her provides. If any 
of the property ownership certificates or relevant documents prove to be fake, 
then party B should bear all the legal liability and should return all the illegal gains.  
      2. Party B and his/her relatives involved in this resettlement program as 
residents to be resettled will no longer enjoy the relevant 50m2/head, 80m2/head 
and 130m2/head bonus in any other demolition and relocation programs.  
      3. Party B ensures that he/she has the right to sign this contract on the behalf of 
his/her family members.  
      4. Party A and the demolition and relocation company do not have any legal 
responsibility for the division, heritage or dispute upon the house that is going to 
be demolished among family members.  
      Party A and the demolition and relocation company do not have any legal 
responsibility for the arguments among party B’s family members caused by the 
distribution of the compensation, subsidy and bonus.  
      5. If any new bonus is added after this contract is signed, according to the 
second clause of the policy of FHeadquartersMinutes[2011]20, which is that if the 
F village’s residential land was demolished more than 90% at the end of 2012, the 
‘look back’ action will be taken, which is that if the compensation standard is better 
than this one, all the households who has already signed the contract can get the 
balance.  
 
Item 11. This contract is triplicate: party A keeps two copies, party B keeps one 
copy. The other issues that do not mention in this contract should be negotiated by 
party A and party B. If any arguments about the contract rise, they would be 
judged by the People’s Court of Huli District.  
 
Party A: XXXX Company                                                            Party B:          
Representative (sign and seal):                              Representative (sign and seal):           
 
The unit which takes the demolition actions: YYYY Company 
Representative (sign and seal):  
                                                                                              __day/__month/20__year  
 
